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Abstract 
Background  
The contours of today’s corporate landscape are strongly shaped by finance 
investors who own businesses, either in part or fully. This thesis analyses the 
processes of cooperation and interaction between businesses and finance 
investors regarding technology strategy. In addition to the question of the direct 
influence finance investors might have on technology strategy, indirect 
influences are also investigated. An evaluation of the finance investors’ 
capabilities and responsibilities is carried out in parallel to understand what “real 
potential” investors have to influence the technology strategy of companies in 
their portfolio. This work addresses a gap in current existing literature and 
research in this area as the elements of direct involvement of investors in 
technology strategy of firms they own are not yet studied in depth.  
 
Methodology  
A purely qualitative approach of case study research was chosen as the method 
most suitable for obtaining the desired insights. A pilot project involving two 
cases, confirmed the efficacy of the semi-structured questionnaire for 
conducting in-depth interviews. A further 12 case studies were carried out with 
companies that were selected following defined criteria to ensure the 
reproducibility of results. The final work has a fundament of 14 cases, consisting 
of 43 interviews with finance investors and portfolio company representatives. 
 
Conclusion  
Finance investors consider the technology strategy of their portfolio companies 
to be vital as it impacts the market value of the company and financial results. 
Besides the financial impact of technology strategy, finance investors show no 
specific interest in technology strategy nor are they likely to have major 
expertise in this area. Responsibility for driving technology strategy is clearly in 
the hands of the corporate managers. But finance investors do exert strong 
x 
indirect influence by controlling and steering budgets, investments, etc. and also 
through their consultancy role in the organisational development process.  
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the motivation in selecting this subject with its importance 
and implications for specific audiences. In addition, the context of the study in 
the business landscape and its specific focus are explained, familiarising the 
reader with the situation that is the groundwork for the study. The chapter 
closes with a roadmap of the work to guide the reader through the thesis up to 
the discussion of the results and the conclusions. 
 
1.1 Motivation and implications 
This study aims to add to the existing fundament of scientific analysis on the 
interaction of investment funds with the companies in their portfolio. The 
underlying motivation for the study is the lack of data and information on the 
extent to which finance investors influence the companies in their portfolios. 
This includes information about capabilities and expertise of investment funds 
including interaction channels and mechanisms. Shareholding and non-
shareholding stakeholders’ interaction with corporations is well-described today 
on the macro perspective through various scientific studies and analyses 
(Surroca et al., 2013). But still widely unknown are processes of interaction on 
the micro level and the real cause and effect flows, particularly for non-public 
exchanges between stakeholders and companies (David et al., 2009, Surroca 
and Tribò, 2008, Sarkar, 2008).  
 
This thesis shall close this gap at wide extend and stimulate further research in 
this area. The constellation with the least research in interaction processes and 
mechanisms, but one that plays an important role in the current corporate 
landscape (Greenwood and Schor, 2009), is the interaction of powerful finance 
investors with the corporations they own. There are articles available about 
investor-driven change and transformation in prominent individual companies, 
but none is written at a level of detail that describes the complete chain of 
stakeholder interaction (Burnett et al., 2012). So there are a lot of unknowns 
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requiring answers, answers which could then be used as a tool in overcoming 
the aforementioned issues and processes in corporations (Mishina et al., 2012).  
 
The ultimate question left unanswered by the existing literature is how do 
finance investors influence the technology strategy of the firms they own. While 
this area is of utmost importance for companies in the long-term and perceived 
as such by the company employees, it is seen as less important for the short-
term evolution and thus off the radar for institutional investors (David et al., 
2007). Investigating the role finance investors take in the technology strategy for 
the companies they own serves as the general starting point, but one that 
opens up a more specific analysis. A major component of academic work to be 
done is establishing what the channels of communication are between active 
stakeholders as well as the mechanisms and processes of interaction.  
 
Taking into consideration not only the investors but also all the stakeholders’ 
individual capabilities and interests is a fundamental milestone in understanding 
each individual’s potential and actual impact on corporate technology strategy 
(Hoskisson et al., 2004). The existing secondary literature can produce only a 
superficial view of what is actually going on in corporations in terms of investor 
involvement in this specific area. As a matter of fact, collecting new data is the 
most critical aspect to get the necessary insights into the stakeholder 
cooperation processes (Chari et al., 2008). Having defined the organisational 
framework, refining the research questions in an iterative process equals the 
identification of the missing piece in a puzzle but ensures that the focus is set 
correctly. 
 
1.2 Audience benefiting from new insights from this study 
The first paragraph has already established that this research is of interest for 
the academic audience, not only researchers dealing with technology but also 
for those specialising in shareholder activism, for instance, or stakeholder 
activism, organisational learning, innovation, etc. The processes of interaction 
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are very similar for a variety of issues (Klein and Zur, 2009a), thus establishing 
the process of defining technology strategy is a good starting point for launching 
in-depth research in other areas. In addition, the results of this work will help 
people working in organisations with finance investor involvement to better 
understand the mechanisms and processes of influence. It brings more 
transparency to the positive, but also the potentially negative points in the 
dynamic and replaces theory not based in fact, or guesswork and assumptions, 
with empirical data (Mishina et al., 2012).  
 
For investors it provides valuable insights, as well as an objective outsider’s 
view into their actions and involvement. Ultimately the research was aimed at 
giving the broad public insight into an area, which until now has been 
considered as a black box with very limited information on what is going on in 
inside. Clarification of the interdependencies would expose the happenings on 
the micro-level in organisations with strong stakeholder involvement. This in 
turn will create a better awareness for hidden agendas or cognitive dissonances 
and can be used to promote the buy-in of all relevant stakeholders in specific 
actions. If the complex structures and interactions are better understood by the 
key players, then each individual can act or react in a way that eliminates or at 
least reduces misunderstanding or frustration benefiting the overall target – that 
is – a functional and efficient corporation.  
 
Beyond the aforementioned contribution, the outcomes of the thesis will also 
deliver valuable new insights for regulatory and controlling institutions. 
Understanding what is going on in closed-door sessions is vital if rules and 
regulations are to be created which are then respected. If advantages for a 
small group of people result in disadvantages for other stakeholders then 
countermeasures are needed. However, the basis for this is a comprehensive 
understanding of the overall situation, the actors and the processes, which can 
as of today not be gained from existing data. In the following, the general 
background to the subject of this thesis and the significance of the investment 
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industry are briefly explained to provide a common starting point for the reader 
and writer.  
 
1.3 Context in the business landscape and focus of the study 
For many start-up businesses access to funding from external shareholders is 
today imperative to enable them to start walking on their own feet (Stroemsten 
and Waluszewski, 2012). Investment in state-of-the-art equipment and 
infrastructure quickly exceeds the available budget and requires financial 
support (Richtel, 1998). External funding can in the same way be important for 
mature businesses to pursue growth strategies, which are beyond their 
individual limits. Global expansion and product proliferation require intensive 
investment that is often difficult to acquire from banks due to insufficient 
physical assets and property. Many ideas and opportunities would have 
remained unrealised and unused without the involvement of external 
shareholders (Baum and Silverman, 2004).  
 
Adventurous and rational external shareholders are often willing to help out by 
filling the financing gaps in a wide range of regions, markets and business 
segments. As a consequence, the number of companies fully or partly owned 
by finance investors is steadily increasing (Davis and Thompson, 1994, Chou 
and Hardin Iii, 2012). In the second quarter of 2010, global ownership of 
investment funds in companies exceeded 17 trillion Euros (EFAMA, 2010). This 
figure confirms that the number of companies all over the world in the 
ownership of finance investors is highly significant (Useem, 1996, Davis and 
Thompson, 1994). Subsequently, the role that the finance investment industry 
plays in the global economy is increasingly important (Ferreira and Matos, 
2008, Tihanyi et al., 2003, Kochhar and David, 1996).  
 
In this sense current literature concludes that institutional shareholders actively 
influence the actions, decisions and processes in the businesses in which they 
invest their money (Nisar, 2005, David et al., 2001, Zahra et al., 1995, Wright et 
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al., 2002). It is surprising in consideration of these facts and figures, but detailed 
data about direct interaction between investors and corporate management 
teams is still very rare. One of the reasons is that historically, meetings between 
CEOs and asset managers took place behind closed doors. Any official 
announcement about the subject matter or outcome of such meetings has been 
the exception rather than the rule. The situation is gradually changing due to a 
variety of reasons.  
 
A major factor in the promotion of transparency is that investors today 
frequently use annual general meetings to pass on criticism to their portfolio 
company’s top management (Romano, 2000). The presence of the media and 
other shareholders at annual meetings then results in a leverage effect and 
subsequently to increased pressure on the managers (Karpoff, 2001). 
Nowadays, when a member of this formerly closed circle wants to express their 
subjective opinion to the broad public, they can easily find a channel to do so. 
This is because increasing investor activity and their influence on individual 
enterprises and the economy in general attracts a great deal of interest. In the 
German media, this became a hot topic around 2005, when politicians blamed 
finance investors for only being interested in maximising profit and that they 
were not considering the negative effects on companies in the long term (VDI-
Nachrichten/JWC, 2007).  
 
Around the same time, print and online medias were quick to pick up on the 
story of finance investors attempting to buy shares in a certain German 
company. In such cases, the investors were often labelled “Heuschrecken” (= 
German for locusts, a metaphor inspired by a swarm of locusts used by the 
German politician Franz Müntefering during a speech on November 22nd, 
2004) (VDI-Nachrichten/ps, 2006). The press picked up cuts in jobs or closure 
of factories without much footage being given to the details or consideration 
given to the underlying reasons. Most articles on this subject were published by 
the yellow press and were negative. It was and still is often forgotten or ignored 
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that the root cause for such cuts often was that the former management had not 
been fast enough in reacting to a changing environment.  
 
The reality is that no stakeholder acts purely negatively per se, but the reasons 
for particular courses of action are complex and the outcome often difficult to 
predict. One of the founders of the US-Investment Company KKR (Kohlberg, 
Kravis, Roberts & Co), Mr. Henry Kravis, said at the 2006 Super Return 
congress in Frankfurt that significant and painful restructuring is sometimes 
inevitable for firms to keep them fit for long-term survival in the market or to 
bring them back on track. Many finance investors have extensive expertise and 
experience in analysing business situations and defining suitable action. When 
severe action is taken after they get on board a firm, they are often perceived as 
merely being interested in firing people, while in fact stagnation would have led 
to the collapse of the firm.  
 
What also needs to be considered is that organisational changes also generate 
workplaces. Contrary to anecdotal evidence it has been found that the overall 
number of newly created jobs in companies with finance investor involvement is 
higher than the number of job cuts (Brien, 2005). The study “Employment 
Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe” confirms that 
finance investors created one million new workplaces in the years 2000 to 2004, 
which is eight times the average growth rate of the 25 EU states in the same 
time period (Brien, 2006). This fact indicates that investment companies do not 
have a purely negative impact on the economy but that they do not adequately 
communicate the positive effects of their activities, otherwise the image of 
finance investors would be much more diversified (Clark et al., 2004).  
 
When companies are not willing or incapable of kicking-off necessary 
organisational and technological changes, they lose ground to the benefit of 
their competitors. The gut feeling and instinct of seasoned senior managers are 
excellent when complementary to rational comparative future oriented objective 
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analysis, but standalone they are mostly insufficient and can bring businesses 
to the edge of a precipice. Investors see and use such stagnant tendencies as 
an opportunity to re-adjust company performance and value. The following 
example shows, in contrast, that the involvement of finance investors in the 
definition of a future technology strategy for a business is often but not always 
positive.  
 
In this case, technological change and subsequent focus on one area ultimately 
led to the fall of GEC (General Electric Company). For a long time GEC was 
one of Britain’s biggest and best known manufacturing companies. In 1999 
GEC sold its defence business to BAe (British Aerospace) and instigated a 
major reorganisation involving finance investors in order to concentrate fully on 
telecommunication technology. The “new” business was named Marconi plc. to 
reflect their new strategic direction, which focused on communication 
technology. During and after the reorganisation Marconi acquired several 
companies in the telecommunications sector. It was the peak of the “dot com 
boom” and Marconi paid a high price for most of its acquisitions.  
 
The finance investors supported and pushed the acquisition and 
telecommunication-focused approach, as at that time telecommunication was 
comparable with the gold rush decades before (Leach, 2004). In 2001, the burst 
of the “dot com bubble” brought Marconi to its knees. The shares lost more than 
90% of their value. At the time it was clear that the technology and market 
strategy decision made in 1999 had had disastrous consequences for the 
company and the shareholders. On January 24, 2006 the takeover of Marconi´s 
telecommunications business by the competitor Ericsson was officially 
announced.  
 
“All conditions for Ericsson (NASDAQ: ERICY) to acquire key assets of 
Marconi Corporation plc's telecommunications business have been 
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fulfilled and the transaction was completed on January 23, 2006.” 
(Ericcson-Media-Relations, 2006) 
 
This is an extreme, but excellent example illustrating how dramatic and severe 
change and uncertainty can negatively impact enterprises within a short period 
of time. The decisive factor in the Marconi case was the downturn of the 
telecommunications sector and the decision to streamline and readjust market 
focus and strategy. Of relevance for this thesis is the involvement of active 
shareholders in the business planning and strategy definition process. It is 
important to keep in mind that for shareholders with a diversified portfolio the 
consequences of a failed strategy are without doubt painful, but not to the same 
degree as for the business and its employees. The involvement of active 
shareholders can be the lever needed to reconstruct a company and prepare it 
for the next decades.  
 
The inherent risk however can also mean the collapse of a firm. The case 
proves that being adaptive is key to survival in the market or in being able to 
take advantage of new conditions. The ideal world, in which the survival and 
success of a firm is the result of an isolated strategy and roadmap defined by 
the management, does not exist. In the real world the situation is much more 
complex and a wrong or non-existent strategy or plan can be overcompensated 
by other effects (Kay, 2010). Clarifying the role that institutional investors play in 
the area of learning and adaptation in the firms they own is the overall goal of 
this work. Focus is directed to their influence and involvement in corporate 
technology and R&D as one of the crucial elements for the long-term survival 
and performance of a company (Cefis and Marsili, 2006).  
 
A basic thing is to understand through which channels and with which frequency 
information is shared between investor and investee. A key question to be 
answered is, if and how much finance investors are interested in the 
technologies used by companies in their portfolio. Whether there is shareholder 
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involvement in the decision-making processes, the clarification of investors’ 
capabilities and the justification for their involvement is another point requiring 
investigation in understanding the overall picture. It seems difficult, if not 
impossible, to steer a company in the right direction without access to 
comprehensive knowledge about markets, products, processes and other 
constraints.  
 
Thus a clear understanding of the experience institutional shareholders have 
had and share openly is of utmost importance. The issues seem very basic. But 
due to the complexity of the investor / manager relationship and the meagre 
insider information available, they cannot be answered through pure figure 
analysis or by the existing literature. The fact that most of the currently available 
research about institutional shareholder activism with regards to technology is 
limited to quantitative analysis of annual reports or databases (Karpoff, 2001, 
Bhagal et al., 2008) was a major challenge for this work. The point is that public 
domain descriptive data is not always suitable for the analysis of whether 
investor influence triggers action, because it is potentially biased.  
 
To avoid misinterpretation, each evaluation or measurement of influence must 
be comprehensively screened and all contributing factors analysed. What is 
going at the micro level between institutional shareholders and the corporate 
management is as yet widely unknown (Rehbein et al., 2004, Le et al., 2006). 
As such a key challenge is how to give adequate consideration to the 
complexity of the processes, including all parameters, stakeholders and areas 
of interaction. Only when this is done carefully can the outcome be reliable and 
scientifically valid. Detailed insight into how investors become involved after the 
shares of a firm have been bought requires in-depth analysis of the interaction 
process between the parties with direct input from both shareholder and 
corporation representatives.  
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Other researchers who have undertaken statistical analysis of the existing and 
publicly available data have also highlighted the necessity for further analysis in 
this area. This is the only way to understand if and how investor involvement 
directly affects evolutionary and organisational learning processes in 
corporations. Otherwise the processes and activities that led to the correlations 
found remain unknown (David et al., 2001, Shahzad and David, 2010). Analysis 
of the interaction between institutional investors and the corporations in which 
they have shares should close a gap in the current literature and knowledge 
base and focus on technology strategy. From a scientific perspective, if 
evaluation of cooperation is to be objective, it is vital to gain information from 
and about the direct interaction between the concerned parties. A detailed 
discussion and analysis follows in the next chapters.  
 
1.4 Roadmap of the work 
Chapter 1 begins with a concise discussion of the motivation for and the 
implications of the thesis, as well as the audience likely to benefit from the study 
results. It continues with an exploration of the cooperation between institutional 
investors and the companies in their portfolios. An example is given of the 
challenges of change and uncertainty and the need for evolutionary adaptation 
and learning. Understanding whether finance investors do play a role in those 
processes, especially in technology strategy and R&D, is the core focus of this 
work. In chapter 2 some relevant basic notions are defined. This is followed by 
a paragraph about the cooperation and interaction between investment funds 
and the companies in their portfolios.  
 
The definition of evolutionary theory for this work and its relation to the research 
topic is elaborated in the first part of chapter 3. The existing literature about 
general or specific shareholder activism and corporate governance including the 
related theories is reviewed and discussed in the second part of chapter 3. 
Later in chapter 3, gaps in the scientific body of knowledge are identified and 
confirmed through discussion of the existing literature. The discussion 
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precipitates the research questions which are listed at the end of the chapter as 
part of the literature review conclusions. The most suitable research 
methodology, including a discussion of pros and cons, is defined and outlined in 
chapter 4.  
 
In the same part of the thesis, the pilot project performed to test the 
methodology is described and the results and implications discussed. The 
outcome of the pilot study forms the basis for definition of the final project, 
which includes the derived improvements. In chapter 5, the results of the case 
studies are outlined following the flow of the semi-structured questionnaire and 
are displayed using one table for each analysis. Additional evidence collated 
during the interviews is described at the end of chapter 5. Critical discussion of 
the results, also in relation to the literature analysed during chapter 3, is dealt 
with in chapter 6. In this chapter the approach to attempt to close the scientific 
gap identified in chapter 3 is defined. The work closes with the conclusion and 
suggestions for further research in chapter 7.  
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Chapter 2 Definition of basic notions and information on the 
interaction between the main actors 
This chapter starts with a paragraph defining some basic terms and notions 
used throughout the thesis. It is important that the reader and writer have the 
same understanding and interpretation of the terms used. It continues with a 
quick introduction to the dynamics of interaction between investment funds and 
the companies in their portfolios - for the reader who might not have extensive 
knowledge of this subject.  
 
2.1 Definition of some relevant basic notions 
Some basic terms and roles that are fundamental to the research topic require 
explicit specification, as some of them have been defined and interpreted in 
different ways in the existing literature (Albers and Gassmann, 2005). The 
definitions begin with technology strategy as the focus of the analysis, continue 
with the parties involved who are the institutional investors, their employees or 
partners, the fund managers, and the companies they own in part or full, the 
investees.  
 
2.1.1 Technology strategy 
A strategy is an action plan that is formed to achieve a specific target by utilising 
and controlling the available financial, physical and human resources (Harvard-
Business-School, 2005). The internal initiatives of each individual company 
towards the generation of new or improved technologies are a key area 
(Metcalfe, 2005, Burgelman et al., 2008, Le et al., 2006). Monitoring and 
evaluating the technologies developed and used by other companies and 
industries is vital in supporting internal decision-making processes. In most 
cases the driving factors are the personal experience of decision-makers and 
people involved (Hill and Westbrook, 1997). One of the most critical aspects of 
strategic planning is technology.  
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Technology describes the knowledge about and the application of crafts, 
methods, tools, techniques, systems and products of these things (Hanks, 
2010). For this work, the focus is on the application and influence of technology 
in the areas of IT, processes and methods in production, products and 
materials. Technology is not a matter exclusively for high tech firms. It is 
relevant for most businesses in certain areas such as IT or production, 
(Reichert, 1994). To keep a certain market position the use of state-of-the-art 
technology is mandatory. Thus advances in technology have to be monitored 
closely to avoid losing ground to competitors. Technological change is typically 
the result of inventions and innovations that derive from continuous and 
incremental learning processes within each individual company and from 
outside (Pavitt, 2003).  
 
Such changes can be very specific ones, e.g. a breakthrough in nano-
technology that directly affects companies working in that sector. In the 
business environment, technological innovations play a major role in achieving 
or maintaining competitive advantage against other companies in the same 
area (Pegels and Thirumurthy, 1996). Surely, for businesses in different areas 
the significance of specific technological innovations is not equal but dependent 
on the area of activity and the product (Tell, 2000). To survive over time in a 
market, each company and the technology it uses and applies has to be 
competitive with other companies. The only other but even better option for 
long-term survival and growth is to have a competitive advantage, typically 
gained through taking a leading role in innovations.  
 
As a pre-condition for taking a leading role, the decision makers in a company 
have to have access to product and process innovation. Secondly, they have to 
have an innovator’s mindset (Rogers, 2003). People and companies with a so-
called innovator’s mindset are willing to take the risk of implementing or 
launching a new product, process or service before the majority of other people 
or companies would do it (Thomas, 1996). Knowing that the significant 
investment, which in most cases is required to push innovation forward, often 
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brings only a minimum of return due to the high risk and uncertainty involved 
(Coad and Rao, 2008). Uncertainty and unquantifiable risks are the biggest 
hurdles that people and organisations have to overcome when they are aiming 
for technological leadership.  
 
When these conditions and mindset are not fulfilled, a company will never 
become a technology leader (Cohan and Unger, 2006). Clearly, technological 
leadership cannot be the target for each and every company. The key is to 
survive in the market and remain competitive. When the decision-makers want 
to minimise risk, uncertainty or investment, the optimal technology strategy can 
be i) to run everything as it is for a longer time or ii) to follow some innovators 
who have already tested the water successfully. A differentiation has to be 
made with respect to the market strategy, as for some markets like 
telecommunications leading-edge technology is key to playing a major role. For 
less technology affine markets it can be more effective to give minor priority to 
new technology. Clearly, market strategy correlates closely with technology 
strategy and predefines the requirement for certain skills, standards and 
equipment.  
 
2.1.2 Institutional investors 
In 1774, the Dutch merchant Adriaan van Ketwich formed the investment trust 
Eendragt Maakt Magt (transl. Unity Creates Strength) with the target of offering 
private investors diversification at reasonable cost. In the late 19th and the 
following 20th century, several investment funds were founded in the British 
Isles and in the USA due to the strong demand for such products in the 
investment market.1 The market demand for investment funds in Germany, in 
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon region, was not significant until the mid 1990s.2 
                                            
1 The fact that the roots of funds are in Holland is often disregarded in the 
literature. The Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, which was founded in 
Scotlandin 1868, is often falsely identified as the first mutual fund 
ROUWENHORST, K. G. (2004) The Origins of Mutual Funds. Yale ICF..  
2 In Germany the first fund product was created in 1950 by the investment 
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Even today, the basic principle of all funds is to pool money from a number of 
investors to buy any kind of securities (Teacher Reference Center, 2005). While 
securities can be in the form of a variety of assets (real estates, ships, 
companies), only those investments in corporations are of relevance to this 
thesis.  
 
According to the 2009 3rd quarter report of the European Fund and Asset 
Management Association (EFAMA) about 10% of European funds are managed 
in Germany. That means, in numbers, 6,081 funds – of a total of 52,715 funds 
with an overall value of about 6.8 trillion Euro at the end of the 3rd quarter of 
2009 (EFAMA, 2009). The enormous amount of money involved means the 
investment companies have to have excellent and professional employees on 
board to handle and manage the portfolios in a profitable and stable manner. 
There are large teams of analysts and assistants in the background, but actually 
the most important people are the ones who are in direct contact and who 
interact with the firms in which they have shares. They are the fund managers 
and in some cases specific members of the portfolio teams. 
 
2.1.3 Fund managers 
With the foundation of the mutual funds, a new kind of job was created, the fund 
manager. Besides the founders and/or owners of investment companies, these 
are the key people in the fund industry. They monitor and control on a day-to-
day basis the performance of the companies in their portfolio, the market 
                                                                                                                                
company ADIG that had been founded one year earlier in 1949 DEMBOWSKI, 
A. (1999) Profi-Handbuch Investmendfonds, Bonn, Walhalla Verlag. From then 
on demand was stimulated by initial public offerings of companies like Deutsche 
Telekom AG or EM-TV, as well as by intensive advertising for newly founded 
discount brokers like Direktanlagebank and Consors VON ROSEN, R. (2001) 
Aktienmärkte und Aktienkultur in Europa. Handbuch Europäischer Kapitalmarkt 
2001. Wiesbaden, Detlev Hummel/Rolf-E. Breuer. Nowadays it is no longer 
unusual for the general public to have shares in public companies or investment 
funds in their portfolio. Statistics prove that investment funds are well accepted 
these days.  
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situation as well as economic changes and trends (Bainbridge, 1995). Insights 
from these people are extremely rare and their time is highly valuable. Their 
income is strongly linked with their success. The algorithms according to which 
their financial compensation is defined are often complex and dependent on a 
large set of parameters (William N. Goetzmann, 2003). Despite their powerful 
position in the economy, the names of the individual managers used to be 
unknown. Recently, newspapers and magazines have been publishing reports 
and interviews with them (Freitag, 2006). Public interest in the people is the 
result of reports about the big deals that are planned and made by investors 
(Missal, 2006). The investing institution is often a company of significant size 
itself, depending on the number of investments and consolidated capital, but the 
people in the back office are unknown. The public faces, if any, are those of the 
fund managers or owners of investment companies. 
 
2.1.4 Companies in full or part ownership of institutional investors 
(= investees) 
Companies in the portfolios of investment funds are mainly stock corporations 
and private limited companies, but companies with other legal forms can also 
be found. In comparison to the shares of stock corporations that are traded on 
the stock exchange and thus accessible to everyone, an investment in mutual 
funds gives access to investment in private equity such as private limited 
companies and other non-public companies. Diversification of risk is one of the 
advantages compared to publicly traded stocks. Historically, the typical targets 
for finance investors were businesses which had been valued below the overall 
value of their tangible assets at the time of takeover, while nowadays the focus 
includes the capabilities and potential of each individual investment (Kay, 2009).  
 
There are also cases where investors bundle different businesses under one 
roof to benefit from synergies. Examples for such a build strategy are cases M3 
                                            
3 Further information about the case studies of this thesis follows in chapter 3 
and the appendix.  
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and N. At the same time, it sometimes works the other way around, i.e. a large 
group company may be broken up to generate a higher overall return compared 
to the maximum achievable price for the company as a whole. Evidence for 
such an investor choice is shown in case E. Entrepreneurial investor behaviour 
can be found for mature businesses, which is the business type under 
investigation in this study, but it is much more common for start up companies, 
not only, but mainly, because the company value is typically much lower.  
 
2.2 Cooperation and interaction between investment funds and firms 
One of the wider aims of this thesis is to clarify the role that investment funds 
play in the firms they own, when the focus is on technology strategy. As not all 
readers will have knowledge about the interaction between finance investors 
and the companies they own, this paragraph is intended to provide a short 
overview. Legal regulations ensure that funds with minor share packages have 
only very limited options to exert standalone direct influence (Hoskisson et al., 
2002). Thus if a minority shareholder wants to get their voice heard, an 
appropriate strategy needs to be defined within the framework of shareholder 
rights. One option is to join or invite other shareholders to speak at annual 
general meetings (Burnett et al., 2012).  
 
Just like all stakeholders, shareholders can also join or support organisations 
that run environmental or social issue campaigns, for instance, targeting not 
only industries, but also specific companies (Bomberg, 2012). The situation is 
the opposite when an investment fund has the dominant share package, 
because this may mean they have full decision making authority (Campbell et 
al., 2012, Klein and Zur, 2009a). The management board of the company is 
then fully dependent on the fund management for authorisation or approval on 
actions. A clear and good understanding of the options available to companies 
for interaction with minority and majority shareholders is fundamental to 
understand the different dynamics, and to draw the right conclusions when 
analysing the findings at the final stage of the research project.  
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Because of the significant difference between minority and majority shareholder 
rights (Hall et al., 2014), the case study sample for this thesis was chosen to 
consist mainly of cases with dominant investor involvement as this would give 
more transparency about the role investors play in the area of technology 
strategy of firms with regards to capability, experience and expertise. Defining 
the sample that way diminishes the potential effect of lack of involvement due to 
a lack of authority, which might not be obvious from the point of view of an 
outsider who is not permanently involved in the interaction process. Reaching 
an understanding about the basic channels of interaction and the methods of 
influence is first base before going on to the next layer of investigation 
concerning the effect of influence on corporate technology strategy (Shahzad 
and David, 2010).  
 
People may have hidden agendas, individual targets or conflicting interests for a 
variety of reasons, e.g. the importance of spare time with the family or 
incentives that are linked with defined KPIs (Burnett et al., 2012). Besides the 
CEO of a company, the board of management and the executives from all 
disciplines are the key people involved in the exchange with investors (Burnett 
et al., 2012). They may be directly involved and interact with investor 
representatives or only contribute to the preparation of meetings and reports. 
The controllers play a key role as they consolidate and align the raw data used 
to prepare a data pack for the investors. Each division and department will want 
to show a good performance and, if possible, no weak points that would draw 
unwanted attention, while still respecting the need for transparency.  
 
As in all organisations or relationships, hiding or trying to whitewash issues 
beyond a defensible level causes mistrust (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Investor teams 
have an explicit mission to make the best of any investment and clearly this is 
often not negative, but positive for the businesses concerned. However, they 
can only accomplish their mission when the corporate management is fully open 
and transparent in their communication about both the good and the bad. 
Attempts by the corporate management to “protect” employees, processes or 
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products by adapting information for the investors is likely to create a negative 
backlash. Permanent alertness to such hidden agendas and potential 
distractions is vital in the phases of data collection and data analysis. It is 
difficult to uncover such phenomena when analysing secondary data.  
 
In face-to-face meetings, however, it is a key task of the researcher to ask 
questions eliciting information which is not distorted or embellished. This would 
conflict with natural investor expectation (Hall et al., 2014), no matter what the 
driving factors are (financial, such as patent royalties, fulfilment of personal 
KPIs or emotional, such as personal involvement in the development, 
implementation of products and processes). At the end of the day, a 
constructive and productive collaboration of both the investor and investee 
management team is the best that can happen for both parties, as this brings 
the highest probability of good corporate performance, success and value 
improvement.  
 
Major disturbances trigger immediate change in an organisation (Klein and Zur, 
2009a), as time for incremental improvement and optimisation is limited. In such 
cases, finance investors often prefer to place third-party consultants with the 
necessary expertise in senior management positions instead of pursuing the 
traditional hiring process, which again is linked to their limited time horizon. 
After defining the basic terms used in this thesis and getting readers that are not 
familiar with the topic up to speed, the following chapter deals with the current 
literature considered relevant to the study. That is, the challenges of change 
and uncertainty for corporations as they cope with a continuous evolutionary 
process that affects the corporate organisation as a whole.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical framework, literature, and research 
questions 
This chapter starts with a paragraph that discusses the timeline and the sources 
used for the literature review. Thereafter, the theoretical framework, current 
literature on the subject and the implications of this study are discussed. The 
intention is to uncover areas where active shareholders could influence the 
learning processes within companies. Evidence about corporate governance 
and shareholder activism, gained by other researchers, is reviewed and 
discussed with a focus on the potential influence of active institutional investors 
on corporate technology strategy and R&D. The foundation for the literature 
review and subsequent discussion is the evolutionary theory. Technological 
change, which is the phenomenon under analysis in this work, can be explained 
by the principles of the evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 
Discussion with other researchers and study of the existing literature confirmed 
that an approach based on evolutionary theory would be the most appropriate 
for this research. In the following, the processes of corporate learning and the 
potential involvement of shareholders are discussed based on the latest 
available evidence. Towards the end of this chapter, specific literature about 
corporate governance, stakeholder and shareholder activism is analysed, 
including current evidence in the area of technology strategy. The chapter 
closes with the identification of the gaps in the current literature and the 
definition of the research questions.  
 
3.1 Sources of secondary data used in the literature review and timeline 
of the review process 
The groundwork for the literature review covered the standard literature on 
epistemology, economic theory, technology, shareholder activism and corporate 
governance, which is available in the university libraries of France, Germany 
and the UK. The review of literature was limited to the English and German 
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languages, with no restrictions or limitations on the date of publication or 
geographical origin. This course of action produced a substantial base of 
existing knowledge, but nothing on the latest trends or scientific research. More 
up-to-date knowledge was accessed through different online databases, such 
as Web of Knowledge/Thomson Reuters, EBSCOhost or ProQuest, which 
include journals that are published on a regular basis and that contain research 
which has already been reviewed by an expert panel.  
 
Most of the data was extracted from academic journals. But, e-books and other 
material published online, such as conference reports, etc. also proved to be 
fruitful sources for relevant information. Interesting articles or books broadened 
the perspective through their citation section, which in turn showed the way to 
other published material, people or institutions. Eminent research institutes 
provided the most recent and up-to-date insights and thoughts, as the material 
published in their online resources had not yet undergone third-party review 
(which often takes more than one year). The websites of the following institutes 
were also reviewed during the study: ECGI (European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Brussels/BE), ICGN (International Corporate Governance Network, 
London/UK), GCGF (Global Corporate Governance Forum, Washington/US), 
BETA (Bureau d’Économie Théorique et Appliquée, Strasbourg/France), SPRU 
(Science and Technology Policy Research, Sussex/UK), MIoIR (Manchester 
Institut of Innovation research – former CRIC and PREST –, Manchester/UK), 
SIEPR (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford/US), CGRP 
(Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford/US), SIPA (School of 
International and Public Affairs, New York/US), DRUID (Danish Research Unit 
for Industrial Dynamics, Aalborg/DK).  
 
Last, but not least, articles and interviews relating to the research topic were 
found in magazines and newspapers such as Manager Magazine, VDI-
Nachrichten, FTD, Capital, WELT, FAZ and Handelsblatt. With today’s 
possibilities, finding sufficient data is not difficult, and the focus shifts to deciding 
which data and information is relevant and can contribute to the study. In total, 
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163 books (both hardcopy and e-books), 674 articles in journals (only e-
Journals), 269 articles in newspapers, magazines (hardcopy) and other online 
sources (electronic format) as well as 137 working and discussion papers from 
research institutes (electronic format) were reviewed and used for the literature 
review and discussion in this chapter.  
 
In the following paragraphs, data from all the areas that were considered 
relevant, either as a base for the research project or in close-relation to the 
research questions, was reviewed, analysed and discussed. Journals targeting 
corporate governance, shareholder activism, economics, strategic management 
and finance were identified as being most relevant for the study. After a solid 
fundament had been created from basic literature, the online search was 
continued following a structured process involving keywords, both standalone 
and in combination. The literature review was conducted in several different 
waves. The first wave being a review of all the data that had been published to 
date, without any limit on the publication date.  
 
This first and largest wave was conducted in 2006 and 2007 as part of phase 1 
of the DBA project. The second wave was conducted at the beginning of phase 
2 of the DBA project, in 2008 and 2009. In the following years leading up to 
2014, an annual review was conducted to update the relevant literature, 
searching only for literature published after the last review date. By following 
this method, this study has been able to integrate all relevant literature and data 
published up to mid 2014. Additional, company-specific, data was collected and 
reviewed as part of the case study research, which started in 2007 and 
continued until 2011. During this time span, historical and current data and 
information were collected and analysed in preparation for the interviews, and 
also in order to have the necessary background to draw the right conclusions.  
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3.2 The role and influence of finance investors in organisational learning 
and adaptation processes 
To understand how organisations can be influenced by finance investors it is 
vital first to understand how organisations are structured, how they work and 
how businesses are permanently influenced by the natural processes of 
learning and adaptation. Having a good knowledge and understanding of the 
latest research in this area is crucial to be prepared for interviews that deal with 
this topic to analyse the impact of investment fund involvement. This ensures 
that the right questions are asked and that the answers can be interpreted 
correctly. Organisations vary significantly in activity and size and as such each 
one is individual and different. Some characteristics are shared between all of 
them, allowing classification into different categories.  
 
A very basic description covers just three aspects – human activity in a socially 
designed system, goal orientation and respect of defined boundaries (Aldrich, 
2007). Any influence in these three areas is equivalent to triggering people and 
impacting the organisation as a whole with the consequence that the system will 
come to a new equilibrium. At the end of the day, performance always comes 
down to the individual people who form the organisation, which in effect means 
any kind of involvement results in an influence on people, and investment funds 
are no exception to this rule. Generally, the long-term survival and 
competitiveness of a company is dependent on a variety of constraints, 
conditions and circumstances, which differ from one company to the next 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 
All these influencing parameters are permanent and sometimes rapidly 
changing (Durmusoglu et al., 2008) so that experience and expertise of decision 
makers is of high value in each company. It is a fact that, “Companies are not 
isolated institutions; they constantly interact with their environment. This 
includes markets, customers, suppliers, competitors, regulatory institutions, 
staff, economy, ecology, science and technology, etc.” (Augsdoerfer, 1996). In 
conclusion, it is clear that markets, competitors and products change so quickly 
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that permanent monitoring coupled with acting and reacting is key to keeping 
pace with evolutionary processes and to ensuring the business remains in the 
club of fit companies with long-term survival perspectives.  
 
Anyone who is part of the organisation or a stakeholder with rights to take 
influence can impact the organisation. Although influence is also correlated to 
hierarchy and the will to change things. Re-setting the goals or boundaries in an 
organisation through leaders or external influencers such as finance investors – 
the influencers at the focus of this work, can cause friction and frustration when 
the necessity for these new conditions is not explained to or supported by the 
employees who are part of the organisation (Aldrich, 1999). When a new 
management or outsiders, such as consultants or finance investors, drive 
initiatives, the workforce can switch into alarm mode and fear a negative impact, 
which in turn is not beneficial for the shareholders and/or the top management.  
 
But it is possible to get the workforce on board. It is possible to inspire their 
motivation, however this requires open communication and explanation of the 
reasons for change and adaptation. Making sure all the stakeholders 
understand the underlying motivation for a take-over by a finance investor is key 
to getting their buy in and ensuring there is support and identification with the 
goals and boundaries. This is important for all businesses and all change. It is 
assumed that interactive processes are prevalent, because the classical theory 
of decision under certainty, assumes that economists are rational, infinitely 
sensitive and well-informed, with the result that all possible actions are known 
and the outcomes are foreseeable (Simon, 1959).  
 
But this does not reflect reality. In the classical understanding, all the relevant 
and influencing factors would have to remain static, which is evidently not the 
case in an economic environment (Schumpeter, 1911, Schumpeter, 1908). If 
the fundamental and comprehensive prediction of complex systems like the 
economy were possible, everybody would be immensely rich. A lottery would 
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not work in the way it does today, where prediction of the winning numbers is 
impossible and the only party winning each time is the lottery institution. Applied 
to individual businesses, prediction of influencing parameters and subsequent 
decision-making might seem less complex, but in fact it is not (Lazonick, 2007). 
All the stakeholders of firms including the workforce are aware of this, which 
leads to the consequence that the confidence for directional changes initiated 
by the business leaders is not a given, but has to be “acquired”.  
 
The fact that the people who are part of an organisation can never think or act 
independently from memberships in or relation to other groups or organisations 
(Weick and Quinn, 1999) is a key point to be considered when decisions within 
an organisation are made. Conflict of interests may not be possible to avoid and 
therefore, decision-making processes can never be fully rational (March, 1965). 
With regards to corporations, the interests of a finance investor, a private 
company owner and a CEO of a public company are overlapping at wide extend 
but are different in the detail. In addition to the problems that arise from 
relationships and conflicting interests, the complexity of the environment 
multiplies the uncertainties (Mohrman and Lawler, 2012).  
 
Any party trying or wanting to exert influence needs to understand this 
correlation and structure conditions for the specific organisation. Otherwise it is 
pretty much trial, error and learning from failure, which for public companies 
especially is not an option due to the simultaneous reaction of the stock market. 
While planning based on accurate analysis and mathematically calculated 
assumptions is standard for most firms, the latest studies also produce 
evidence that a pragmatic and flexible path is often the better way to reach a 
given target (Kay, 2010). This in turn is evidence supporting the assumption that 
evolutionary processes influencing the economy and the interacting 
corporations are not foreseeable and that long-term planning is difficult.  
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The involvement of a finance investor with large previous experience can be 
highly valuable and positively impacting the speed and grade of adaptation of a 
business to changing conditions. No matter for what reasons changes are made 
or initiated within an organisation - it is crucial to be transparent on all levels of 
the organisation. Transparent not only in the reasons for doing something, but 
also regarding the expected outcome and consequences of not doing it or doing 
it differently can help a lot to make people in organisations understand and 
support specific actions, especially when finance investors are involved. What is 
important for everybody to understand is that there is no 100% guarantee for 
the success of a certain strategic directional change.  
 
The reality is that each enterprise has to find its own way of remaining alive, as 
making decisions under full certainty is in most cases impossible (Langlois, 
2007). Darwin’s finding that only the strong species that can best adapt to a 
changing environment will survive (Darwin, 1859) is today more than ever 
applicable to the economy and individual enterprises (Frank, 2011), while 
differences in both spheres are still the subject of scientific discussion (Cordes, 
2006). A distinction that is relevant to today’s economic context is the speed of 
adaptation, which often is more critical than the accuracy with which it happens. 
Global competition is present everywhere and the speed at which conditions 
and assumptions are changing is greater than ever (Birchfield, 2012).  
 
It is crucial for all firms to be open to change and synchronised across 
departments and working levels. Finance investors often take advantage of the 
hesitation of a company owner or leader to drive change when this is needed to 
offset inefficiencies or the inability to adapt to the evolving environment.  
Schumpeter used the term “creative destruction” to describe the permanent 
process of displacing something that is well-known and replacing it by 
something new (Becker and Knudsen, 2002, Schumpeter, 1939). Coping with 
permanent changes in knowledge and information due to interaction with 
customers, suppliers, external partners and fluctuation of employees (March, 
1965) is already a challenge well understood in many areas and regions.  
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In combination with incredibly fast communication channels, globalisation is 
multiplying the complexity and appears to be one of the major enablers and 
drivers for frequent change and high mid and long-term uncertainty (Laszlo and 
Blachfellner, 2012). Just one such example for the permanent challenge of a 
truly global company is the management of a global footprint in the face of 
demand and currency fluctuations, political crisis, knowledge transfer between 
regions and other uncertainties. This environment sets high barriers for 
companies competing with others in the market and demands highly skilled and 
knowledgeable decision makers. Companies that have lost their way in this 
increasingly competitive environment are often attractive prey for finance 
investors.  
 
All businesses have to compete with each other for a limited number of 
customers and it is clear that only the best companies with the right products 
and the right strategy will survive in the long-term (Greenwood, 2012). Thirty 
years ago Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter identified routines from which they 
derived a model of industrial evolution with innovation and global imitation 
(Becker, 2006). They analysed the necessity of R&D investment for innovation, 
the correlation of competitive advantage with innovation, and differences in the 
organisation of companies with the conclusion that the industry evolution is 
determined by the innovation activities of the enterprises (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). The role and involvement of active shareholders in monitoring and 
reacting to varying conditions, developing long-term strategies and short-term 
tactics for the firms in their portfolio and how they cope with unavoidable 
change has yet to be clarified in detail.  
 
It is vital for the successful management of corporate change and uncertainty to 
have capable decision-makers involved who can also discuss critically divergent 
opinions (Engau and Hoffmann, 2011). Do investors actively help and contribute 
to this? When steering large mature organisations, it is crucial to have the 
capability to react quickly, analyse and wherever possible also foresee 
threatening situations. With regards to shareholder activism and corporate 
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control, the question arises as to whether a corporate management has the 
freedom to act accordingly without prior approval. Personal experience is a 
factor that is not equal, but different for all individuals. So are paradigms such 
as the view of the world and the methods and tools to act in line with this 
(Henderson et al., 2006).  
 
Both knowledge and experience can be acquired from outside the company. 
Depending on the company need, this can be done by hiring permanent 
employees with a profile that fills a determined gap, with temporary workers or 
with consultants who support specific projects for a limited period of time. When 
change comes in small incremental steps, it can be foreseen and planned for, 
according to how a firm observes the environment. In the long-term, if they wish 
to avoid vanishing from the market, every organisation needs to learn to adapt 
automatically to change (Mohrman and Lawler, 2012). While for some 
managers, it is difficult enough to translate incremental change into adequate 
corporate actions, a much bigger and thus often critical challenge is to react to 
radical changes that completely re-set the scene (Oliff, 2012).  
 
Knowledge and competitiveness gaps versus other firms with faster learning 
curves and in the worst case the bankruptcy of a business are potential 
consequences, if incorrect or no action is taken. The area of technology is very 
sensitive as technological progress can make previous advanced technology 
outdated and demand immediate, but sensitive management action. Knowledge 
growth starts from individuals and thus a structure allowing and ensuring the 
central consolidation of knowledge and its distribution to others within systems 
is of high importance for the consolidated knowledge growth of a system 
(Metcalfe et al., 2002). All change automatically leads to an increase in 
knowledge and information within every single company.  
 
Where many firms struggle is to share and conserve the lessons learned. 
Investors often come onto the scene to intervene and take corrective action 
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when an opportunistic and selfish management does not condition and steer a 
business accordingly (Gillan and Starks, 2003). As companies do not have 
cognitive capabilities per se they learn through the people who reflect and store 
the learning and knowledge in descriptions of procedures, methods, rules, the 
corporate culture and values and different kinds of databases (Schulz, 2001). 
Like all human beings, both company managers and investor representatives 
are on a continuous journey of learning from personal and second-hand 
experiences, training, individual study, modelling and coaching 
(Antonacopoulou, 2006).  
 
The emphasis on aforementioned contributors to learning differs from person to 
person due to the fact that everyone’s set of stimulators is different in intensity 
and frequency. Furthermore, cognitive capabilities and individual interests are 
not equal for all human beings, like feelings and emotions triggered by 
environmental factors (Lucey and Dowling, 2005). Inefficiencies and friction 
inherent in every system is the potential for active shareholders to mine, for 
their own and other shareholders’ benefit. There is no standard recipe available 
to company leaders that describes how to react and what to do that covers all 
possible cases and situations. Also empirical work done in that area is as of 
today quite limited (Kempster, 2009).  
 
Anecdotal evidence in several management books indicates that company 
managers typically either have a strong track record in a specific industry where 
they have held several positions in different companies or they climbed up the 
career ladder in one company over time. In both cases, they will be familiar with 
the product and industry-specific requirements, state-of-the-art technology and 
trends. The experience gained about standard processes is just as relevant as 
that gained from extreme and critical cases. People who have only experienced 
one company or one segment often reach their limits when new challenges 
arise due to radical changes. For active shareholders, this can be the point 
where a potential risk for a firm can be turned into the chance to beat 
competitors in the market who are struggling with this as well.  
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It is assumed that the wider the portfolio of experience, the smaller the risk that 
a manager will encounter a situation where they do not know what to do or how 
to react. Conscious and subconscious learning from past situations is one of the 
key elements for excellence in leadership practice (Kempster, 2009). It is 
subsequently important for firms not only to apply knowledge and experience in 
decision-making processes, but also influence definition of the learning and 
memory structures within a business. Whether active finance investors can and 
do affect the corporate learning processes of the business they own as much as 
the employees or consultants cannot be evaluated as yet. A lot of information is 
available about shareholder activism and its effects in general, but the actual 
process of shareholder involvement has not been analysed at the micro-level.  
 
When an investor enters a new business field where they lack expertise, it is 
unlikely that they will exert an influence on products or segments. There can be 
similarities among enterprises, which are independent of the products or 
sectors, but with which an experienced investor is familiar and which could take 
the business forward quickly, instead of having to hike through the full learning 
curve again. The question arises as to how investors would share their 
knowledge with the portfolio company. Bearing in mind that most investors not 
only hold one, but a portfolio of investments, it can be assumed that the time 
and effort spent on each individual investment is linked with its importance in 
the portfolio relative to other investments.  
 
An indirect way to speed up learning processes taken by some investors is to 
acquire expertise in the form of top managers. One prominent example was Mr. 
Wolfgang Bernhard, ex-board member of Volkswagen and Daimler Chrysler 
(Braunberger, 2007). He was hired in 2007 by the Private Equity Company 
Cerberus to take over a leading position at one of their latest investments, the 
US carmaker Chrysler. With such human resource strategies, investors are 
clearly aiming to position themselves to play a more important role than just 
financing. The evolution of this specific triangle of cooperation (Cerberus  
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Chrysler  Bernhard) however shows that a combination, which may at first 
sight have appeared ideal, was later no guarantor for success.  
 
Bernhard stayed for just one year. Another year later and Chrysler was again 
close to bankruptcy, but survived due to a cooperation with the Italian carmaker 
Fiat (plö/Reuters/dpa, 2009). Whether the plan of Cerberus to hire an 
automotive expert was wrong from the beginning or whether the situation 
evolved in a direction that made it fail cannot be said. Due to the complex 
structures and influencing parameters, the risk that an HR decision may fail 
cannot be avoided. It has been proven that institutional investors typically have 
extensive expertise in monitoring and analysis of economic data and 
benchmark analysis of different firms in a segment by comparing available 
numeric data (Li and Xue, 2009).  
 
This is in fact not a surprise, as this is the basis of their business and often 
decisive for a right or wrong investment decision. The pace with which such 
investors can work to get an overview of a business including its weak and 
strong points is thus very high. The major reason why investors get on board 
companies that are not using their full potential is that they have the capability 
and expertise to do so. Their primary interest is often not to keep companies in 
the portfolio, but to transform the potential company value into a positive return 
for the investor. Thus adequate action to get the best out of an investment has 
to be identified and launched quickly. The outcome of the initial analysis is an 
action plan that can also involve a certain risk, maybe more then the corporate 
management would take, when the model developed by the investor is 
promising overall and in line with certain criteria (Baysinger et al., 1991).  
 
When the corporate management team decides that the direction dictated by 
the investor is too risky, this can lead to conflicts and lack of management 
engagement in achieving the target. Most of these exchanges and conflicts 
happen behind closed doors and do not become visible to the outsiders who are 
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not directly involved from the investor or investee side. Ideally, the shareholders 
and management of a company have the same objectives and the same 
understanding of how to manage a company and which targets are achievable 
(Daly, 2011). And in fact this would be the case if the classical theory of 
decisions under certainty made by economists who are fully rational and 
completely informed applied.  
 
In reality however, individual opinions are often different and not seldom 
contrary to each other and this leads to conflicts between the corporate 
management and active shareholders - so called agency conflicts (Tien and 
Chen, 2012). One rational explanation for this natural discrepancy is that the 
knowledge and learning processes already undergone are often different for 
corporate managers and investors. When institutional investors have greater 
experience and know-how than company managers, it would seem plausible for 
them to engage themselves actively in firms they own. But in how far the 
availability and access to knowledge and experience can guarantee the ad hoc 
application to other situations or systems is questionable.  
 
Thus discussions about “the right way to go” between investors and corporate 
management teams are normal, as they are for every form of organisation 
where people with different backgrounds and experiences have to define 
common goals, boundaries and appropriate activities. Overcoming such 
distractions is crucial for the success of a business and subsequently the 
investment made by the investor. Combining the knowledge and experience of 
both parties is the best guarantee for corporate success. What makes it even 
more difficult is the fact that enterprises like economies are systems which are 
individual, specific and permanently influenced by an incredible and in most 
cases not quantifiable number of parameters (Metcalfe et al., 2001).  
 
To simplify the complexity most of the models built to simulate the system 
exclude factors that are not significant. A tricky point could be that opinions of 
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individuals about what is and what is not a significant factor are possibly 
divergent. Without having sufficient knowledge and understanding of a system, 
it is difficult to steer it actively. Evolutionary strategies that are stable may 
remain uncovered. That it is difficult, but not impossible for an outsider to make 
a difference to a business has been proven by a number of restructuring and 
turnaround managers. These groups of people often have no more than a few 
months to get companies back on track. Various examples for this can be found 
in the economic literature.  
 
What needs to be kept in mind however is that in such cases it is often not the 
optimisation and long-term competitiveness that is at the centre of the activities, 
but short-term survival, accepting the corresponding restructuring cost (Lin and 
Yang, 2012). While restructuring requires rigorous action, a process of 
stabilisation, as a second step when the measures have been successful, is 
needed. When the reasoning behind the steps taken has not been explained or 
was not explained well enough to the workforce at an early stage, there is the 
unavoidable risk that good and skilled employees, who are vital for the 
business, leave to go to other companies where they hope to find more stability 
and security. How to keep alive or spark corporate entrepreneurship (CE)4 
within an organisation therefore is a topic of major importance for finance 
investor representatives or turnaround managers and thus of relevance to this 
study.  
 
CE is in many organisations the dominant factor in organisational development, 
problem solving and performance improvement (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2004). 
Ideally it should be top-down - managers create an environment where CE can 
be practised and communicated - and bottom-up - employees can seek 
                                            
4 Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is entrepreneurship in existing organisations 
of all sizes in the form of entrepreneurial activities or behaviour, superior to or 
divergent from the standard procedures and processes ANTONCIC, B. & 
HISRICH, R. D. (2004) Corporate entrepreneurship contingencies and 
organizational wealth creation. Journal of Management Development, 23, 518-
550. 
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dialogue with the management, activities are acknowledged and rewarded in 
the organisation - (Heinonen and Toivonen, 2007). The difficulty for finance 
investors or turnaround managers is that due to a lack of trust, unclear 
directions or rules, potential corporate entrepreneurs remain passive or at least 
do not apply their full potential. Any such interference destabilises a system that 
used to be evolutionary stable until a new equilibrium or system stability is 
found.  
 
The problems and dilemmas discussed before plus the financial affairs and 
ruins of well-known, world-leading companies during the recent financial crisis 
led to the sharp focus on corporate governance laws and provisions (Mallin, 
2012). As the effects were global, the topic became the centre of expert’s 
interest all around the world. At the same time, both individual and institutional 
investors lost confidence in existing corporate governance systems and 
mechanisms. While individual investors have only limited possibilities to exert 
influence, institutional investors who have full or dominant ownership can 
involve themselves strongly to improve and reshape the situation. This is a 
radical change to the past when most shareholders passively held their shares, 
considering them to be a security with growing value.  
 
Today, most majority shareholders act in line with the possibilities and 
responsibilities they have through their ownership of businesses (Davis et al., 
2006). Even more, they recognise that effective engagement with companies in 
their portfolio is vital for them to achieve good long-term performance and 
survival. A cooperative and trustful leadership team in the concerned 
companies is equally important and must not be underestimated. Above and 
beyond this, different institutions, such as the OECD (Economic Co-operation 
and Development) and the ICGN (International Corporate Governance 
Network), are making efforts to harmonise, orchestrate and structure corporate 
governance practises globally.  
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The principles published and regularly updated by organisations of that kind 
cover the major rights, responsibilities and public obligations, such as voting, 
creating value and monitoring (Mallin, 2012). As the existing knowledge about 
the impact of corporate governance and specifically, the influence of 
shareholder activism on corporate learning and evolutionary processes, 
correlates to this project and is relevant, it is reviewed in the following 
paragraphs more in depth. Shareholder activism as an area of corporate 
governance includes all the instruments and actions that are available and 
utilised by shareholders to exert influence on the firms in their portfolios and 
also to resolve agency conflicts (Smith, 1996).  
 
All shareholders (= principals) struggle when cooperating with corporate 
managers (= agents) because of cognitive and behavioural limitations 
(Lazonick, 2007) that cannot be fully eliminated by mutual contracts (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The principals (= shareholders) hire agents (= corporate 
managers), delegate duties and responsibilities to them when they themselves 
do not have the knowledge or skills that are necessary to do the work or when 
an agent can perform the same task at a lower cost (Caers et al., 2006). This 
condition is the basis for a functioning relationship between institutional 
investors and the managers employed by the companies in their portfolio. As 
the welfare of both the principals and the agents depends on the outcome of the 
agents’ actions (Bowie and Freeman, 1992), the shareholders in the role of the 
principals will become active when they can contribute to the success of the 
business.  
 
A limiting and problematic factor in relationships with large institutional investors 
can be an asymmetry in the overall financial situation of both parties. If 
shareholders have widely diversified their invested capital in shares of 100 firms 
with varying output and performance, it is then not per se dramatic for them if a 
single institution goes bankrupt when a risky strategy fails. For the corporate 
management of this particular institution, this can however be a disaster if the 
managers have no other income. Subsequently they will understandably tend to 
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keep the risks low (Munari et al., 2011). Risk-avoiding management behaviour 
like this means companies do not use their full potential to enter new markets or 
expand in existing markets with mid and long-term R&D investment (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003).  
 
Active shareholder engagement and a board of directors who objectively act 
and judge must identify any such “drifting” management behaviour and trigger 
corrective action. If corporate managers are not forced to take risks, they are in 
a very comfortable position without the need or motivation to maximise their 
efforts by accepting some entrepreneurial risks (Makri et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the shareholders’ return on investment will never be maximised 
when the managements’ compensation is linked purely with actual financial 
results. To avoid such management behaviour, various instruments such as 
performance-oriented incentive schemes are used, but with questionable 
effectiveness (Lin et al., 2011). A major difficulty in this regard is to define how 
performance can be accurately measured.  
 
If incorrect key figures are used as performance indicators or if the 
management manipulates these figures, the system and process is ineffective 
and the investor is again in trouble. The management is then enabled to serve 
the own interests in a way that does not support the interests of the shareholder 
(Englander and Kaufman, 2004, Jensen, 1994), but exclusively their own. This 
is a dilemma for the shareholder, but with their limited insight it is often difficult 
to figure out whether the corporate management is using the full potential for 
the company’s objectives or not. Incentive schemes are therefore frequently 
modified in consideration of the latest situation of the company and the interests 
of the shareholders, which is an effective but still insufficient measure 
(Levinthal, 1988).  
 
According to Makri, Lane and Gomez-Mejia, a combination of targets including 
short-term financial results and innovation-related behaviour and attitude are 
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key for technology driven companies (Makri et al., 2006). In effect, a corporate 
manager or agent is in the better position as long as the shareholder or principal 
does not have perfect information about the company, agent capabilities and 
agent activities - which they never will have. If the agent receives a fixed 
payment and no performance linked incentives, they will employ as little effort 
as possible to achieve the agreed objectives. If they do receive incentives for 
extraordinary performance, they can influence or even manipulate the 
indicators.  
 
The fact that the objectives and motivations of shareholders and corporate 
managers are not congruent leads to the so-called agency conflict, which 
means the actions maximising the joint profit are contrary to the actions 
maximising the private profit of each contractual partner (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). To eliminate or minimise agency conflicts and agent costs is one 
of the core targets of shareholder activism and corporate governance 
(O'Sullivan, 2000, Aguilera et al., 2011). But the relationship and cooperation 
between active majority shareholders and the corporate management, within 
the framework of the traditional agency theory and beyond, is still widely 
unexplored (Lazonick, 2007, Sugheir et al., 2008).  
 
During two decades to the end of the 20th century a similar simplified view 
triggered the belief that maximising shareholder value results in the best 
possible economic performance, but this turned out to be not true (Lazonick, 
2007). Specific agency problems that can be observed in businesses that are 
constructed for stability and improvement of existing systems (Birchfield, 2012) 
include skilled incompetence5, defensive routines6 and fancy footwork7. These 
                                            
5 Skilled incompetence is the use of strategies to hinder changes in 
organisations with the objective of avoiding someone losing face in such 
modified conditions WENGLEN, R. & SVENSSON, P. (2008) The skilled 
incompetent manager. Sociologisk Forskning, 43-+..  
6 Defensive routine means the automatic use of mechanisms to protect 
members in organisations from embarrassing or threatening events ARGYRIS, 
C. (2003) A life full of learning. Organization Studies, 24, 1178-1192..  
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are hurdles for companies on the way to success that can lock improvement 
potential and hinder changes with high risks for firms (Probst and Büchel, 
1998). In an environment such as we have today - fast changing, aggressive 
and with lots of competition (Aguilera et al., 2011), such attitudes can 
significantly slow a business, especially when the attitudes have been 
entrenched for years.  
 
Adaptation is vital but can only happen when the need for it is recognised and 
discussed openly (Mohrman and Lawler, 2012). All such stagnation-oriented 
firm behaviour is potentially attractive for investors who recognise the latent 
potential and are not reluctant to break down barriers that hinder changes 
(Graves and Waddock, 1990). Breaking up existing comfort zones and 
requesting an open and constructive exchange including decisions for 
necessary adaptations are some of the dominant levers that activist investors 
use post-acquisition. While this can be negative for managers who set the 
barriers, it potentially frees up creativity and power for employees who have 
become tired of running up against walls.  
 
The ones who do not leave the company are prepared to continue in suboptimal 
circumstances and conditions after realising that it is less painful than to drive 
and enforce change and evolution (Hon Keung and Alison Lai Fong, 2010). It is 
typically only a small group of people who benefit when no or just minimum 
change happens. In companies it can be the top management and a few 
selected people who profit from change being avoided or reduced to a 
minimum. In one of the cases described later, the case C, the majority of the 
executive team were close to retirement and wealthy, because of the good 
salary they had had for two or even three decades. In that company, changes 
were accepted only when it was absolutely necessary, e.g. because of a 
customer demand with the threat of losing the majority of existing business.  
                                                                                                                                
7 Fancy footwork stands for the use of all mechanisms that are used to avoid 
uncovering management failures BEER, M. & EISENSTAT, R. A. (1996) 
Developing an Organization Capable of Implementing Strategy and Learning. 
Human Relations, 49, 597-619.. 
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Whether the wish to remain in the comfort zone and refusal to accept new 
challenges is linked more to the age of people or with the individual people’s 
mindset and targets is unclear and not important for of this work and thus not 
specifically analysed. Relevant is only that such behaviour offers a potential for 
investors who want to achieve the maximum from a company by implementing 
each and every measure needed (Klein and Zur, 2009b). Such shareholder 
activism and all associated active and deliberate activities influencing the 
strategy and politics of a corporation are scientifically classified as an element 
of corporate governance (Brandenberger, 2002). Corporate governance 
generally takes into account the interests of all stakeholders, not only the ones 
of the board of directors, management and shareholders but also the ones of 
customers, suppliers, employees and as a whole, even the community and the 
environment (Becht et al., 2002).  
 
The different interests are protected and regulated by a variety of corporate 
governance policies, laws, customs, processes and institutions (Vintila and 
Gherghina, 2012). The most important areas concerned are fiduciary duty, 
accountability and the economic efficiency view, targeting on optimised financial 
results and shareholders’ welfare (van Ees et al., 2009). Rules and mechanisms 
are in place to ensure companies always act in good faith. In the context of this 
thesis, this means to influence the management decisions of a corporation on 
environmental issues, product strategy, market strategy and all areas of profit 
maximisation that directly or indirectly influence technology strategy. It is 
unsurprising that years ago institutional investors were the first among 
shareholders to exert influence in amendments or changes in corporate 
governance (Parrino et al., 2003).  
 
In the early 1980s shareholders started to become active in certain areas, it had 
become common practice by the 1990s (Nelson, 2005) and since the financial 
crisis that started in 2007, has been expected (Mallin, 2012). Today some large 
companies organise events in parallel to annual meetings to exchange 
information with their majority shareholders about topics that have been 
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identified to be of interest, either by the organising company or the shareholders 
to avoid being confronted publicly with aggressive shareholders (Park and 
Tonello, 2009). While at first sight this appears to be very good practice, it is 
highly important that these events are not disadvantageous to the minority 
shareholders who are not invited (Thamotheram and Le Floc'h, 2012).  
 
The involvement of lawyers and experts who know the latest regulatory 
framework in the area of corporate governance is therefore absolutely vital to 
avoid problems with non-participating shareholders afterwards. Talking to 
people with personal experience in this area, it is clear that direct exchange with 
shareholders is often a walk on a very thin line. The dominant trend in today’s 
landscape of making use of the voice option8 needs to be considered in the 
actions and decision-making processes to avoid escalating conflicts, because if 
no direct exchange channel is provided some shareholders will find an indirect 
one (Smith, 1996). The other traditional options developed by Hirschmann in 
1970, the loyalty option9 and the exit option10 (Hirschmann, 1970) are still 
chosen for minority investments, but for most majority shareholders, it is a must 
to involve themselves actively in the businesses they own.  
 
                                            
8 The voice option means to exert influence on a corporation through direct 
activity aimed at approaching the company management. The use of voting 
rights is very popular and active participation in annual general meetings 
FERREIRA, M. A. & MATOS, P. (2008) The colors of investors‚ money: The 
role of institutional investors around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 
88, 499-533. 
9 The loyalty option describes loyal shareholders who have decided not to take 
any action to influence their portfolio companies, but to keep their shares. They 
wait passively for what time will bring and put their loyal trust in the company, in 
fact the company management, hoping that they will do the right things, so that 
over time the shareholders are rewarded for their loyalty and patience. 
SUDARSANAM, S. (2008) Does Shareholder Activism Help or Hinder 
Shareholder Value Enhancement? (Empirical Evidence from the UK). Cranfield, 
School of Management, Cranfield University. 
10 The exit option means simply to sell shares instead of either being loyal and 
waiting or becoming active ADMATI, A. R. & PFLEIDERER, P. (2009) The "Wall 
Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 22, 2645-2685. 
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A tricky topic, which needs to be approached in this thesis, without putting the 
focus on it, is the representation of shareholders on management boards. Of 
specific interest is the involvement and influence of board members in so-called 
top-decisions, which are significant for the future direction of a company 
(Useem and Zelleke, 2006). With reference to this, corporate governance not 
only observes the operational company structures, but also takes a close look 
at the supervisory board (Hambrick et al., 2008). For minority shareholders the 
repertoire of possible actions in this regard is pretty much limited due to the 
relatively small amount of influence and power they have. In a few rare cases, 
minority investors write “poison pen letters” to the CEOs of corporations in 
which they have shares to force change when they are not satisfied with the 
performance of the portfolio company top management or the CEO.  
 
This is a very tough method that can gain enormous momentum. Traditionally a 
“poison pen letter” was written anonymously with vitriolic content, intended to 
upset or unmask the addressee in a very direct and impolite manner. The 
modern version in the finance world however is very often published, 
sometimes on a website, sometimes even in the newspaper in the form of an 
advert. The authors are typically founders of investment funds or top fund 
managers and known for such extrovert and aggressive behaviour. Two well-
known candidates are Daniel S. Loeb and Carl Icahn. They are very offensive 
and direct in their letters that are often several pages long. Things like blaming 
a CEO for spending time on the golf course during business hours instead of 
taking care of the shareholders interests are standard content.  
 
In the same way missing information about and engagement within the 
company are highlighted. Most painful for the addressees is that these letters 
generally spark discussion and comment about what is actually pure 
schadenfreude. The letters trigger an avalanche of unrest, which at the end of 
the day can overwhelm and bring down the CEO. One of the most recent 
examples of such a showdown was the “battle” between Carl Icahn and Yahoo. 
Ultimately Icahn was unsuccessful, but he definitely gave the Yahoo board 
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members a hard time. Examples of such behaviour can be found on the 
websites of the investor perpetrators. Often with provocation for other 
shareholders to join in with the criticism. Putting pressure on the portfolio 
company CEO is often the primary target of finance investors (Block, 2006).  
 
Having understood that, it is no surprise that such people and organisations are 
aggressive and use all they can to exert influence simply because they are 
convinced that they are cleverer, better able to estimate the market trend and 
more focussed on the shareholder interests. Whether this is reality or whether 
this type of investor actually is more capable or only populist and strongly 
entrepreneurial, cannot and will not be analysed in this work. But it is a fact that 
this extreme form of shareholder activism does exist. Such a course of action is 
no option for private minority shareholders who are not prominent. When single 
shareholders cannot reach a critical momentum, they can amalgamate their 
shares with other shareholders or authorise a third-party to act in place of them, 
e.g. at the annual general meetings (Engelken, 2005).  
 
However only very few minority shareholders actually walk that way to express 
their views, recommendations and requests (Daly, 2011). Interestingly, not only 
private investors can join proxy actions but institutional shareholders as well 
(Klausner, 2001). Bundling of individual votes and minority shares is even 
supported by the governments of many countries through specific laws. The 
target is to allow several minority shareholders to reach a critical mass, i.e. be a 
significant lever to be heard by the companies in which they have invested their 
money. In Germany for example, since November 2005 companies have had to 
accommodate a shareholder activism law - the bill of UMAG (Corporate integrity 
and modernisation of the right of appeal).  
 
The main focus of this work however is on individual institutional investment 
companies that hold share packages large enough to exert influence without 
requiring any authorisation or support from other shareholders. If and to what 
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extent shareholders become active or not depends strongly on their opinion of 
the corporate management team (Parker, 2007). When a management team 
acts following stewardship principles – this means setting the goals of the 
corporation above private goals and not concentrating primarily on lower-level 
needs like payment and safety (Caers et al., 2006) – then shareholders should 
either not become active or give only positive advice. Stewards are likely to 
follow altruistic principles and create a positive stimulus towards a common 
target of a business (Dicke and Ott, 2002).  
 
They are driven by ambition, aim for higher-order needs like self-fulfilment 
(Davis et al., 1997) and can be found in all hierarchical layers of a company. 
Stewards in the second and third management line can be the real drivers in a 
company’s success. They can easily compensate for a lack of competence and 
engagement of a first line manager so that a weak performer in the top 
management can be invisible. Identifying such interdependencies and putting 
subsequent “corrective action” in place can unhook further entrepreneurship 
potential when the right leader, who can orchestrate such a team, is on board. 
The expectation is that a strong correlation exists between the shareholders’ 
opinion of the management team and shareholder influence on the 
organisational development and evolutionary processes.  
 
A tactic of institutional investors to gain quick results is to assume that minority 
shareholders will follow them when they use the voice option due to belief in the 
expertise of the institutional shareholders (Park and Tonello, 2009). That wave 
works in both directions when prominent investors sell or buy so that this effect 
in itself is sometimes sufficient to generate a positive profit margin for the “lead” 
investor, simply through the market price fluctuation, which is triggered by the 
pull effect. Such purely speculative approaches are one of the main root causes 
for scepticism by company employees when an investor acquires a large 
portion of shares. Working against such cognitive hurdles is key to avoiding 
wasting time thinking about the “real” intention of an investor.  
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The positive effect that shareholder activism offers shareholders – regardless of 
amplitude – is not necessarily equally beneficial to the company leaders. When 
shareholder activism targets the resolution of an agency conflict at CEO level 
that is limiting a business’s potential profit, it can put the CEO in an 
uncomfortable situation. In such cases, all regulations and options are applied 
to put pressure on the CEO to make them work the way they should in their 
role. Another option is to replace the CEO when their profile does not fit to the 
directional change attempted by the investor (Decker and Mellewigt, 2012). 
CEO´s are paid a lot of money and thus they should use all their capabilities to 
attain the maximum for the company they are leading.  
 
When they are unable to be a continuous successful leader, replacement is 
unavoidable. However a CEO can react in several ways that are harmful for a 
company as well. If they are not willing to adopt the shareholders’ opinions and 
requests, they can reduce their activities and efforts to a minimum to avoid an 
escalating conflict. This would be a worst-case scenario because the reduction 
in effort is not immediately visible to other people. Another possible CEO 
reaction would be to quit their job instead of battling with shareholders on the 
issue of how they manage the enterprise. Many senior executives are financially 
independent, having worked for decades in top management positions. Their 
primary motivation for working is very often just the power they have in an 
executive position, not the salary.  
 
In such cases a limitation of power could be a reason for a CEO to quit their job. 
In such a case the evolutionary development of a business and its processes 
would be affected indirectly and unintended. The effect for the business and the 
employees is the same, similarly to when any shareholder influence in that 
direction was made intentionally. The negative effects of too much or too 
offensive shareholder activism are also mentioned in an interview of Dennis 
Block of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. He said that an increasing number of 
CEOs and directors are experiencing more pressure to improve the company 
performance from the shareholders than from their job itself (Block, 2006). If 
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one counts the numerous reports about aggressive shareholder activities that 
are published in the media and consider the unofficial face-to-face discussion 
between institutional investors and CEOs, that sounds realistic.  
 
Obviously this is not good for either the CEOs or the business when a huge 
amount of the leaders’ time and energy is “wasted” on giving statements to 
active shareholders. On the other hand, people or institutions that have 
dominant share packages in businesses can dictate the direction to be taken, 
based on information they need to force from the management team (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003). The opinions about the overall role of institutional investors are 
ambivalent, depending on the holding time and the size of the share package 
(Hsu and Koh, 2005). Investors who prefer short holding times and small 
package acquisitions are supposed not to become directly involved in corporate 
governance issues related to their investments, but stimulate myopic behaviour 
of the managers at the businesses (Porter, 1992, Bhide, 1993).  
 
On the contrary, different researchers found that investment institutions watch 
and “educate” the management team in the companies they own to avoid legal 
or regulatory conflict (Bushee, 1998). When institutional investors are engaged 
in the businesses they own, they are often supporting long-term strategies of 
the management (Wahal and McConnell, 2000), and not what is generally 
assumed to be the short-term orientation of investors. In some cases 
institutional investors even act as a buffer between short-term oriented 
individual investors and corporate management teams who develop long-term 
oriented strategies and visions (Wahal and McConnell, 2000). This can be 
explained by the fact that institutional investors have broader access to the 
information and resources supporting them in developing a realistic prediction of 
the potential future gains from long-term investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, Elyasiani and Jia, 2011).  
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Scenarios described in existing research confirm that asset managers not only 
monitor what happens in the companies in their portfolio, they also impact them 
strongly on different occasions in different areas (Freitag, 2006). Their risk-
taking ability and willingness correlates strongly with the portfolio diversification 
they have. At the end of the day, the priority of each individual investment in the 
portfolio of finance investor is strongly linked with the individual relevance, 
relative to their overall portfolio value. Independently of that, short-term oriented 
“traders” never engage themselves as long-term oriented finance investors do. 
This means large shareholders with a handful of investments tend to be to 
conservative and push long-term strategic investments with high potential 
returns, but correspondingly low risk in contrast to ones with largely diversified 
portfolios (Munari et al., 2011).  
 
The success of the businesses triggers the shareholder value and liquidity as 
key areas of interest for each investor (Gillan et al., 2000). One option that 
institutional investors choose to reach their ultimate goals is to impact and 
influence directly the diversification of companies by strategic business exits or 
striking new paths through acquisition of germ cells (Decker and Mellewigt, 
2012). In such cases the investors dictate direction and corporate management 
follows. A very effective measure to ensure that the shareholders’ opinions and 
strategies are implemented in the businesses they own is participation in the 
selection process of the corporate management team (Campbell et al., 2012). In 
some cases this even takes place when active investors enter a merger or 
acquisition (Burnett et al., 2012).  
 
It seems plausible that institutional investors would need to be involved in the 
technology strategy decisions taken by the firms they own in part or full, 
independently from any market or sector driven desire or strategy. This would 
imply they believe they know better than the company management which 
technology or technology strategy is the best one for a specific business. 
Current literature does not deliver sufficient evidence to allow a watertight 
conclusion, but indicates the requirement for research in this area. The outcome 
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of different studies that the positive effect of shareholder activism is marginal 
(Romano, 2000) might be right for certain cases, but the underlying assumption 
of this thesis cannot be generalised. The ambivalent reality was discussed in 
the previous chapters and is also reflected in the following chapters and case 
studies.  
 
3.3 The effect of corporate social and environmental-oriented 
stakeholder activism on corporate technology strategy 
Besides institutional shareholder activism, this thesis investigates the relevance 
of the impact of other stakeholders in trying to improve corporate social or 
environmental performance in the sense of a triple bottom line (TBL) approach 
through affecting corporate behaviour and policies (Jeurissen, 2000). The focus 
is on two major motivators currently driving such activities and interest. Firstly 
corporate environmental behaviour (CEB), in particular the issue of emissions 
which contribute to climate change and is a negative external corporate effect 
(Sarkar, 2008). And secondly corporate social responsibility (CSR), i.e. the 
implementation of socially-oriented elements in companies (Valor, 2005) as 
another core part of company policy.  
 
The extent to which these specific motivators incorporate direct or indirect 
technology elements that consequently influence corporate technology strategy 
is an interesting not yet studied aspect of this research project (Hall et al., 
2014). When technology elements are present, it is crucial to understand the 
mechanisms by which the technology strategy of a business actually is 
impacted. Additional clarification is required as to whether corporate effects 
originated by CEB-driven stakeholder activism differ from CSR-driven activities 
and if the consequences are similar or even the same. The stakeholders in this 
context are individuals, governmental organisations, non-governmental 
organisations or any kind of community with a common interest (Valor, 2005).  
48 
These stakeholders have various options for making themselves heard by the 
companies they are targeting and influencing their private politics11 (Baron and 
Diermeier, 2007). One of the most frequently used “standard” channels is active 
participation at annual general meetings. One-to-one meetings of a stakeholder 
with corporate management are rare as in general a stakeholder does not have 
a major share package (Campbell et al., 2012). Prominent examples are 
organisations or communities like Greenpeace, which are even prepared to 
undertake illegal action, so-called campaigns, to get public attention via the 
media. Pirate activity of this type, which typically targets a company or a 
complete industry to confront it with a specific issue (Baron and Diermeier, 
2007) can at first sight be seen as inappropriate in today’s culture.  
 
Such campaigns often break the law. Illegal behaviour of this type is not a 
method to change things that would come to most people’s minds, but the effect 
is often extraordinary and in direct correlation with how whacky and risky the 
activities actually are. When the media reports on campaigns, the rocket has 
been launched, meaning either the broad public or prominent people are 
sufficiently impassioned to get on board and raise their voices in support of the 
campaign initially started by a few individuals. In such cases, it may be 
concluded that a few individuals representing organisations do a lot of lobby 
work to make the public aware of specific issues, such as greenhouse gas 
emissions, to initiate or boost social movements (Reid and Toffel, 2009).  
 
As outlined previously, in the end it is often the consumer or end-user who 
finally puts the pressure on corporations by ostracizing specific brands or 
                                            
11 Private politics address situations of conflict and their resolution without 
reliance on the law or government. Methods include political competition over 
entitlements in the status quo, direct competition for public support, bargaining 
over the resolution of the conflict and the maintenance of private agreements. 
The term private means that the parties do not rely on public law or the courts. 
The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in which 
people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others.  
BARON, D. P. (2003) Private Politics. Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 12, 31-66. 
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products (Baron and Diermeier, 2007) and this is typically sparked by non-
shareholder stakeholder activism. This mechanism of influence is very effective, 
but complex as it relies on subsequent causal effects to reach the target. In 
general the activism intended to create awareness for corporate social 
responsibility and the activism on the effects of corporate emissions on climate 
change are very similar and both bear significant opportunities and risks (Hall et 
al., 2014). The starting point around which activities are built is always a specific 
issue with the target of motivating people to support the activity and creating 
pressure on companies or industries (Baron and Diermeier, 2007).  
 
And the stakeholders having an interest in contributing to shaping the emerging 
fields of CSR and CEB as institutional entrepreneurs (Avetisyan and Ferrary, 
2013) can, but must not be the same stakeholders. Activities or campaigns 
focussing on environmental or social related issues not only target corporations, 
but also those individual stakeholders who are seen as justifiable targets in the 
push for bringing about a change in attitude (Klein and Zur, 2009a). Such 
campaigns are often organised globally and attract media attention, including 
television. The results of such campaigns and the consequences for 
corporations are relevant to this research particularly when the effect extends to 
be a re-think by management teams on technology strategy.  
 
Environment-related topics are often closely linked with technology, e.g. 
emissions affecting the environment are correlated with the technologies used 
by firms (Reid and Toffel, 2009). A reduction in emissions can typically be 
achieved by using fewer resources and by implementing newer, more efficient 
machines, equipment and processes (Colwell and Joshi, 2013). When 
corporations respond to activist campaigning by introducing more responsible 
policies, the effect can be the same as new government legislation. However, 
campaign success depends to a large extent on where in a business the 
activism is addressed, i.e. which people in the organisation it reaches (Delmas 
and Toffel, 2008). A business typically becomes actively involved in a campaign 
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to minimise or eliminate any unwanted effects on stakeholders or the 
environment only when it makes commercial sense.  
 
And this can be the case, either when an improvement for stakeholders or the 
environment is positively correlated with the profit of the business, e.g. a 
production technology update reduces the production costs or stops a 
consumer boycott (Huang and Wu, 2010). What needs to be looked at carefully 
is what happens to the old equipment, whether it really is scrapped or merely 
transferred to another country where no confrontation is visible on the radar - 
and this is actually common practice for many global companies (Surroca et al., 
2013). Another positive by-product of prominent businesses updating the 
technologies they use or their corporate policies is the pull-effect for other 
businesses in the same segment (Colwell and Joshi, 2013).  
 
Such follow-on effects can turn a situation from one where the pioneer company 
might have had a slight competitive advantage over its competitors to a 
situation where the majority of companies follow and the few who do not get on 
board are kicked out of the market shortly after (Zahra et al., 1995). In terms of 
effective private politics this would be the best possible result, as it would 
change not only one company but also a complete market (Sarkar, 2008). 
Campaigns can and often do influence corporate technology strategy. While 
corporate social responsibility has a lot of internal elements that are not 
technology related, such as dealing with employee issues, a lot of the 
environmental-oriented activities impact corporate technology strategy one-to-
one. 
 
3.4 Further implications from the secondary literature; focus and 
fieldwork 
Current literature is rich in information about stakeholder and shareholder 
activism and how corporations are changing due to stakeholder and 
shareholder influence (Mishina et al., 2012). However, what is unclear so far is 
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how and why things are actually happening in companies with shareholder 
influence, and this cannot be analysed with the published figures. In the 
previous chapters, two major factors of influence were reviewed based on the 
existing data and evidence. One is the involvement of shareholders who have, 
by law, the right to be involved in the development and decision-making 
processes in the organisation. Utilisation of their shareholder rights affects the 
businesses concerned and correspondingly the area of technology strategy, 
which is the core focus of this work.  
 
Additionally, stakeholder influence can result from social or environmental 
activity. This can also impact technology strategy. The risk is high that incorrect 
conclusions may be drawn regarding the triggers for changes in the technology 
strategy of companies, simply because of the variety of influencing factors that 
have often not been recognised or understood. As only a very limited number of 
people are actually involved in these processes, it is unsurprising that little is 
known and in order to understand more the first-hand insights of these people 
are required (David, 2001). To avoid coming to false conclusions, it is crucial to 
have a good, case-specific understanding of all the relevant parameters and 
influencers and an acceptance that a state of 100% information and knowledge 
can never be reached (Floyd, 1995, Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
 
A very good example of how incorrect implications are reached is the private 
politic actions to pressure companies or industries over specific issues. 
Corporate changes may be incorrectly interpreted when at the same time a 
finance investor was involved, a governmental policy was put in place or an 
incentive was introduced for investing in new technologies. If defining the real 
trigger for a change is difficult for an insider; it is near impossible for an outsider 
given the lack of transparency regarding all impacting factors. The mechanisms 
enabling the stakeholders without a dominant share package to influence 
management decisions, which have been discussed in current literature and 
which have already in part been analysed, are mechanisms that are visible to 
the public.  
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These are mainly different forms of direct confrontation. One option is a speech 
at an annual general meeting or a proxy vote, when other stakeholders and the 
media support a request (Romano, 2000). Another option is the planning and 
conduct of activist campaigning where the media has an important role (Baron, 
2009), as discussed in the previous paragraph. In both cases the chain of 
desired effects ends when other stakeholders support the activity and pressure 
on the corporate management team is increased (Park and Tonello, 2009). The 
advantage of these strategies is that neither requires a dominant shareholder. 
These mechanisms are not directly, but indirectly effective when it comes to 
technology decisions (e.g. requests regarding CEB). Furthermore the cause 
and chain of effects are relatively obvious and can be analysed with relative 
ease, possibly polishing the CEO’s image (Lewis et al., 2013).  
 
Another effective measure, for which there is evidence, is the implementation of 
coercive government measures (David et al., 2008). Again, while global 
companies do sometimes choose to reshuffle their global footprint by taking 
advantage of countries with less restrictive regulations (Sarkar, 2008), evidence 
does exist for stakeholders influencing firms’ behaviour, management and 
technology strategy and also cases where stakeholders are included on the 
corporate board of directors (Sánchez et al., 2011). The difficulties involved in 
extracting information about this form of interaction are relatively low as a group 
of people is always involved. An effect unwanted by all stakeholders is when 
corporate executives make concessions in response to stakeholder requests, in 
reality not to accommodate them, but to support a private entrenchment 
strategy of their own (Cespa and Cestone, 2002).  
 
Uncovering hidden agendas such as this is one of the obligations of the board 
of directors. But such things are generally not visible at first sight (Surroca and 
Tribò, 2008). What remains an unknown is what exactly is going on when large 
shareholders have direct access to corporate executives (Shahzad and David, 
2010). When requests or commands are responded to, it is typically done in a 
discrete and straight forward way out of the public eye (Klein and Zur, 2009a). 
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The direct effect of involvement of this type, as well as the indirect influence 
originating from, e.g. internal control or delegation of authority mechanisms 
have not yet been studied or analysed in detail. This is however a crucial 
element in correctly understanding and interpreting corporate changes made 
due to investor involvement and minimises the risk of misleading data or 
insufficient knowledge and understanding of other influencing factors.  
 
Being entirely clear about all the influence parameters and understanding the 
interactions between the stakeholders is very important. It is crucial for the 
researcher to develop the right feel for each individual case and situation so that 
the right questions are asked and appropriate data and information collected 
(Yin, 2003). If the information is found to be asymmetric, a systematic has to be 
found to reveal the underlying reasons for divergent data or the motivation for 
divergent statements. Conflicts that cannot be solved within the framework of 
the research will be mentioned explicitly in the conclusions of the specific case 
and also in the summary. In this sense, selection of the right research 
methodology is decisive. 
 
3.5 Gaps in the current knowledge base 
An important issue not yet answered by present evidence is, what are the 
channels through which institutional investors become involved? There are a 
variety of ways to interact, but few of them are publicly accessible. Scientific 
analysis has therefore rarely been carried out. Participation at annual meetings 
where there is the chance to speak is a frequently used method, but one that in 
most cases is not very specific as it follows a general populist approach 
(Jochims and Reuter, 2006). Immediately after the acquisition of a dominant 
share package, it is evident that institutional majority shareholders establish 
direct contact with the management in order to exert influence and negotiate in 
corporate meetings off stage (Byrne, 1999, Nisar, 2005, Gillan and Starks, 
2003).  
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Detailed insights about such exchanges are unknown and have not yet been 
studied within the framework of a scientific project. Face-to-face or small group 
meetings are the best choice for delicate or important exchanges in a business 
context and the same applies to the investor investee context (Lin and Yang, 
2012). A common practice when personal meetings with the company 
management have not produced the expected results is to contact board 
members or external advisers directly in a second level of escalation (Useem, 
1996, Nisar, 2005). Taking into consideration all aspects and areas of reaction 
and interaction, the situation is very complex and non-transparent. There are 
cases where investors know before the acquisition of a business or part of it 
where they have to act or interact or whom they have to fire or bring on board 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
 
But there are also cases where it is not that clear where involvement is needed 
to lift potential by solving agency conflicts or to initiate and speed up learning 
processes (Karpoff, 1996). Who the people are who are involved in the 
exchange and how frequently they communicate or interact has not been 
analysed in depth and the evidence which does exist is based on secondary 
analysis. For the mature businesses that are the focus of this work, it is still 
widely unknown what kind of engagement is really carried out in practice to fulfil 
investors’ expectations by initiating appropriate company reactions (Baysinger 
et al., 1991, Tihanyi et al., 2003, Belloc, 2011). Most of the knowledge 
developed by other researchers is about start up companies and venture 
capitalism.  
 
Current research has found that transient12 institutional investors affect tactical 
actions such as product pricing or the HR strategies of businesses in which they 
invest, but focus less on strategic actions – the opposite behaviour is found for 
                                            
12 Transient institutional investors do not focus on specific segments for their 
investments and often hold smaller stakes, with a short-term oriented and more 
tactical approach PORTER, M. E. (1992) Capital Choices: Changing the Way 
America Invests In Industry. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5, 4-16. 
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dedicated13 institutional investors (Connelly et al., 2010). These findings confirm 
that investors act in dependence on their investment horizon and philosophy 
(Yan and Zhang, 2009, Munari et al., 2011). Correlations with strategic actions 
were found with regard to adjustments of the marketing mix, definition of a build 
strategy, but nothing focussed on R&D, even if some investors would have the 
power to do so. What is unfortunately kept out by most researchers is how any 
influence actually takes place, no matter whether the targeted impact is tactic or 
strategic.  
 
The ability to influence strategic actions is seen more with dedicated investors 
due to their specialisation and experience, while transient investors act less 
selectively in terms of business focus (Bushee, 2001). Herding behaviour 
occurs when dedicated investors exchange with other investors who are active 
in the same area about what actions the executives of their companies should 
pursue (Gutierrez Jr and Kelley, 2008). Such cooperation can influence and 
maybe irritate the full market, when the investors hold shares in dominant 
players. Nisar evidenced two start up cases where venture investors had 
significant expertise in the business sector in which they had invested (Nisar, 
2005). They had intervened in the management decision processes at firms in 
which they invested to the benefit of both the investee and the investor.  
 
In these cases no negative effects of investor activism were found, in fact the 
financial funding and support for organisational development generated very 
positive effects for the businesses. The technology strategy followed was 
defined by the businesses with the close involvement of the investors, which 
was vital for the success and positioning of the businesses. The benefit for 
start-up companies in these cases was far beyond pure financial support. It 
included considerable knowledge transfer in the different areas of organisational 
development and confirms that venture capital investors often act as coaches 
                                            
13 Dedicated institutional investors focus on a limited number of specific 
investments where they have a higher amount of shares and follow a long-term 
and strategic approach Ibid. 
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and consultants (Baum and Silverman, 2004). In other words, the involvement 
of active investors pushes evolutionary processes in early stage companies.  
 
This thesis intends clarifying whether active institutional investors influence 
mature businesses in the same way. Each relationship between a finance 
investor and a company is as different as one company is to another (Belloc, 
2011). To understand the roles that institutional shareholders play, it is vital to 
develop a better understanding of their capabilities and their approach and 
willingness for active engagement. General explorations of the cooperation and 
interaction between finance investors and their investees have already been 
made. Specifically in the R&D area, however very little scientific evidence has 
been available so far (Rehbein et al., 2004, Baysinger et al., 1991, Munari et al., 
2011). Existing work is based on secondary data including fact and figure 
analysis with heterogeneous results (Grossman, 1999, Becker-Blease, 2012).  
 
R&D intensity is measured by the number of new product launches, R&D 
spending or the number of patent registrations (Choi et al., 2012). A very 
interesting piece of work is “The Role of Activism by Institutional Investors in 
Influencing R&D” by P. David et al. (2001). This research project was a 
longitudinal analysis of 73 large firms over a time span of 7 years with 
institutional investor ownership. The project examined the correlation between 
R&D inputs, R&D outputs and shareholder activism. The project was based on 
secondary data from reports and databases and the application of statistical 
methodology. The conclusion of that project was that institutional investor 
activism correlates positively with both R&D input and output.  
 
As investor activism is a quite recent, but complex phenomenon, more research 
needs to be carried out to gain further knowledge and evidence with a focus on 
technology and innovation strategy (Belloc, 2011, Chizema, 2011). As yet, no 
qualitative research has been done to uncover the mechanisms of interaction 
between finance investors and firms in their portfolio that influence directly or 
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indirectly the technology strategy (Le et al., 2006). The inside view that gives an 
understanding about how things are changed and affected due to investor 
involvement is missing, while the evidence about what happens and which 
areas are effected is extensive. It appears that moving beyond statistical fact 
and figure analysis to understand what is going on behind the scenes, either 
has not attracted other researchers so far, or no method of access has been 
found to do so successfully.  
 
Closing this gap will enrich the scientific body of knowledge in many ways. It will 
bring more transparency to the interaction between investment funds and the 
companies in their portfolios. Subsequently, there should be a better 
understanding of the extent to which investors play a role in the corporate 
landscape and economy. This is important to re-confirm or re-open discussion 
on previous research into investor involvement. Last, but not least, all insider 
information is crucial in adjusting and improving policy-making aimed at 
ensuring fair competition with equal chances for all players in the market. 
 
3.6 Definition of research questions 
A core question to be answered is whether finance investors aim to influence 
directly the technology strategies of companies in their portfolio (RQ 1). Linked 
with RQ 1 it is crucial to understand which possibilities active shareholders can 
and do use to exert influence. A look behind the scenes has to deliver insight 
into the methods and tools used when investors interact with firms in their 
portfolio (RQ 2). A factor that strongly correlates with how information and data 
is exchanged is the frequency and regularity of exchange between the parties 
(RQ 3). A suitable research project that delivers data for analysis had to be 
defined and carried out to follow this approach. The planned contribution to the 
knowledge base of shareholder activism is not general, but focused on the area 
of technology strategy as one of the key elements for company success and 
long-term survival (Pegels and Thirumurthy, 1996, Zahra et al., 1995, 
Burgelman et al., 2008).  
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In order to understand the interaction and potential influence on technology 
strategy at the businesses, a deeper dive into the scene of interaction is vital 
(Baysinger et al., 1991). One of the most fundamental points to be clarified is 
how much expertise asset managers, i.e. the investment companies really have 
in the business fields of their investments (RQ 4). In consideration of these 
deliberations, an interesting question to answer is who is considered to be the 
expert in technology strategy on each side (RQ 5). Understanding to what 
extent an investor buys expertise from third-party advisors and analysts is 
complementary, but fascinating add-on information. At the beginning of this 
thesis, it was stated that all stakeholders influence evolutionary processes in 
businesses.  
 
The logical expectation would thus be that the involvement of active investors 
has an influence on the processes of learning and evolution in companies 
(RQ 6), bearing in mind that the size of a share package determines 
shareholder rights and authorisations to some extent (Davis and Thompson, 
1994). The underlying aim of the research is to develop a better and deeper 
understanding of all correlated processes, interactions and effects as these are 
still controversial (Kochhar and David, 1996).  
 
In conclusion, the research questions to be answered by the evidence 
produced by this thesis are: 
 
RQ 1. Do finance investors aim to influence directly the technology 
strategy of companies in their portfolio?  
The answers to this research question should reveal whether the investor has 
the intention to actively influence decisions regarding technology strategy 
decisions or not. Involvement in other areas that affects the technology strategy 
of the business would not be considered as direct, but as indirect influence. 
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RQ 2. How does the exchange between finance investors and the 
companies in their portfolio function (methods, tools, people 
involved…)? 
The case studies should provide an understanding of the scenery and 
conditions under which exchange between active shareholders and portfolio 
companies, i.e. the corporate management happens. Whether the procedures 
and practices applied are similar in all cases or whether significant differences 
are observed will be one of the key outcomes. This should make it clear 
whether active shareholders act individually and specifically, in consideration of 
the fact that each organisation, its situation, capabilities and potential are 
individual, but never equal. 
 
RQ 3. What is the frequency of exchange between finance investors and 
the corporate management? 
The frequency is expected to indicate the intensity of the interaction, 
regardless of the tools and methods used to communicate. When the 
frequency is harmonic for all cases it can be assumed that it is a standard 
routine. If large variations are uncovered, then the individual situation of the 
case study firms will be analysed to identify possible correlations such as 
financial performance. 
 
RQ 4. Do finance investors have the expertise to define the best 
technology strategies for the companies they own? 
If an investor has the expertise and capabilities and if they want to oppose 
decisions regarding technology strategy made by the portfolio company’s top 
management, it is nonetheless unclear why the investor’s wishes and not the 
management of the company should take priority. This question should clarify 
which roles active shareholders can fill and to what extent they are capable of 
guiding the businesses in their portfolio with regards to technology strategy. It 
shall also uncover the limitations of active investors that they recognise 
themselves and also the limitations seen by the corporate management teams. 
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RQ 5. Who do both parties (investment company and company 
management) consider to be the experts in technology strategy? 
If an active shareholder’s behaviour is dictatorial, this appears only to be 
justified when they clearly know better than the corporate management. This 
appears implausible, as the company management should be the true panel of 
experts in that area. The views of the individuals should contribute to the 
understanding and explanation of investor behaviour and activity.  
 
RQ 6. What is the finance investor’s role in the organisational learning 
process of the companies in their portfolio? 
If it is assumed that an investor exerts influence, no matter to what degree, the 
effect of that influence should be visible in corporate and organisational 
learning processes. Exactly what the explicit effects are and what this means 
in the consequences for the individual businesses will help to understand the 
influence that active investors do have on businesses and the economy on a 
broader scale. The research questions listed above pin down what the core 
area of this research project is. The questions should be answered by the 
results and insights gained from the research project that follows in the next 
chapters. It is crucial to develop a broad and comprehensive understanding of 
each individual case in order to produce sound answers, avoid 
misinterpretations and incorrect results. While the scope of the data collection 
is as wide as possible to capture the maximum information and insights, the 
following step of analysis and extraction is decisive in reaching the correct 
conclusion.  
 
3.7  Analytical framework and dimensions 
It is mission critical that the analytical framework to answer the research 
questions is properly defined (Gill and Johnson, 2002). This includes the 
definition of the analytical dimensions which are at the core of the fieldwork 
(Schnell et al., 1999, Yin, 2003). It starts with a confidentiality guarantee for the 
interviewees in a bid to ensure no information is hidden or embellished. It 
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continues with case-specific information about the interviewees, their 
background (general and in the company for which they are currently working) 
and the companies involved. This data is helpful for later analysis and 
comparison between the cases, especially when conflicting information is 
received. In addition to the research questions, the following information is 
required from all interviewees to be able to answer the research questions.  
 
One of the first things to be clarified for each study case and each individual is 
who is communicating with whom, with which frequency and about what. With 
this information, the individual rules and regulations regarding delegation of 
authority can be identified. These are correlated with the frequency of 
communication. From the scientific point of view the communication methods, 
tools and channels are equally important as the content of the communication, 
and are a good indicator of intensity and specific preferences regarding 
communication. To understand the roles that the interviewees actually play and 
how other stakeholders see them, it is necessary to collect information about 
their specialisation in the industries or regions they work in and when/from 
whom they acquire additional expertise or know-how when it is required.  
 
This can mean the involvement of third-party consultancies or people from 
personal or professional networks. There then followed questions getting to the 
heart of the research topic, that is the importance of technology strategy for 
individual people, their personal involvement and the sources of information and 
advice they make use of both inside the outside the business. A vital input for 
the analysis of the research results is information about interdependencies 
between departments, disciplines and regulations that may have impacted 
definition of the technology strategy. This can be, for example, budget decisions 
or the application of specific processes and tools. Differences between 
stakeholders and the way how they are seen by each other (consultant or just 
controller) help to understand and interpret cultural differences and their 
consequences.  
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Last but not least, it has to be asked how far the information divulged during an 
interview is hidden, filtered or embellished and what motivates such behaviour. 
The all-important closing question is which other people the current interviewee 
could recommend to be contacted for an interview. All the elements under 
investigation can vary a lot from case to case (Kaufmann, 1999). Subsequently, 
using a methodology allowing identification of divergences between the 
individual cases is very important (Yin, 2003). Any judgement of the outcome of 
the case studies can only take place after all the case studies have been 
concluded and cross checks between the cases run. This ensures consistent 
evaluation and interpretation of the case study results and reduces the risk of 
misinterpretation (Mason, 1996).  
 
For the fieldwork, it means that all the relevant dimensions outlined in this 
paragraph need to be reflected in the guidelines for the semi-structured 
interviews and individually supplemented during the interviews to extract the 
maximum from each interview. Each situation and person is different and so are 
their perceptions and views about situations, processes and the world as a 
whole. Finding an empathic connection with each interviewee is the key to 
gathering data and information that cannot be accessed by a strict, structured 
interview with exactly the same questions asked in the same order.  
 
 
 
63 
Chapter 4 Research design and methodology 
This chapter is dedicated to understanding the interaction between institutional 
investors and companies they own, in order to gain an insight into the 
processes and systematic that are typically involved in such relationships. One 
of the core targets of this work was to establish clarity regarding the expertise 
and involvement of institutional shareholders in the technology strategy 
deployed by companies they own, which also covers all the mechanisms of 
interaction between the parties. The technologies can be applied in the 
production processes, they can lie in marketed or semi-finished products that 
are used internally and they can also have a strong correlation with a specific 
sector or market. In the example of GEC that was mentioned in the introduction 
the chosen market and the technology were closely related. For this thesis an 
influence in the corporate technology strategy via a market decision would be 
considered but only as an indirect trigger. 
 
4.1 Methodology definition and case study preparation 
The initial groundwork for the research used all the secondary data available 
relating to the research topic. There is a lot of literature and data on stakeholder 
activism, finance investor involvement, corporate governance and other areas 
of the research topic chosen for this thesis. Besides the sources for the 
literature review (see paragraph 3.1), the following information on the 
companies and investment funds was used to prepare for the interviews: 
- Annual reports 
- Corporate newspapers 
- Corporate websites 
- Corporate press releases 
- Corporate information packages for investors 
- Investor websites 
- Other publications available on the internet (news, magazines, …) 
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A condensed package of data and information was prepared for each case. 
This included size (revenue and number of employees), markets served, global 
footprint, annual R&D spending, stock of patents, annual patent filing, financial 
and other KPIs. Data collection began about 6 months before the first interview 
took place and continued up until the last interview, to ensure the information 
about the business was up-to-date. Historical data from up to 5 years ago was 
included. This analysis sometimes made it possible to deduce why an 
investment fund became involved. In some, but not all cases, the literature even 
included statements by the investment fund stating the reasons for the investor 
involvement. It is equally important to understand what type of investor the 
investor is and their intention and role in the specific investment.  
 
The duration of investor involvement and the evolution of the firm’s performance 
in this period is also helpful information, but not always available. Looking at the 
details of the results published by individual researchers produced a good 
framework which could then be supplemented with new findings generated by 
an advanced research project. A good understanding of the available data is 
vital in ensuring the right approach is taken to contribute further to the topic. The 
research questions address a gap that currently exists, this is confirmed after 
the detailed literature review, summarised in the previous chapter. The 
statistical evidence already available in the form of quantitative research about 
general institutional investor activity with regards to R&D (David et al., 2001) is 
a good starting point, even though the mechanisms of direct interaction that 
drive the actual measurable influence on R&D have yet to be exposed.  
 
However, a research project in greater depth, focusing on the direct interaction 
between the leadership teams of both the investor and the corporate 
management was needed to close this gap. The results of this research project 
could be used to verify the numerical data analysis already done by other 
researchers, as the approach and target outcomes are different. The decision 
on whether a qualitative or quantitative approach was more likely to produce the 
necessary information in the required quality and amount was straightforward. 
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As each company’s relationship with its stakeholders is individual, the research 
project needed to deliver insight into the micro-level of interaction between the 
stakeholders in all forms of interaction, regular, irregular, verbal and written. It 
would be unrealistic to expect that communication follows a standard format, a 
lot of exchange is situation and topic dependent.  
 
It’s in the nature of the beast that in some case studies divergent characteristics 
were found which required a different methodology. In order to extract sufficient 
information and to understand the mechanisms of interaction an exploratory 
methodology was necessary so the work was not just a summary of existing 
data, but also a contribution to the scientific knowledge database in its own 
right. In other words, the method of choice at this point had to be the qualitative 
one. In view of this and other facts, the methods available to choose from were 
actually limited. After a careful review and discussion with the supervisors, the 
research method most appropriate for this project clearly had to be case study 
research. This method ensures that maximum insight is gained through the 
flexibility and room for adaptation inherent in the individual scenarios being 
studied.  
 
Ideally, case study research is based on personal observation. This was not 
possible, as the access to high-level meetings could not be granted to the 
extent that would be required to produce the necessary information. All the 
parties who contributed to the project confirmed this. The second best, but in 
effect only feasible option, was to conduct personal interviews with the people 
who are actually involved in the processes. A semi-structured questionnaire 
appeared to be a solution to allow the interviewees to be guided and also allow 
them to describe in detail their specific situation and experiences (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002). The target subjects were the asset managers of institutional 
investors and senior executives of businesses in their ownership. The extent to 
which other people involved in the process could also deliver valuable 
information was one of the things that only became clear after the project had 
begun and the first interviews had already been conducted.  
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Due to the complex environment affecting each individual finance investor  
company relationship, each situation or case is entirely individual and unique. 
Subsequently the number and kinds of people who can provide a detailed 
insight into the cooperation and interaction between the finance investors on the 
one side and the corporate management on the other side can be expected to 
vary from case to case. Thus it was important to find a good balance between a 
structured, equivalent and replicable way of working and to maintain the 
required sensitivity and broadness to identify areas, activities and people who 
could make a positive contribution to the research project. Flexibility was a must 
to guarantee that the maximum amount of information was obtained from each 
individual case and person.  
 
Before starting the research project, all the available secondary data was 
analysed and evaluated. The results are summarised in chapter 3 in the form of 
a literature review. They represent the fundament of this research project. This 
sets the scene for the actual design, corresponding methods and procedures of 
the research. The design of the questionnaire was based on the knowledge and 
information collated from the initial analysis of secondary data. The interview 
was more of a guided conversation than a strict question and answer session 
(Yin, 2003). The ability of the interviewer to achieve a positive and comfortable 
atmosphere is an important skill that is highly important for the quality and 
amount of information that can be produced from an interview (Yin, 2003). The 
person being interviewed should be able talk as openly as possible and it is the 
responsibility of the interviewer to note down all the relevant data produced by 
the interview.  
 
4.2 Final content of the interviews; planning of the analysis 
The interviews were all based on the same set of questions. The interviewees 
were free to stray from the central question. The following questions were 
designed to produce a cluster of responses, allowing identification of similarities 
interdependencies and both convergent and divergent phenomena: 
67 
0. General data: (a) Industry - firm, name, position, how long with firm? (b) 
Investor firm, name, role, age + experience? 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom? 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting, ...)? 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects, …) and who prepares/receives it? 
5. Do your asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest, …)? 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is or who can be the 3rd party be (specific division of investor, independent 
consulting company, …)? 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
7b. If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
8. What is the link/relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and influence on technology strategy? 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will be successful in the mid- to long-term? 
10a. What can investors do to influence their portfolio companies’ technology 
strategy? 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers restrict 
information – if yes/no – why? 
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10c. Are all investors (and asset managers) the same or are there differences 
between them? 
11. Is the technology strategy indirectly influenced by, e.g. budget decisions? 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
14. Can you recommend other people whom I could interview? 
 
This set of questions was developed in conjunction with the tables used to 
illustrate the results in chapter four. There was a predefined set of sub-
questions for each question, so that an answer which initially delivered 
insufficient information could be probed by adjusting and extending the 
questions until a complete answer was obtained. The decision was made to 
supplement the text with tables and give the reader a quick comparison of the 
key outcomes. Each table summarises the answers to one question. The 
condensed answers allow comparison and analysis across all the study cases. 
In addition to the individual questions, the cases were screened for convergent 
and divergent results; as well as isolated findings, which could deliver extra 
information for the study. 
 
4.3 Case study execution 
Before the final research work began, a pilot project was carried out to test 
whether the chosen methodology and research plan were appropriate and 
sufficient to answer the questions posed by the project. The investigation is 
likely to catalyse ideas and provide motivation for further quantitative research. 
A wide range of secondary data analysis covering stakeholder activism, 
corporate governance and organisational learning combined with the results 
from case studies for this research ensured that high-quality scientific data was 
generated. The interviews were all conducted in the same way for the different 
stakeholders so that by applying the matched method to each individual case 
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and a subsequent synthesis across all cases, divergences became visible 
immediately.  
 
It was clear from the beginning of the research project and confirmed during the 
secondary data analysis that a lot of divergences would be found in the study 
cases and that these would need to be understood and explained. 
Consequently analysis of the results was equally or even more important than 
the preparation and conduction of the interviews (Mohrman and Lawler, 2012). 
For all divergences found, explanations had to be found and root causes 
defined to ensure that the right conclusions were drawn. In the same way, when 
the results validated each other, it was still necessary to see whether the 
underlying reasons and driving factors were convergent or whether different 
factors accidentally produced the same result or whether the “interviewee’s 
intention” produced the same result.  
 
Evaluation of the interviewee’s openness und trustworthiness is something that 
cannot be measured objectively without subjective influences. But a good gut 
feeling helps to interpret non-aligned statements from different people and 
contributes to a broader understanding of the mechanisms and 
interdependencies between different authorities ((Kempster, 2009)). It is unlikely 
that all interviewees will talk openly about any hidden agendas they might have, 
but a few indirect questions can uncover a lot that would remain invisible in 
direct conversation (Mohrman and Lawler, 2012). A prerequisite in ensuring that 
the deductions made from the interview answers have considered all the 
relevant influencing dimensions is the definition of all those dimensions. Such 
dimensions are quantitative dimensions, for example, the age of organisations 
under analysis, their size in terms of annual revenue and number of employees 
(see table 2) and their ownership structure (see table 3).  
 
In some cases things appeared to be simple at first sight, but then when the 
complex interaction of different stakeholders, different company policies, 
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different products, etc. was considered, incorrect initial assumptions meant that 
potentially specific characteristics of a case had not been brought to light. In 
such cases there was no option other than to dig into the details and conduct a 
complete portfolio of analysis before a conclusion could be confirmed. When 
rival explanations for the same results were found, the analysis had to be re-
done and re-focussed (Yin, 2003). In three cases, a second round of analysis or 
interview was required when conflicting arguments could neither be confirmed 
nor aligned and for this the interviewee(s) had to agree to further interview, 
which again took several weeks time.  
 
Developing models for individual cases and then applying them to other cases 
with iterative adjustments (Schnell et al., 1999) based on the data matrixes 
summarising the relevant variables turned out to be helpful in reducing the 
complexity of this multi-case study project. This proved to be a very useful tool 
in looking at processes, delegation of authority and the impact on the 
technology strategy of companies, while simultaneously justifying the 
condensation of the relevant facts and figures. While in the beginning it 
appeared to be a major challenge to get sufficient data for analysis, later the 
challenge was in the opposite – namely how to filter for the right and relevant 
data. 
 
4.4 Identification of interview partners and the interview process 
One of the first steps in the project was to understand and define who the right 
people to interview were. It is clear that the most valuable and accurate 
information about the businesses will come from the CEO or the people in the 
first management line. These people are in touch with the investors and are 
directly involved in the interaction and decision making process. On the investor 
side, asset managers and other people who are in direct interaction with the 
companies were also targeted for interview. Identifying suitable interview 
partners was one of the first major hurdles, as not every investment firm or 
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company website is transparent enough to allow access to their senior 
executives.  
 
However, access is one thing and relatively easy compared to the next difficult 
step, which is arranging an interview. A suitable interviewee in the investee area 
had to have had experience with a couple of investments in which technology 
played a dominant role, either in the product itself or in the production or 
support processes. When it is difficult to gain direct access to a target person, 
there are bypass strategies that may result in access to that person despite the 
initial hurdles experienced. It can be helpful to build up a relationship and 
understanding of the research topic at the assistant level, that is, with someone 
who has direct contact with the target person. The availability of a free slot in 
the calendar of an executive can rapidly increase when their assistant is 
motivated to lobby for you.  
 
This kind of lobbyist involvement is frequently used in business and has proven 
to be a successful approach for this research project too. The only 
disadvantage with this strategy is the additional time needed. However, if 
another interview time slot had to be arranged at a later date, the “network” 
already built up was often very useful. It is a sign of our times that people in 
senior management are nowadays overloaded with a daily bombardment of 
emails, meetings and conference calls. Thus initial reluctance or impeded 
access does not necessarily equate to a lack of willingness to support research 
projects such as this one. Nevertheless, such protection mechanisms had to be 
penetrated or by-passed to ensure there was maximum input into the research 
project.  
 
This major hurdle was also a factor that affected the sample size. In theory 
there are hundreds of potential interview candidates out there, of whom the 
majority cannot be accessed or are unwilling to contribute. As time for most of 
the prospective interview candidates is their most rare resource, they do not 
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readily offer a slice of this to an unknown researcher. That does not mean it is 
impossible to find sources of information, but it was one of the most difficult and 
uncertain parts of this project and required the application of inventiveness and 
ingenuity to break through to the targeted interviewees. After identifying and 
then convincing suitable interviewees to be interviewed, the next tricky step was 
to generate enough trust to allow them to talk openly about their experience and 
knowledge.  
 
Keeping all data confidential was a priority and this had to be guaranteed right 
from the start. It must always be kept in mind that the interviewee is entirely free 
to decide what to tell, what not to tell, how to explain and what to hide. Before 
the initial contact was made, all the available information about the company 
concerned, the person and the background were to be collected, analysed and 
evaluated. If data about a specific and related investment case was available, 
that too had to be studied and analysed as well. This basis allows 
communication with the interviewees to begin at eye level. There is no doubt 
that all interviewees appreciate the interviewer being armed with basic 
information and knowledge, to avoid starting with the very basics, but instead 
build on the information the interviewer already has.  
 
4.5 Sample definition and description 
The subjects under investigation are companies that are in the ownership of 
finance investors. Each action, driven either by the company management or 
the investor can potentially have a direct or indirect effect on any parameter of 
the company. Which parameters those are and which ones are relevant to this 
research project and the ones chosen for monitoring is discussed later. A 
company can be active in various areas and many of the parameters, 
depending on the area of activity, are at least partly predefined. In light of the 
subject of the research, it is obvious that only those companies active in an area 
in which technology strategy is of importance were elements of interest for in-
depth analysis. Whether the technology is in the product or in the process does 
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not matter, as the question is not restricted to one or the other, but to 
technology strategy in general.  
 
Having defined the area of activity required for companies suitable for the 
research sample, the next decision to be taken was how narrow the filter had to 
be. Does investor influence depend on the area of activity and is it subsequently 
necessary to focus on companies in a certain area? The assumption made for 
this project was no, it is not necessary to focus on one area. The reason for this 
decision was that in this analysis, the only thing of relevance was whether an 
investor was aiming to influence the companies in the area of technology 
strategy or not. The sources of information and support used by the investor are 
interesting from the helicopter view, but whether relevant information is obtained 
from consultant A or B is irrelevant. It is only important to know whether external 
expertise is used, all the rest was immaterial at this stage.  
 
A further academic paper may be necessary to generate additional evidence. 
Does the size of a business influence investor effort or investment aimed at 
improving the performance of it? If company size always equals potential in 
terms of earnings or share value, the answer would probably be yes. However, 
small companies do sometimes deliver multiple ROIs that can scarcely be 
gained with large investments, thus company size does not matter. Whether the 
engagement lasts weeks, months or years is also not primarily important in 
answering the research question. As the complexity of a company normally 
corresponds to its size, the overall amount of effort that an investor may need to 
make is also equivalent to size (roughly speaking). But that is not the focus of 
this thesis.  
 
The aforementioned facts suggested that filtering by company size was not 
appropriate. Much more relevant is the potential the investor expects to be able 
to convert into earnings for themselves. The conventions and corresponding 
regulatory framework of the investor’s institution can predefine or limit the 
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options available to exert influence. When committees are installed to define on 
a consensus basis the direction of the technology strategy to be followed, the 
input and influence that an investor can exert is limited. When the committee 
members are experts in the area, even third-party expertise requested by an 
investor might be ignored.  
 
When the members of the committee work part-time and are not fully dependent 
on their financial compensation they are more likely try to fight in line with their 
own conviction and not in line with the definition of their role. However, the 
opposite may be the case when an investor has the power to uninstall such a 
committee or even part of the company management, because of a mismatch in 
understanding the way the company should go. The age dimension of the 
portfolio companies was considered, but not seen as relevant for a company 
which was no longer a start-up and had reached a certain level of maturity. The 
sample was selected using a minimum age of 10 years as the threshold. 
Thereafter it can be assumed that the company is recognised and settled in the 
market.  
 
In parallel, the market position, growth rate and product portfolio of the company 
were analysed in comparison to competitors in the same segment. This helped 
to confirm that the company had indeed found its place in the market and was 
not just a new star on the rise. Nonetheless the analysis investigated the 
findings for a correlation with the age dimension, even if this was not expected 
beforehand. In the area of finance, the effects and regulations of the capital 
market discipline are significant as they can play a major role in the decision 
making process with regards to e.g. the risk involved in an investment. For this 
specific research project, the effects of the capital market discipline were not of 
major importance. They have nothing to do with the capability an investor has to 
exert influence on the technology strategy of their investments, nor do they 
affect the possibility of introducing such know-how, if available.  
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The maximum effect would be a limitation in certain areas and something that 
could still be identified and analysed due to the flexibility of the research 
methodology chosen. The regulations regarding insider trading could not 
influence the outcome of this research project either, as possible limitations due 
to insider trading do not correlate either to competencies on the investor side or 
their influence and expertise within a firm. However, insider trading was a 
potential roadblock in the interviews with the company management of public 
companies. The interview partner might not have been able to talk openly about 
what is going on in terms of technology strategy, as they might have given an 
insight that would generate an advantage compared to other shareholders. This 
risk however, appears to have been minimum and not to have limited the 
outcome of this research as the questions were about the interaction processes 
only and not about technological details.  
 
Press announcements about changes in companies’ top management are often 
evidence of weak company performance. It is a normal process signifying that 
shareholders and stakeholders are trying to improve an imperfect situation. This 
fact could lead to the assumption that the same happens in the area of 
technology strategy. If a company is managing its technology strategy 
successfully, why should an investor be involved? On the other hand, if a 
company is struggling in that area, is an investor likely to know better than the 
company management about how to improve the situation? The assumption for 
this research was that an investor who has personal know-how or who is 
interested in the area of technology strategy would be involved in that field.  
 
No matter whether the involvement is just to make sure everything is on track or 
to exert major influence, the mechanisms and actions are likely to be similar, 
independent of company performance and other actions that might be taken or 
supported by the investor involved. The ownership structure of a company is 
definitely a significant parameter in evaluating the extent to which external 
investors exert influence. Depending on the dominance of individual 
shareholders, the potential can be minimal or major. Minor shareholders, for 
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example, would find it very difficult to dictate the direction of the technology 
strategy when the CEO himself is a major shareholder of the company. This is 
actually often the case for companies that were privately owned before they 
went public.  
 
For sure, the way in which an investor would try to influence decisions is 
different compared to the influence a private equity investor with 90% share in a 
firm would have. Nevertheless, a major point to be analysed in this thesis was 
whether an investor has the capability and interest to exert influence on 
technology strategy. Should this not be the case, then other questions about 
exerting influence become purely secondary. With regards to the structure and 
limitation of ownership, it should be said that some investors do not care 
whether their number of shares is significant or not. A few well-known people 
have been known to act aggressively and publish provocative unpleasant letters 
they have written to the company top management. Even if the content is 
entirely false or some accusations are exaggerated, for the people concerned, it 
can result in a loss of credibility in the public eye and cause a lot of stress.  
 
Such behaviour and attitudes are the exception not the rule, but strong wording 
is an excellent eye-catcher for the “yellow” press and exposure to the broad 
public. The final selection of suitable interviewees was made via a database 
published on the website of the “German Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association” (www.bvkap.de). All companies that were chosen had a strong link 
with technology and technology strategy. Verification extracted from the 
company websites and articles that the products of the firm as well as the 
processes are strongly dependent on technology drove the decision process. In 
total, 263 companies were contacted via email. Of the first batch of emails, 17 
companies replied that they do not give any information about their investments 
to third parties.  
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Some 31 companies replied to the first email reminder (second round of 
interviewee contact), of which 6 finally sent positive feedback, whereas 25 
refused access. In the third round, companies were called by phone with the 
result that more 8 said they were willing to meet for an interview. The final 
sample used in the multiple case study research, consisted of 14 cases, 
comprising expert interviews with finance investors and companies in their 
portfolio. At the pilot stage, the focus of the work was on getting a general 
insight into the interaction between finance investors and the businesses. For 
the pilot study, both an experienced asset manager and a CEO of a private 
equity owned company were interviewed.  
 
The details of this are included in the company A and company B case studies, 
described in the following chapter. In total, 43 people from the 14 companies 
and finance investment companies were interviewed between 2007 and 2011. 
From the total number of interviewees, 26 had a leading role at a portfolio 
company and 17 were asset managers or portfolio team members.  
 
   Interviews in calendar year 
Case 
Number of 
interviews with 
portfolio company 
representatives 
Number of 
interviews with 
finance investor 
representatives 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A 1 1 X - X - - 
B 4 1 X X - - - 
C 3 2 - - - X - 
D 1 1 - - - X - 
E 4 2 - - X X - 
F 2 1 - - X X - 
G 1 1 - - - - X 
H 2 1 - - - X X 
I 1 1 - - - - X 
J 1 2 - - - - X 
K 2 1 - - - - X 
L 1 1 - - - X X 
M 1 1 - - - - X 
N 2 1 - - - - X 
total 26 17      
Table 1 - Interview timeline 
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Case 
Annual 
turnover 
in 
million 
EUR 
Number of 
employees 
Foundation 
year of 
portfolio 
company / 
age in yrs 
@ first 
interview 
Products are 
commodities, 
innovative 
or both 
(mixed 
portfolio) 
Technology 
and 
innovation 
is found in 
product, 
process 
or both 
EBITDA 
level x as 
% of the 
annual 
turnover 
Trend of 
financial 
performance 
A 70 95 1985 / 22 innovative both 10<x≤15 stable 
B 1,000 8,000 1954 / 53 innovative both 0<x≤5 negative 
C 400 2,500 1953 / 57 innovative both 0<x≤5 negative 
D 60 300 1925 / 85 both both 5<x≤10 positive 
E 1,300 13,000 1988 / 21 both both 10<x≤15 positive 
F 500 4,300 1857 / 152 both both 5<x≤10 positive 
G 40 250 1956 / 55 both both 0<x≤5 stable 
H 110 600 1960 / 50 both both 0<x≤5 negative 
I 60 400 1607 / 404 innovative both 5<x≤10 positive 
J 370 3,500 1997 / 14 innovative both 0<x≤5 negative 
K 180 1,800 1882 / 129 innovative both 10<x≤15 positive 
L 110 800 1906 / 104 innovative both 0<x≤5 negative 
M 750 5,200 1902 / 109 both both 15<x≤20 positive 
N 1,100 3,400 1965 / 46 both both 15<x≤20 positive 
Table 2 - Profile of the portfolio companies involved in the interviews 
 
The businesses are active in the areas of software, electronics, mechanical 
engineering and solar technology. The size of the portfolio companies which 
were analysed varies from 40 million Euro annual turnover and 95 employees to 
1.3 billion Euro annual turnover and more than 13,000 employees globally. The 
age of the corporations varied from 14 to more than 400 years, with a median 
age value of 56 years. The following tables provide a detailed overview of the 
case characteristics. Further information can be found in the case studies that 
are included as appendixes. The shareholder structure is illustrated in the 
following table. In all cases a dominant shareholder with more than 50% of 
shares is involved, while in cases A and C the majority shareholder was not a 
finance investor but the company founder and family.  
 
In all other cases the majority investor is a finance investor or a finance investor 
consortium. Free-floating shares were a feature of less than 5% of cases. 
Further information about the time of engagement of the individual investors 
and evolution of the businesses from foundation till today is included in each 
single case study report in the attachment. 
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Case 
Single shareholder 
with >50% shares? 
Dominant finance 
investor involved 
No. of shareholders with a 
share package y in % of 
total shares 10<y<50 
% of free 
floating shares 
A yes no four <5 
B yes yes two <5 
C yes no zero <5 
D yes yes two <5 
E yes yes zero <5 
F yes yes one <5 
G yes yes zero <5 
H yes yes zero <5 
I yes yes zero <5 
J yes yes zero <5 
K yes yes one <5 
L yes yes zero <5 
M yes yes zero <5 
N yes yes zero <5 
Table 3 - Shareholder structure of the portfolio companies involved in the interviews 
 
4.6 Advantages of the selected research design 
Because of the high number of relevant dimensions in this exploratory project, it 
would have been inadequate to conduct a pure quantitative analysis. To 
understand the complex relationship between companies and their investors 
with regards to technology strategy and to ensure that no relevant information 
was ignored or misinterpreted, it was absolutely necessary to collect and 
analyse qualitative data firstly. This was the only way to ensure that no relevant 
information was ignored or misinterpreted. The result of the doctoral thesis 
could in theory provide results that can then be used, applying a certain set of 
indicators, to generate quantitative data to broaden the analysis of the finance 
investor  company relationship.  
 
It was decided that if during the work, a combination of qualitative information 
and quantitative information appeared to be beneficial to the quality of the work, 
then both could be combined without a problem. The flexibility thus gained is a 
highly valuable advantage of the research design selected. Furthermore the 
interview style selected, based on a semi-structured questionnaire, allowed the 
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interviewer to adapt the questions and the conversation to specifics that came 
up during the interview and appeared to be significant to the project.  
 
4.7 Limitations of the research design 
Two people were interviewed for the pilot project and it immediately became 
clear that it is firstly very difficult to get initial access and then even more difficult 
to set up a date for an interview. Both interview partners were very busy people 
so the meetings had to be scheduled several weeks in advance. This was not a 
negative experience, but generally this sort of person is very difficult to access 
without an introduction by a friend or network connection. After contact was 
successfully established, another important issue was how to use the limited 
time in the most efficient way. A comfortable atmosphere is important, but it can 
also limit the information obtainable, especially if too much time is spent on 
conversation about hobbies or general things that are typical warming-up 
subjects.  
 
A remark about the prepared semi-structured questionnaire turned out to be a 
good way to return to the interview itself. In the run up to the day of the 
interview, it was vital to schedule sufficient time, not to forget how much effort is 
required to plan and carry out the interviews or to write up the collected 
information. Without good preparation for the interview, such as collecting 
information about the interviewees and the individual enterprises or investment 
cases, opportunities may be missed and the information obtained from the 
interview less than required. In general, the study was immensely challenging - 
particularly with regards to the individual cases and the different background 
conditions, which were essential to take into consideration. It is extremely 
helpful when an empathic connection can be made, but there is no standard 
recipe as all people are individuals and different.  
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Another aspect, which is of crucial importance to the interviewees, is 
confidentiality and trust. Most of the interviewees requested that neither their 
names nor the companies they were talking about should be mentioned in the 
thesis or in any publicly accessible document or file. The promise to codify all 
names in order to prevent identification of people or companies by an outsider 
at a later date was a key requirement in agreeing to be interviewed. Talking 
about this and convincing the interviewees that they can trust the interviewer 
was crucial in ensuring that the maximum amount of attainable information was 
harvested during the interviews. A potential problem was that the interview 
partners might give only filtered or even wrong information.  
 
It is their choice to accept being interviewed and naturally they are free to say 
what they will – the whole story, just a selected part of it or even a sugar-coated 
version. This could lead to a false interpretation or false conclusions. Therefore, 
it was necessary to phrase the questions in such a way that valuable knowledge 
could be given, information which would give insight into the relationship of the 
researched parties, without asking questions that were too confidential. Mistrust 
in the interview phase, would have been poison for the outcome and had to be 
avoided at all costs. However, If an interviewee did go deeper than expected 
into details that were of interest, but specific and confidential, this was 
welcomed as a chance to gain the maximum amount of information.  
 
4.8 Pilot project 
The mandatory first step in the actual fieldwork was to verify that the chosen 
methodology, its tools, the preparation, the resulting data and information were 
in line with both the expected and required outcome (Gill and Johnson, 2002). 
To do this, it was decided to carry out an initial pilot study that would include all 
the activities, preparation and analysis planned for the main research project. 
Two people from different investment cases were interviewed for the pilot study. 
Before the first interview took place, intensive research about the interviewee, 
their background and their current role in professional life was carried out. In a 
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last step before the interview itself started, the interviewee was prepared by 
providing some brief information about the interviewer, the subject of study and 
some keywords linked with the topic.  
 
From time to time during the interviews, a quick look at a document that listed 
some headwords as a mnemonic device proved to be extremely helpful. It 
became clear that it is very important to be flexible enough to be able to come 
up with additional questions when the feedback and explanations given by the 
interviewee required further probing. This is the only way to collate the 
maximum amount of information. After the pilot project, some questions that 
had not been included in the first version of the questionnaire, but which 
developed during the interviews were added as lessons learned. The pilot study 
showed that the questionnaire needed to be updated to get a fundamental 
overview of the relationship under investigation and to enable deduction of 
correct and appropriate results.  
 
Based on the detailed background information gained from secondary data, the 
discussions flowed well and did not stick because of a lack of knowledge or 
understanding on the part of the interviewer. The general experience from the 
pilot project was that the interviewees were very open to talk the experiences 
they had had with different types of investors or company managers. They 
expressed their personal views clearly and openly. Complex situations were 
described and explained in detail and with a great deal of patience, even when 
additional questions were asked to maximise the output and to investigate each 
and every aspect of the relationship. The questions just had to be specific and 
professionally addressed.  
 
One of the interviewees commented positively on the good knowledge and 
understanding that analysis of the existing literature had given me and said that 
he had experienced interviews with people who did not invest sufficient time in 
preparing for the interview by familiarising themselves with the available data. In 
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such interviews he refused to spend time explaining things that could easily be 
found on the company website or elsewhere. It is a matter of respect and 
professionalism that the interviewer is as well prepared as possible. The most 
important sources for preparing for the interviews, apart from the company and 
person specific information, proved to be a small number of articles in journals, 
a bachelor thesis about investor activism and a number of articles about asset 
managers, CEOs, companies in the ownership of finance investors, investment 
companies and investment cases.  
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Chapter 5 Findings from the case studies 
The following paragraph summarises the findings from all 14 case studies 
based on the questionnaire. This is followed by a conclusion and a discussion 
paragraph. The case study details are included as appendixes in the last part of 
this thesis. Specific information and results can be found there, however all the 
company names and interviewees’ names have been codified, as requested by 
the interviewees at the time of the interviews. Furthermore, the interviewees 
required an undertaking that the details would not be made accessible to the 
public, only the examiners at the university, as the descriptions of the 
companies make it very easy to identify the companies and subsequently the 
people interviewed. This shall apply for a minimum of ten years after the official 
submission of the thesis.  
 
Whenever possible, the outcomes of the individual questions from the 
questionnaire were illustrated with a table. As all the analysis followed a 
qualitative approach, not targeting any quantitative result, the questions in most 
cases could be answered with either a Yes or a No. This was to avoid the 
impression that numerical data was being collated, as this was not the intention 
in the pre-interview phase. The preparation and actual interviews were not 
designed to yield quantitative data. Nevertheless, a tabulated summary gives a 
quick and clear overview of the core outcome and as such is a good add-on for 
the aggregated feedback section.  
 
5.1 Detailed summary of answers to the semi-structured questionnaire 
The following findings were established by the manual screening, question by 
question of all data and feedback collected during the interviews. 
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1. How often do investors and investees communicate? 
In all cases, both the investors and investees confirmed regular communication 
was standard. If shareholders do not have a dominant package, they cannot 
dictate the frequency or subject of the exchange. But still, some try to do so. If 
minority shareholders request information at short notice, an answer will only be 
given reluctantly by the portfolio company management, if an answer is given at 
all. This was observed in cases A and C. When an investor has a dominant 
share package they have the authority to decide when exchanges will take 
place and what the context should be. Feedback from the interviews confirms 
that this is the normal way of interaction between the investor and the company 
management.  
 
The closest contact between investor and investee was seen in the case of 
company F, where the finance investor consortium, which had taken over 
ownership from the previous single private equity investor, installed a chief 
restructuring officer. This person was in permanent contact with the finance 
investor steering committee.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange between finance 
investor and portfolio company 
once per month or less 
Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
Exchange between finance 
investor and portfolio company 
several times per month 
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4 - Frequency of communication between finance investor and portfolio company 
 
In conclusion, it can be summarised that in order to be permanently up to 
speed, finance investors with dominant share packages typically meet the CEO 
of the companies monthly or bi-monthly, sometimes with the involvement of the 
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top management team. Minority shareholders have to be content with the 
minimal insight they are allowed by law (as accorded by the size of their share 
package). Finance investors who own majority packages have frequent 
exchanges by phone and email as well. On average, weekly communication by 
both phone and email is standard. The only exception in the cases was 
company D, where the standard frequency was only monthly, with on-demand 
exceptions. The on-demand exchanges were typically to get approval for 
investments or other decisions with impact on the finances.  
 
Contact was much closer during specific phases, e.g. budget preparation, and 
the frequency of exchange with the dominant investor involved, higher in all 
cases. Furthermore, investors frequently join or support project teams at 
companies in their portfolio for a period of time. The most common objective of 
such projects is either to investigate and define actions regarding markets and 
product portfolio or to identify weak points in the organisation or the financial 
models used to evaluate business cases. Involvement can mean that a team is 
based at the portfolio company for the time of the project or the involvement can 
just as well be remote, by phone and email or as a back office function to 
analyse data. In all cases where the finance investor does not have a majority 
share package, personal meetings are scheduled for a maximum of once per 
quarter or twice a year.  
 
This is because in such cases there is no actual investor involvement in the 
decision-making processes. Emails or phone calls are rare, on average less 
than once per month. In conclusion it is evident that the frequency of personal 
meetings as well as of other channels of communication correlates to both the 
size of the share package and the influence that an investor can exert by law on 
the portfolio company.  
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2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom 
(investor/investee)? 
The representative of the business, who leads the exchanges and joins most 
meetings in person, is the CEO. This was confirmed across all cases. CEO`s 
are also in the loop regarding all the other exchanges where they are not 
personally involved. They receive copies of the emails, meeting minutes and 
status reports from their teams who are in touch with the investor without their 
involvement. From the investor side, the asset manager plays the same role as 
the CEO of the portfolio company. In some cases, steering committees will have 
been installed with more investor representatives. This of course depends on 
the size of the portfolio company and the importance of decisions that have to 
be taken for the portfolio company or the investment firm as a whole.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Portfolio company CEO leads the 
exchange from investee side 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other C-level members of the 
portfolio company are occasionally 
involved 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Portfolio company members below 
C-level are occasionally involved 
No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
The exchange from the investor 
side is led by an asset manager 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other management members from 
the investor side are occasionally 
involved (e.g. a defined steering 
committee) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other investor representatives 
such as portfolio teams are 
occasionally involved 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5 - Overview of people involvement in the portfolio comany <=> finance 
investor exchange process 
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For specific projects, an investment firm may also send analysts or portfolio 
team members to the portfolio company to support and closely monitor specific 
activities to ensure decisions are made in line with the targets and strategy of 
the investment firm. The only case where the investor placed a chief 
restructuring officer as a permanent leader in a portfolio company was case F. 
The instalment of a chief restructuring officer to report directly to the investor is 
a kind of last measure when fundamental actions cannot be handled by the 
portfolio company management itself due to limitations of knowledge or 
experience or when the investor does not have sufficient trust in the portfolio 
company management.  
 
The leading role the company CEO and the asset manager take in the 
exchange process is homogeneously evident in all cases. Involvement of other 
C-level members from the company and a steering committee from the investor 
side was observed in all cases apart from G. This can be explained by the size 
of both the company G and the majority investor, as both were much smaller 
than those involved in the other cases in terms of annual turnover, and capital 
invested. 
 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
A personal meeting was the preference specified by all people interviewed for 
regular reviews and important decisions, and something that cannot be 
substituted either by email, phone or videoconference. Some decisions are not 
important enough to require both parties sitting in the same room where not 
only words but also gestures and facial expressions are exchanged during the 
communication. Face-to-face meetings are vital for different kinds of 
presentations such as budget presentations, important product presentations or 
human resource decisions when an investor has a share package big enough to 
grant him the right to be involved in such processes. It was very important for all 
the investors interviewed to have personal contact with the company top 
management on a regular basis.  
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From time to time visits to the production sites are on the agenda as well, but 
are relatively seldom. On average a maximum of once a year. The portfolio 
company management will always take care to prepare for investor visits to 
factories to avoid any negative surprises that could cause trouble and to deflect 
any embarrassing questions. Despite the advantages of personal meetings, the 
most common communication method is email, especially when the back and 
forth exchanges regarding a specific topic are also included in the count.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Use of email Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Use of phone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Use of personal meetings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Most frequently used method e/p e P p e e e/p e/p e/p e/p e/p p e/p e/p 
Preferred method for important 
topics (pm = personal meeting) 
pm pm pm p pm pm pm pm pm pm pm pm pm pm 
Table 6 - Overview of confirmed ways for regular communication 
 
Email is the best tool when a majority shareholder is involved in the approval 
process for investments or any other regularly recurring topics. The advantages 
of email it is easy to have more than one person in the loop and on the other 
hand it is not necessary to arrange an appointment in advance, as it is for a 
conference call. What does however often happen is that the investor is 
informed by email about an investment case, including the business case 
calculation, and then in parallel, further information is given by phone, so 
avoiding the inclusion of a long story in the email. For bilateral exchanges, the 
preferred and most dominant communication method is the conference call, 
because immediate interaction and discussion is much more effective than 
exchange by email.  
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4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the 
report (key figures, projects…) and who prepares/receives it? 
Besides general communication via the different channels, a regular reporting 
system was in place for all the investment cases analysed for this research 
project. In the cases where the finance investors had no dominant share 
package, reporting was once per quarter or even just once per semester. The 
content of the reports is the same as that which can be found in the annual 
reports published by the companies, but lighter and without specific project or 
initiative data. This was found in cases A and C. The reporting tool is strongly 
influenced by the investors in the cases where one investor or a consortium of 
finance investors has a dominant package. This was evident in all cases except 
in I where the investor agreed to a one-to-one internal monthly summary from 
the C-level management.  
 
In all the other cases with dominant investor involvement, information additional 
to the standard KPIs was requested such as turnover, the number of quality 
complaints, the book-to-bill ratio and the corresponding plan  actual 
comparisons. One very important area of reporting is the status of projects and 
initiatives, no matter whether these are new products or important product lines. 
In case B, the investor provided the portfolio company with a design of a 
project-reporting tool that looked like the instrument panel in a car. In case D, 
the portfolio company had some weaknesses in the production area that 
negatively impacted the overall efficiency of the production equipment. Thus the 
OEE (Overall Equipment Efficiency) was one KPI specifically requested for 
inclusion in the reports.  
 
In case E, the focus for some time was on the result of pricing initiatives. In 
conclusion, it is clear that majority investors generally require a lot of 
information, but their requests are based on the current situation in the portfolio 
company. They generally then ask for further information or details to fully 
understand the situation and environment. This is important, no matter whether 
they intend to keep the investment for a long time or if an IPO or a sale is 
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planned in the near future. If the reports show a trend in either a positive or 
negative direction, the investor will question and re-evaluate how to continue 
with the investment. Top management in cooperation with all departments 
concerned prepares the reports. The recipients on the investor side are asset 
managers who will forward the reports internally for analysis by their portfolio 
teams and back offices.  
 
All the data included in the reports is critical and may require short notice follow-
up meetings for serious discrepancies or even when a negative trend is starting 
to be visible. Thus a CEO will review the content carefully before it is finally 
transmitted to the investors, regardless of the fact that all the parameters to be 
included in a report are clearly defined.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regular reporting? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reporting is designed according to 
finance investor’s request (specific 
KPIs) 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 7 - Investor influence on portfolio company reporting 
 
Sometimes the manager delivering the information might not foresee the 
consequences or reactions of the investor. Therefore minor modifications to the 
wording or care in the selection of the subjects is necessary and very helpful to 
avoid unjustifiably alarming the investors. Manipulation of the data however, is 
strictly forbidden. 
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5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest…)? 
An asset manager typically has at least some basic knowledge and experience 
of the sectors or markets in which the companies in the portfolio under their 
leadership are active. All the interviewees said in certain cases the asset 
managers did have detailed expert knowledge about products and processes, 
however no such evidence was found in the case studies for this research. In 
the cases G, I, L and M, selection of the asset manager was made 
independently of considerations of experience or expertise in specific markets 
or products, but only according to the size of the portfolio company, the legal 
form and the current performance. In other words, any information regarding 
technological changes or proposals provided by the portfolio companies was 
not assessed directly by the asset managers.  
 
This is the major reason for the involvement of portfolio teams and back offices. 
These teams work to provide a benchmark in a comparison with other 
companies in the same markets. Generally, proposals for business cases and 
decisions of all sorts are prepared and presented by the portfolio company 
management. The investor steering committee then just decides YES, NO or 
REWORK. All the investors commented that they do not need to have expert 
knowledge down to the very last detail. Their area of expertise is to drive 
decisions based on data that has been collected and analysed by other people 
beforehand.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Portfolio company activity 
(products, markets...) drives 
selection of the asset manager 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Portfolio company size/legal 
form/actual performance drives 
the selection of the asset manager 
No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Table 8 – Factors that dominate the asset manager’s selection process for potential 
investments 
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6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or 
advice? Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, 
independent consulting company…)? 
The first time 3rd party expertise is utilised in an investment project is the pre-
investment phase. This is when the finance investors have to evaluate the real 
value of the company and what they can and have to pay to get the business, 
but also how to ensure that it will be a profitable investment for them. In the pre-
investment phase, the finance investor normally buys the third-party expertise 
whereas in the investment phase, it is regularly the responsibility of the 
company to pay for it. Third-party advice was used in the pre-investment phase 
in all research cases except C. After a finance investor has entered into an 
investment, they often recommend or even dictate which 3rd party has to be 
involved in which topic.  
 
This is typically based on the often very long and extensive experience they 
have had with selected consultancies and institutes. Worth mentioning here 
again is the case of the company F, where a chief restructuring officer was 
deployed as a permanent 3rd party to drive the changes and reorganisation 
within a portfolio company on a global basis. In this situation, the top priority 
was to improve the most significant company parameters such as the EBITda, 
to make the company more attractive to both the current owner and any 
potential buyer. Although in the other research cases no one was deployed as a 
permanent manager at a portfolio company, the priorities were similar. Investors 
will often request the involvement of a third-party consultancy for major 
decisions, not because they are looking for a blueprint for the right technology 
strategy, but just to double check the business case and analysis already done 
by the portfolio company management.  
 
This process frequently happens in parallel, meaning third-party experts are 
involved in the analysis and business case preparation, so the investor already 
has the guarantee that the evaluation is objective and based on the best 
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available knowledge. Evidence for this was found in all cases where dominant 
investor involvement was present, but not in G or I. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor involved No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Third-party expertise is used in the 
pre-investment phase 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Third-party expertise is used for 
specific business cases involving 
e.g. new markets, new technology 
or to generally improve the 
company performance 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 9 - Involvement of 3rd party expertise in the pre-investment and actual 
investment phase 
 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their 
portfolio companies? 
All the finance investors in the research cases considered the technology and 
the corresponding technology strategy used and applied at companies in their 
portfolio as an area of high importance. This is due to the strong correlation 
between technology and the market value of a portfolio company regarding a 
potential sale and impact on short and long term earnings. In cases G and H 
however, lots of other issues were also in the spotlight of the investors in the 
active investment phase so that technology and technology strategy were not 
really on the priority radar. The focus was more on stabilising processes and the 
business model as a whole. In none of the cases had an asset manager or 
finance investor tried to exert direct influence on the technology or the 
technology strategy.  
 
This is considered to be the area of expertise and accountability of the company 
top management and CEO. The finance investors are not and do not want to be 
experts in this area of activity. This was the opinion of both the finance investors 
and portfolio company representatives who were interviewed.  
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 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Finance investor pays attention to 
technology strategy and considers 
it to be a key indicator of the 
company market position and 
value 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finance investor wants to be 
involved in the decision making 
process regarding the technology 
strategy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is one of the 
top areas watched by the finance 
investor in the investment phase 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finance investor wants to drive 
the direction of the technology 
strategy 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 
Table 10 - Finance investor perspective on portfolio company technology strategy 
 
The job of asset managers is to make sure that all decisions are made based 
on sufficient information and their target is to achieve the best possible outcome 
for the investment company. Apart from the financial and segment specific 
limitations and restrictions applicable to projects and investments in the 
technology strategy of companies in the portfolios of finance investors, it has 
become evident that no finance investor is primarily interested in technology 
strategy or any real long term planning that does not have a financial impact on 
him. What does count for investors is that the business case and the correlating 
figures prepared by the company management are robust and substantial. A 
limiting factor is that specific financial results and parameters have to be in a 
certain range at the time of sale.  
 
If they are not reached, severe cuts in different areas such as labour, 
investment, etc. may be the consequence with potential negative impacts on 
areas such as technology. In some cases this might help a company to survive 
when, e.g. the top management is obsessed with technology, believing the right 
technology will solve every problem with the consequence that little attention is 
given to the finances and parameters other than technology influencing the 
company situation.  
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7b. If investors do influence technology strategy, on which basis do they 
do that (legitimation)? 
The data and information accumulated from the case studies shows that the 
finance investors do not know better than the company management as to 
which technology or technology strategy is the right one. This is also not their 
role, but they do have to make the best of any portfolio company. Their overall 
aim is to achieve maximum return taking into consideration both short-term 
earnings and sales revenue when the portfolio company is later sold. Actually, 
in all cases the finance investors stated that they had insufficient expertise to 
dictate or even suggest the best direction for the technology strategy. It is 
evident that proposals from the expert committee at the portfolio company are 
double-checked, but often not directly or solely by the asset managers.  
 
This is the typical area of activity and involvement of third-party companies and 
back office analysts. They are also unlikely to be experts in the area. But they 
evaluate and verify the assumptions and framework parameters and check that 
no parameters have been forgotten. Furthermore, there are cases where 
experts from outside the portfolio company have expert knowledge that allows 
them to judge how promising a proposed technology strategy is and what the 
potential risks are. The difference between investor influenced companies and 
most owner-led and owned companies is the willingness to take financial risks 
by taking on new technologies. An independent entrepreneur might follow a 
specific technology against the opinion and conviction of all other people.  
 
This is not to say that finance investors do not take risks. They do and 
sometimes it is the investments with the biggest risks that deliver the biggest 
returns. But when all the analysts and experts are convinced that the direction 
an entrepreneur would like to take is wrong, no investor group is going to decide 
to follow him. 
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 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Do finance investors think they or 
their teams have the expertise or 
legitimation to drive technology 
decisions 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Do finance investors verify (w or 
w/o external support) the 
alignment of a technology strategy 
proposed by the portfolio company 
management with the investor 
targets 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 11 - Actual finance investor involvement and legitimation to influence their 
portfolio company's technology strategy 
 
Furthermore, innovations are often not radical, but appear in incremental steps. 
The small steps do not always guarantee a direct positive financial effect, but 
they can be vital to get past the next junction on the long-term strategy road and 
positioning of the company. When investor involvement in the decision making 
process is too strong, the possibilities of investigating such new ideas 
pragmatically and without too much analysis beforehand are limited. In case I 
the investor was even the one pushing forward some investments to update the 
production technology, but not because he knew more about the technology. 
The dormant potential for improvement was one of the reasons for the 
acquisition, known to the market before the investor acquired the business. 
 
 Another situation leading to more specific involvement was reported in case E. 
As the company structure at the time of purchase was not entirely compatible 
with the requirements of the potential buyers of the portfolio company, 
investments were concentrated in areas that were interesting for the potential 
buyers, and other areas were downgraded. 
 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analysts…)? 
The business analysts in the back offices and the members of the portfolio 
teams are the most important players in the finance investor’s support team. 
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They are involved and act as advisors in the sense that they analyse and 
evaluate data provided by the portfolio companies or other sources. Their main 
work is to follow up developments in the market of the portfolio companies, 
including the evolution and performance of competitors. Benchmark analysis is 
often used to work out where companies stand relative to each other. In 
addition, a major source of advice, specifically regarding products, processes or 
the technology strategy, is third-party consultants and institutes. At the end of 
the day, approval for proposals prepared by the portfolio company management 
has to come from the asset managers in charge of the investment. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Asset manager has strong support 
from back office analysts 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Asset manager has strong support 
from a whole portfolio team 
Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Third-party consultancies are 
utilised 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Valuable input comes from the 
asset manager network 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 12 - Asset managers’ sources of information 
 
The decision however is not only made on the basis of the facts and data 
prepared by the company. The input from the finance investor’s portfolio teams 
and analysts plus, if applicable, the feedback from 3rd party consultancies and 
institutes is very important as well. By intention or by chance the company 
analysis could miss some important parameters or facts so that the decision of 
the asset managers could potentially be based on insufficient information. All 
asset managers are fully aware that they might never have all or even sufficient 
information required to make the best decision. But by involving further 
expertise from different parties from inside and outside the investment 
companies, the risk of making wrong decisions due to absent or misinterpreted 
data is lower. 
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8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy 
influence? 
The aforementioned feedback from the case studies makes it clear that no 
finance investor has the intention of dictating the technology strategy of the 
portfolio companies, mainly but not only, due to their lack of expertise. However, 
this does not mean that finance investors have no effect on their portfolio 
companies’ technology strategy. There are several links and relationships 
between technology strategy and other areas that are influenced by the finance 
investors to the extent that the influence is apparent, just not in a direct way. A 
mandatory condition for exerting influence is that the finance investor share 
package is big enough. This was in fact the case apart from A and C. In all 
cases with dominant finance investors, influence was exerted on budget and 
investment decisions, even if it was only to give approval, but the consequence 
was indirect influence on technology strategy.  
 
Similarly, the influence of the finance investor on the market positioning and 
product portfolio affects the technology strategy of the portfolio companies. In 
the case of company E, investment in two segments was cut sharply because of 
a mismatch with the portfolio of all potential buyers for E. New investment 
proposals were either rejected or delayed. Another pernicious effect reported for 
E was the finance investor initiative to downsize all relevant departments to a 
minimum. This does result in an immediate and positive effect to the bottom line 
result, but the flexibility to react to sudden increases in demand has gone, as 
has slack for the creativity of the employees. During a difficult business period, 
most employees do understand the necessity of such cuts in spending and work 
harder than ever hoping that their efforts will get the company back on track and 
achieve a better, more comfortable working atmosphere again.  
 
What was reported however was that increased demand and workload just led 
to an increase in workplaces that are absolutely necessary and mechanically 
linked to an increased output of products. Administration staff is kept to a 
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minimum for as long as possible to improve the financial figures. Managers 
have to fight hard for each additional person to strengthen their teams again. 
Such situations also severely affect technology strategy. Whether the situation 
would be different without an external finance investor cannot be said and 
neither is it the focus of this research project. It is however evident that the 
asset managers involved in the cases that were studied acted more severely 
and determinedly with regards to the aforementioned actions than the portfolio 
company did before the investor joined. Whether such actions are ultimately 
negative for a company or whether they are vital for survival is another question 
that cannot be answered by this thesis.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor involved No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced by 
finance investor involvement in 
finance driven decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced by 
finance investor involvement in 
marketing decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced by 
finance investor involvement in 
organisation specific decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 13 – Areas of finance investor involvement that impact technology strategy 
 
Various CEOs said that for finance investors as anonymous shareholders, it is 
ethically less difficult to cut workplaces or implement short-notice, market-
driven, corrective action in a business than for managers who have been 
working at a company for years. Whether the actions are absolutely necessary 
for the survival of the company or whether they are just intended to improve the 
financial results is not clear and of little significance to the people directly 
concerned. 
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9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the 
technology strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in the 
mid and long-term? 
All the institutional shareholders interviewed evaluate the situation and outlook 
of their portfolio companies on a regular basis. For the cases where a dominant 
finance investor or finance investor consortium was involved, all the 
interviewees confirmed a direct influence in the decision-making processes in 
the corresponding portfolio companies with variations in the area of influence 
and the extent of influence. This adds the finance investor to the decision-
making committee. Each decision normally originates from a business case 
prepared by the portfolio company management staff and is double-checked 
and approved by the portfolio company management. This proposal is then 
presented to the majority shareholder. 
 
What follows is a selection process with three options: 
- Green light: 
The investor representatives agree to go ahead with the business case as 
presented, with or without the minor modifications that they request based on 
their own expertise and know-how. This is often the case for investments in 
capacity extensions or investments that are below a defined threshold and 
without significant effect on the product range, market strategy or financial 
result. One of the top factors is the return on investment in both time and 
amount. 
 
- Amber light: 
The business case is not immediately rejected, but it is not sufficiently 
convincing for the investor representatives to give a green light to proceed 
immediately. In such cases further analysis through involvement of the analysts 
and back office people from the finance investors as well as third-party 
consultancies and research institutes is requested. With the additional 
information and expertise input by the enlarged team, the business case might 
102 
need to be reworked. The finance investor will re-evaluate the business case in 
order to decide whether to give the green light to proceed or the red light to stop 
based on the information prepared by the portfolio company management, 
supplemented with data and recommendations from the finance investors back 
offices and the third-party experts.  
 
- Red light: 
It sometimes happens that business cases, which are presented to investor 
representatives, are rejected immediately because of a mismatch with the 
finance investors’ plans. When the positive effect hoped for by the finance 
investor is questionable or insignificant compared to the investment required, in 
most cases it will be immediately rejected. Particularly when the sale of a 
portfolio company is imminent, decisions that do not affect the sale positively 
are delayed or rejected. Paralysis of this sort was reported to severely harm 
portfolio companies when it goes on too long. When no adequate feedback for 
RFQs is given, this leads to frustration both internally at the portfolio companies 
and very often at the customer base as well. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Do specific tools exist to evaluate 
technology / technology strategy 
of a portfolio company 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Technology / technology strategy 
is evaluated in the framework of 
an overall business case (including 
financial parameters) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 14 - Finance investor evaluation of portfolio company technology / technology 
strategy 
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10a. What options can/do investors use to exert influence on their 
portfolio companies’ technology strategy? 
Shareholders with small share packages have no possibility at all of influencing 
the direction technology strategy takes, either directly or indirectly. There are a 
few prominent examples where finance investors with packages below 10% 
have tried to put pressure on the portfolio company management to push 
specific decisions. But there is no known case of a finance investor trying to 
influence directly the technology strategy through such behaviour. An indirect 
influence could occur if the portfolio company top management followed the 
requests from such an investor, but in most cases this does not happen. 
Majority shareholders however, theoretically have the option and power to drive 
decisions on technology strategy, but they do not do so. What happened in 
case F was that the newly installed chief restructuring officer acted with a large 
degree of freedom. The focus of action for such a person is not technology 
strategy, but generally speaking the overall organisation. This affects the 
technology strategy as well, but not as a primary target. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Percentage of ownership would 
allow the finance investor to dictate 
a certain technology strategy 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Technology strategy is dictated by 
finance investor 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Technology strategy is indirectly 
influenced by finance investor (see 
question 8) 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 15 – Possible ways the finance investors might exert influence on their portfolio 
companies’ technology strategy 
 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
A mechanism that can be and is used by the portfolio company management is 
to decide which parameters are important and which not. For some there is no 
grey zone, but for a set of parameters there is usually room for flexible 
interpretation. It also depends on the sources of information that are used to 
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gain historical data, current data and assumptions for the future. Presentation of 
the business case is adapted depending on what the company management 
wants to “sell” to the finance investors. However, no one would hide important 
information or use manipulated or wrong data because of the disastrous 
consequences. It is imperative that mutual trust and respect is established for 
meaningful cooperation. The only variable is the framework considered relevant 
for a specific analysis.  
 
When something is considered to be of minor significance or irrelevant, it must 
not be highlighted. However, transparency is important. If a finance investor or a 
finance investor consortium suspects that someone at the portfolio company is 
not telling them the truth or hiding relevant data or information, that person will 
most likely be replaced without delay. And many interviewees reported this. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Can (and do) portfolio company 
managers influence action by 
“adjusting” the specification of 
information packages 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 16 – Possibility of influencing actions through filtered information 
 
10c. Are all investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
The overall target to get as much money out of an investment as possible is the 
same for all finance investors. The basic direction and systematic is thus similar 
for all investments, not only because of the similarity of the target but also due 
to the fact that employees from investor A can move to investor B and so on. 
Furthermore, ex-asset managers often found their own investment company 
based on the knowledge and experience gained from their previous 
assignments. What always makes a difference is the individual personality of 
the asset manager, as each one has their own way of making their opinion 
heard and getting things done. In the case of H, the investor team even spoke 
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directly to customers and suppliers, which is not usual. An asset manager who 
is convinced that a portfolio company manager will always act as an agent, but 
never as a steward will act differently from one who believes in stewardship. 
 
Furthermore, portfolio companies and asset managers often act globally or 
have their roots in another culture. Categorisation is thus difficult, but there is a 
minority who are known for being particularly aggressive. These are the people 
who write malicious letters in which the portfolio company management is 
strongly attacked (prominent examples are Daniel Löb and Carl Icahn). A 
majority package is not mandatory for this type of person. In the cases studied 
for this research, not a single interviewee acted like that or experienced such 
behaviour, but everyone knows it exists. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Investor focuses on companies 
with specific parameters (e.g. 
"small and medium-sized 
companies", just out of 
insolvency...) 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Investor also re-organises 
companies (buy and build, build 
and burst...)  
No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personality and experience of 
asset managers impacts their 
course of action 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 17 - Differences between finance investors, i.e. asset managers 
 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
Involvement of investors in budget and investment decisions at firms they own 
is clearly one of the most used and most significant ways of being actively 
involved. This produces dynamics that influence the organisation as well as the 
technology strategy, which in most cases is directly or indirectly linked to budget 
decisions. If it isn’t the budget or investment for technology strategy that is 
directly affected, then it is often human resources which are limited and which 
consequently affect the speed and the direction of evolvement of the technology 
strategy. The decisive factor for influence in portfolio company management 
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decisions is the size of the share package. In the cases analysed, all the 
investors or investor consortiums with dominant share packages exerted 
influence on budget and investment decisions.  
 
The reported consequence, in the majority of the cases, was a more strict and 
severe approach than when the company management was able to stand-
alone. This is because the focus is different and the willingness to take a risk, 
which in the worst case may negatively affect the company’s result in the short 
term, without putting the whole company at risk, might be taken by a company 
manager, but not by the finance investor management team because their focus 
is more short term. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Technology strategy is influenced by 
finance investor involvement in 
finance-driven decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced by 
finance investor involvement in 
marketing decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced by 
finance investor involvement in 
organisation specific decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 18 - Areas of finance investor involvement that are impact technology strategy 
 
12. Do investors act as consultants regarding technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
In the cases under analysis, not a single finance investor directly influenced 
technology strategy. Asset managers and portfolio teams do not have the 
expertise or capability to act as consultants for technology strategy. Also, 
forming a company with the best technology or best ever technology strategy 
would not be their prime interest. As an area that contributes to the market 
value of a business, it is not and cannot be completely ignored, but the focus 
and the key competences of the investor management teams are in other 
areas. It was frequently commented during the research that one of the main 
difficulties with technology strategy is prediction of the long-term effect. Some of 
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the investors had heard many promising things about fantastic technologies that 
would supposedly bring the portfolio companies to the foreground in their 
segment, but actually the outcome was seldom like that.  
 
Furthermore, technology is linked with huge investment and in a phase when a 
company is being trimmed and optimised across all disciplines it is difficult to 
get approval for investment. The negative effects for the short and mid-term 
results are often greater than the potential uplift that could realistically be gained 
from the long-term investment. This does not mean that R&D is always cut 
rigorously. Just that the focus of the investment is less strategic and more short-
term. When investments in projects produce an improved EBITda within a short 
period or when the company value is increased more than the amount spent, it 
is definitely an option liked by finance investors. With regards to organisational 
learning, the picture is different.  
 
The requirements for reporting, KPI creation and follow up are sometimes a 
good jolt for the portfolio companies. Instead of evolutionary trial and error 
processes, involvement of an active and experienced investor often leads to the 
implementation of best practice processes within a short period of time. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Investors act as consultants for 
organisational learning 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investors act as consultants for 
technology strategy 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Table 19 – Do the finance investors act as consultants for organisational learning 
and/or technology strategy? 
 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
Larger investment funds are active across several continents with asset 
managers located around the globe, while several of the smaller investment 
companies have limited their activities to a single region. Cultural and regional 
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differences were not the focus of the analysis, but it nonetheless became clear 
that company culture and philosophy were very similar for all the investors 
involved in the cases. An explanation for this phenomenon is the fluctuation of 
asset managers, which leads to a mixture of experience and input from different 
finance investment companies, that coalesces in the individual behaviour and 
philosophy of each single asset manager. One exception was the dominant 
investors involved in D, who were more active in the networking process and 
advice on administrative issues. In the cases under evaluation, no malicious-
letter-writer-type of asset manager was found. All business was carried out on a 
partnership and professional basis with the accompanying decisions and 
consequences, including investor driven changes in the portfolio company 
management team. But without verbal aggression or the censure of the portfolio 
company management.  
 
5.2 Further findings from the interviews and secondary literature 
The existing research includes a number of articles and papers that deal with 
stakeholder activism in general, and influence on technology strategy 
specifically. The results concerning finance investor involvement have all been 
derived from publicly available data, such as annual reports. No research to 
date had used insider information, from either the investment funds or the 
portfolio company management (Shahzad and David, 2010). Subsequently, the 
channels and routines of interaction have not been analysed or understood. The 
underlying reason was not academic researchers’ lack of interest. All the 
interviewees confirmed that the investment company, which was the subject of 
the interview either as employer or as shareholding party, had a policy not to 
give detailed information about their interaction with their portfolio companies.  
 
This was also the standard response to the initial formal and impersonal contact 
with potential interviewees. The main reason for their reluctance is that finance 
investors do not want to see their names in print, either in an academic article or 
in the yellow press, as they are aware that this leaves room for interpretation, 
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rumours and subjective disapproval. All investment fund representatives 
confirmed that they do not want to disclose in detail: how their companies are 
structured, how they select their investments or how they interact with their 
portfolio companies. Consequently, the only option was to confirm 
comprehensive confidentiality for all information they were prepared to give. 
Regarding the selection process, the finance investors confirmed they did not 
focus on companies in specific segments or markets.  
 
A double check of the current investment portfolio of the finance investors 
involved in the case studies confirmed this. All of them have shares in 
companies from different market and product segments. A distinction, however, 
was found with regards to the size of the portfolio companies. This was mainly 
related to the capital available and not as a consequence of a strategy to invest 
only in companies that fall into a certain category in terms of size. If the amount 
of investment required is too much for a single investor, it is common to 
approach other investors who may want to participate in the investment (even if 
this is not an ideal scenario, due the increased complexity of all phases of the 
investment). A business comes onto an investor’s radar as a result of research.  
 
Most important for an investment decision is the potential of a company, and not 
its current financial performance in absolute terms. In different markets and 
product segments; margins, for example, vary significantly; thus the numbers 
themselves need to be seen in the context of the business environment and in 
comparison to other companies with similar business activities. Extensive 
analysis of the market and the targeted business by calling in external 
consultancies is standard before an investment is made. Proper analysis at the 
pre-investment phase is essential for a successful investment. But even if every 
effort has been made, there is never a guarantee for success. All the finance 
investors that were willing to talk about their previous investment results (9 out 
of 14) confirmed that they had sold investments at a loss to off-load shares.  
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Interestingly, in most cases, the businesses were sold on to other finance 
investors. The three most frequently named KPIs and measures to rate 
performance (mentioned by investors for the pre-investment phase, and 
mentioned even more frequently for the investment phase) are EBITDA 
(Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation), OI (Operating 
Income) and NAV (Net Asset Value). In all cases in which the companies 
involved were directly or indirectly dependent on the automotive industry, it was 
confirmed that the automotive crisis in 2008/2009 had a significant negative 
impact on various KPIs and severe measures had been necessary to 
compensate for the negative effects. This is just one example of how external 
events can swamp the effect of stakeholder engagement.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Investment fund has been involved as 
shareholder for "..." years at the time of the 
interview 
8 5 10 5 4 2 1 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 
Type of investment fund (public fund=>PF, 
private equity fund=>PEF, hedge 
fund=>HF) 
PF PE PF PE PE 
HF 
& 
PE 
PE PE PE PE PE PE PE PE 
Table 20 – Timeframe of the investment fund involvement in the corporation, and the 
type of investment fund. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Trend of financial performance (+= positive, 
-= negative, ±= stable) 
± - - + + + ± - + - + - + + 
- EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortisation) 
± - - + + + + - + - + - + + 
- OI (Operating Income) ± - - + + + + - + - + - + + 
- NAV (Net Asset Value) ± ± ± + + + + - + ± + - + + 
Table 21 – Trend of financial performance at the time of the interview, relative to the 
period before the investment fund involvement. 
 
Thus KPIs should be interpreted with caution, especially when big swings are 
observed, to avoid coming to wrong conclusions. Analysis of the study looked at 
the correlation of the impact made by an investor on the type of investor, the 
KPIs (reviewed regularly by the investment fund) and the time frame of the 
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involvement. No correlation was found with either of the variables, even though 
the period during which the investor(s) are involved varied from 1 to 10 years. 
No clear trend in any direction is visible regarding patent filings or R&D 
spending when the status at the time of the interviews is compared with the pre-
investor engagement status. This finding is contrary to previous studies, which 
found a positive correlation between investor involvement and R&D investment 
(David et al., 2001).  
 
Both the number of patent filings and R&D spending depend on many factors, 
including changes in policy and definition. Some companies prefer not to apply 
for patents, as the application process requires detailed documentation, which 
can sometimes help competitors to find ways to bypass the patents. If these 
companies changed their policies and submitted patent applications, the 
number of patent filings would increase dramatically. A large number of patent 
applications does not necessarily mean the business is exceptionally innovative 
or the producer of brilliant ideas. There were no cases in the study where such 
a policy change regarding patent filings was reported, so the trends observed 
purely reflect the objective situation, during the time the investment funds were 
involved versus the pre-investor involvement period.  
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Number of patent filings ± + + - + - - - + ± + - + + 
R&D spending in % of turnover + + + - ± + - - + - + - + + 
Table 22 – Trend of patent filings and R&D spending in % of revenue, relative to the 
period before the investment fund involvement. 
 
The reasons for investment fund intervention through acquisition of shares can 
be divided into three main categories. The most common and typical way for an 
investment fund to get on board a company is when the business comes onto 
the finance investor’s radar through the fund’s research team or third-party 
recommendation. This was applicable in 8 of 14 cases. In 2 cases, the 
investment fund had been approached by the businesses due to financial 
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difficulties, while in the remaining 4 cases, the companies had actively 
contacted investors for an infusion of fresh capital. No correlation was found 
between the reason for finance investors to acquire shares and the technology 
strategy.  
 
Any effect on technology is a secondary effect. The main priority is always the 
improvement and optimisation of financial performance. However, for this 
ultimate target, it is very important for the investors to fine-tune a business 
which is running smoothly or to bring a bankrupt business back on track. In all 
cases, involvement is focussed on the organisational-setting and business 
practices and looking for low-hanging fruits that deliver results within the short- 
to medium-term. The strategic long-term vision is mainly developed as a selling 
argument when the business is going to be sold again. 
 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
IF identified the business as an attractive 
target and acquired shares 
- X X - - X X - X X - - X X 
Business was in or close to bankruptcy and 
the IF was approached to acquire shares 
- - - - - - - X - - - X - - 
Business was looking for new capital and 
approached the IF to acquire shares 
X - - X X - - - - - X - - - 
Table 23 – Reasons for investment fund intervention through acquisition of shares in 
the businesses. 
 
Interaction between the finance investors and their portfolio companies can 
depend on the size of the share package of the respective finance investor or 
investor consortium. Each investor involved in the cases under analysis in this 
research project showed interest in the portfolio companies’ activities, including 
the current situation and future plans. This is no surprise, as it is the job of the 
asset managers to have a good understanding of their portfolio companies. 
Asset managers need to ensure that the expected and promised return from the 
investments does materialise and they can evaluate and react only when they 
are consistently up-to-date. After all, investors have just two options when the 
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results from the portfolio companies do not satisfying their and the secondary 
investors expectations.  
 
They can either try to influence the performance actively, as discussed in the 
chapter on shareholder activism, or they can just simply get rid of the 
investment. Interviewees with share packages below 10% did try to make 
comments and recommendations during personal meetings with the portfolio 
company management, but they were fully aware that their leverage is minimal. 
Pooling with other minor investors to increase the momentum to influence 
directly the portfolio company management does happen, but for the investors 
interviewed this was an option that they very rarely take and had not occurred in 
any of the cases described in this research. This is due to the fact that on the 
one hand the opinions of the individual shareholders are often prohibitively 
different in the detail and then on the other hand there are the difficulties in 
exerting influence, which have been described.  
 
The situation is very different in the case of majority shareholders or private 
equity owners of portfolio companies. They can exert direct influence in their 
role as dominant shareholder or sole owner. At the same time, it is significantly 
more difficult for them to sell their packages or a company as a whole. The 
number of potential buyers is much smaller for a business as a whole or a 
majority stake than it is for a minor share package. In the cases under analysis 
in which the investors or the investor consortiums had dominant share 
packages or 100% ownership of the portfolio company, extensive involvement 
was reported in all cases without exception. If the portfolio company 
performance meets expectations, the investors are involved, but prefer to stay 
in a passive, monitoring role.  
 
The more reality drifts away from expectations in terms of financial results and 
company value, the more the investors will become active. If finance investors 
are actively involved, that does not mean they jump into the role of the company 
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CEO. Neither does it mean that their opinions or position are different from that 
of the company management. But when portfolio companies are 
underperforming, it can be necessary to act quickly and rigorously. Firing staff 
and cutting expenditure immediately becomes a priority. For some company 
managers it is difficult to execute such actions with the required consequence 
and speed. Reported reasons are empathy with the workers or the attempt to 
act in small incremental steps, to minimise the negative effect for the employees 
or company structure.  
 
Portfolio company managers know that there are situations when it is not 
possible to consider such a plan, but when immediate and decisive action is 
necessary. This is when the finance investors, as outsiders, are often more 
objective and aware of the true situation. For the people directly affected, e.g. 
by layoff programs, this creates a negative after-taste with regards to finance 
investors. They are sometimes only thought of as the people who fire 
employees just to improve the company result and line their own and their 
company’s pockets. However, there are cases where companies would have 
gone bankrupt had the finance investors not taken strong action. Although an 
interesting area, it was not the aim of this thesis to investigate which strategies 
are vital for portfolio company survival and which are simply an exercise in 
getting a good deal for the finance investors involved.  
 
5.3 Answers to the research questions: 
1. Do finance investors aim to influence directly the technology strategy 
of their portfolio companies?  
 None of the finance investor representatives interviewed in this research 
project aimed to influence directly the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies. Even if the technology used and applied by a portfolio company is 
considered by the investors to be highly important for the company value and 
market position (Hall and Oriani, 2006), it is not their primary focus. It is simply 
considered to be one element that is crucial for the company’s success, but one 
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for which expertise has to be brought in by the portfolio company. However, the 
evidence from the case studies for this project confirms that if a finance investor 
has a dominant share package, they indirectly exert influence. This happens 
through involvement in decisions about budget, investment, workforce, market 
or product portfolio that are made on the basis of detailed fact and figure 
analysis.  
 
All the business cases presented by the portfolio company management will 
have been carefully checked to ensure they are achievable, realistic and 
supportive of the majority investors’ primary targets. At this stage the finance 
investor portfolio teams and 3rd party companies are involved too, to ensure all 
the relevant parameters and conditions have been given adequate 
consideration. Like balance sheets, business cases can be designed with a 
different focus that culminates in a subjectively influenced “best way to go” 
result. Finance investors often recommend specific consultancies and institutes, 
but the bill normally has to be settled by the portfolio company, no matter what 
the outcome of the involvement. The finance investors’ primary target is not to 
build a technology leader, but to achieve the best financial performance from 
the companies they have acquired.  
 
It does not mean that they intentionally block all technology pushes, but they 
consider themselves to be in charge of evaluating whether the portfolio 
company has the capability and whether it can produce the best possible return. 
As no investor representative is capable of judging straight away whether a 
technology strategy is good or bad, each business case is always double-
checked. This is not always, but frequently with the involvement of specialists in 
analysis and sometimes even with experts in the specific technology itself. It is 
vital for the finance investors to have the clarity to decide which is the best 
option for them to support.  
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2. How do finance investors and their portfolio companies communicate 
(methods, tools, people involved…)? 
 In all the cases, phone, email and personal meetings were confirmed as 
being regularly used to exchange information between investor and investee. 
The most important standardised exchange tool is a report, which in most cases 
is prepared on a monthly basis. For the minority shareholders (case A and C) 
the portfolio company defines the content of the reports, whereas in all other 
cases besides I the content was strongly influenced by the dominant 
shareholders. The investor then acts as a coach by questioning the portfolio 
company’s figures and statements, but also as a boss, i.e. by requesting the 
achievement of a certain EBIT target. From the finance investor side, the asset 
managers in charge of the investment lead the exchanges, but members of a 
defined steering committee or other back office staff join in when required.  
 
From the portfolio company side, the CEO leads the exchange, typically 
supported by other C-level members and people from lower levels when their 
involvement is needed for specific topics. Thorough preparation of all the 
business cases requiring finance investor approval is also critical. When 
information or data is missing or when questions from the finance investor 
cannot be answered precisely or in line with their intended course of action, the 
probability that a business case proposal is rejected is high and the rework 
afterwards often painful for all people involved. This produces a very disciplined 
way of working and in many cases more critical internal evaluation before a 
scenario is presented to the shareholder.  
 
This also leads to situations that are described in the case E, where investment 
approvals were not given or reworks were requested while the proposal was still 
in the internal approval loop. Not because the people in charge were convinced 
this was required, but because they were afraid of negative comments from the 
shareholder and rejection of the proposal. 
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3. What is the frequency of exchange between finance investors and their 
portfolio companies? 
 Depending on the individual situation of each portfolio company, the 
frequency of exchange can be lower or higher, but when a dominant investor is 
involved, it is normal for emails and phone calls to be exchanged several times 
per month. All the interviewees confirmed this. In difficult periods with bad 
financial results or, e.g. in the budget period, the frequency of contact is higher 
and several personal meetings are scheduled in a month, while in a normal 
environment monthly or bi-monthly meetings are standard. The closest 
exchange happened in case F, where a chief restructuring officer was installed 
at the company. It may be summarised that finance investors always want to be 
up-to-date regarding the activities and current status of the companies in their 
portfolio. 
 
4. Do finance investors have the expertise to define the right technology 
strategies for their portfolio companies? 
 The finance investors interviewed confirmed that when it comes to 
technology and technology strategy most of them very quickly reach their limits 
in expertise and experience. Each investment is far too individual to draw 
standardised conclusions regarding technology strategy. It is a very rare 
occurrence for an asset manager to have responsibility for two investments with 
overlapping similarity at the same time. The driver for technology strategy is 
clearly the expert and the top management team of the portfolio company. They 
might seek support and additional expertise from 3rd party companies, either on 
their own initiative or at the request of a dominant finance investor, but a finance 
investor does not and cannot define the technology strategy, but at the same 
time does need to evaluate scenarios and business cases on a professional 
basis, questioning the input and formulating the right questions. 
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5. Who from the two parties (investment company and portfolio company 
management) considers whom to be the expert on technology 
strategy? 
 All the interviewees, regardless of party, confirmed that the expert panel for 
technology strategy and all technology related decisions is the portfolio 
company management supported by the experts in their teams. Regarding the 
asset managers and the finance investors portfolio teams, it is clear that they 
have extensive experience and knowledge in analysis, markets and sometimes 
products as well, but when it comes to technology or technology strategy they 
lack know-how and experience in comparison to the portfolio company 
management team. If this is not the case, then the portfolio company 
management would not be sufficiently competent for its role. Very clearly, 
ultimate accountability lies exclusively with the portfolio companies.  
 
Each involvement and intervention by the finance investors is an attempt to 
improve short/mid-term financial company performance and company value 
overall. This might affect the technology strategy, as explained before, but not 
because the investors have superior knowledge of the technology. The simple 
reasons are financial performance and company value.  
 
6. What is the finance investor’s role in the organisational learning 
process of their portfolio companies? 
 There is clear evidence that finance investors influence the organisational 
learning processes in a variety of different ways. One way is by involvement in 
the process of budget and investment approvals. This clearly affects the 
prioritisation of the portfolio companies. In some cases investors reject budgets 
or investment requests that have already been approved by all the other 
stakeholders involved. That means the investors indirectly steer the 
organisation in a direction in which it would not be moving without investor 
control and regulation. Examples are production capacity extensions that are 
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not made, R&D projects that were not or not fully approved with the necessary 
investment, increase of workforce in different areas, etc.  
 
All these are finance driven activities that affect the company as a whole, in 
some cases more significantly and strongly in the long term than in the short 
term. At the same time, this does lead to improvements in the preparation of 
budgets and investment requests, as it is evident that a well-prepared and well-
founded proposal will be easier to approve than one that is less tight and with 
which the investors have issues. Another significant influence on the 
organisational learning process comes from the reporting system and 
instructions on how business cases have to be presented. All the majority 
shareholders interviewed for these case studies required the submission of 
specific reports. It starts with a request for budget versus actual comparisons at 
a level of detail far beyond common practice before the investor was on board.  
 
Prominent examples, besides the standards such as turnover by customer and 
region; are price erosion, project budgets, margin evolution, past dues, and all 
that by customer, by region, by plant and so on. This results in changes in 
processes and management. In the preparation of business cases, the aim is 
broadened to avoid missing any parameters required by the investors. The 
conjectures to be taken into consideration are often defined with involvement of 
3rd party consultancies and research institutes. The back offices and portfolio 
teams of the finance investors also contribute to this. The feedback from 
portfolio company management on such involvement is positive, as it leads to 
more objective, realistic and reliable business cases and measurement of the 
company performance.  
 
For people who like to play active and enthusiastic roles in their businesses, 
which can mean a limitation as finance investors in general do not value 
passion or creativeness, because their target and timeframe for involvement is 
different from that of the classic entrepreneur. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
Today, most companies apply a variety of technologies in their processes or 
products (Elyasiani and Jia, 2011), as do the companies in this study. It is vital 
to follow a technology strategy that takes into consideration long-term 
constraints and company targets to ensure long-term fitness and survival in the 
market (Klepper, 1996, Burgelman et al., 2008). A good market position can be 
lost in a relatively short time if the wrong technology is chosen (Pegels and 
Thirumurthy, 1996, Zahra et al., 1995). The evidence from the case studies 
confirms that finance investors act in consideration of these beliefs and facts 
when budget and investment decisions are to be made. All the interviewees 
confirmed that technology and technology strategy are very important due to the 
direct impact they have on the company value at all times.  
 
A positive evolution in short and medium-term earnings is reported by 
shareholders in many cases to be another factor why R&D investments are 
given approval. These findings prove that finance investors are not per se short-
term result oriented and reluctant to approve long-term R&D investments, as 
concluded by other studies (Graves, 1988, Graves and Waddock, 1990, 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). Neither do they strictly confirm the assumption that 
finance investors are more in favour of R&D investments with long-term effects 
than corporate management (Baysinger et al., 1991, Davis and Thompson, 
1994, Hansen and Hill, 1991). All interviewees, without exception, made the 
comment that it makes sense to support long-term investments in technology 
when this has a short- or mid-term impact on the business, due to, e.g. value 
creation in the form of products or patents, or when it boosts the price a buyer 
would be willing to pay.  
 
The pre-condition is a solid business case that delivers more in earnings than 
the total cost. When the corporate management prepares and presents this 
information carefully, there is no reason to be against. This professional and 
firm goal-oriented cooperative approach was also reported by Chizema 
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(Chizema, 2011). Evidence exists for the positive effect of direct involvement of 
finance investors in the technology strategy of start-up companies (Nisar, 2005). 
This is a logical benefit as the founders of start-ups are often inexperienced in 
the business world and struggle to respond professionally to market needs and 
requirements. For mature businesses, from which these case studies were built, 
the feedback was different.  
 
In no research case was a direct influence on the corporate technology strategy 
found. These findings are in line with the results from other research projects 
(David et al., 2001, Baysinger et al., 1991). The role that finance investors 
assume for the mature companies in their portfolio is pretty much focussed on 
organisational learning and control at the management level. In only one of the 
14 cases – case H – was the investor involved in discussions with suppliers and 
customers; on the one hand to leverage personal relationships, but also to 
understand the market needs and rules as well as possible. Close involvement, 
but still limited to organisation, was also found in case F where a chief 
restructuring officer had been installed.  
 
These are two rare, but very good examples illustrating that the typical investor 
is not involved in the day-to-day business and that a much more intense 
engagement, similar to the involvement in start up companies is an option if 
needed or beneficial for the investment. The age of the study companies is 
recorded in table 2, but no correlation was found between the individual 
corporation’s age and the research project results. Thus it can be concluded 
that the age of the sample companies does not pre-determine any specific 
characteristics. It is important to note for the observation concerning this 
dimension the fact that the age of the companies varied from 14 to over 400 
years. The average age was 93 years, which means all companies had already 
passed the initial stages of forming, storming, norming and performing.  
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David, Hitt and Gimeno’s analysis concluded that finance investor activism does 
lead to an increase in the R&D spending of their portfolio companies, but not in 
a direct or prescribed way (David et al., 2001). In contrast to the findings of 
David, Hitt and Gimeno, the case studies did not show a clear correlation 
between the investor involvement and the R&D spending of the firms (see table 
22). The results of the case studies confirm, however, that finance investors 
who invest in mature businesses do not see themselves as experts in 
technology strategy, and do not steer the companies in this regard. They do not 
focus on that area, but do want to be informed and involved, to be sure that 
decisions are made on the basis of the best and latest available knowledge (see 
tables 10 and 11).  
 
This level of involvement minimises the risk of the corporate management 
suggesting a direction that supports their own interests better than the ones of 
the shareholders, a risk that agency theorists see in all such relationships 
(Jensen, 1994, Baysinger et al., 1991). No such agency conflict was reported by 
any of the interviewees. In all cases, the investors commented that cooperation 
with the firms is collaborative and target-oriented. Feedback from corporate 
management teams is two-sided. While the majority of the interviewees on the 
investee side appreciate the support and positive influence of the investor, 
some criticise the stringent control and involvement in decision-making 
processes. In how far these are purely objective observations, or whether some 
senior managers simply dislike being overruled by sometimes very young 
investor representatives, cannot be ascertained by this study.  
 
The analysis of the case studies carried out for this research project 
investigated the extent to which real and actual interaction and influence takes 
place in the area of technology strategy by finance investors. Evidence from the 
case studies confirms that finance investors do influence the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company, but not directly. Any influence originates from 
the coaching, consultation and control role of the finance investors, which 
impacts different areas and disciplines according to the KPIs defined. A 
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mandatory condition for investor influence is the momentum of a dominant 
share package (Grossman, 1999). Luckily not every stakeholder or minor 
shareholder can exert direct influence on a company in which they have only a 
few shares.  
 
This power is given only to the investors who have share packages that are big 
enough to allow such involvement by law (Le et al., 2006). Minority 
shareholders thus do not play a major role in company decision-making 
processes as they do not take part in proxy voting. The cases where minority 
shareholders do make proposals or combine their voting rights with other 
shareholders are rare (Grossman, 1999, Daly, 2011). Isolated exceptions are 
prominent individuals like Carl Icahn who act very aggressively with the 
intention of attracting public interest. Otherwise portfolio company managers 
tend to be reluctant to accept ideas, proposals or even requests from minority 
shareholders, simply because of their lack of leverage (Kaplan and Stroemberg, 
2003).  
 
This was observed in cases A and C, which fall into the category of no dominant 
investor involvement. The channels through which indirect influence is made 
are management accounting and steering. An area that positively impacts the 
decision-making processes is the reporting system. Majority investors usually 
make a request for additional KPIs to be included and a lot of plan/actual 
comparisons. Beyond this, data has to be prepared not only as grand totals of a 
corporation, but by customer, by region, by plant and so on. The additional 
layers of information that have to be prepared, usually on a monthly basis, bring 
more clarity to the actual company situation and help to identify quickly when 
things are drifting in the wrong direction. This is also done to identify deviations 
from budget or trends that are not immediately visible.  
 
This is standard protocol when investment funds optimise a business that is 
running stably. The situation is different when shares are acquired in firms that 
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are bankrupt or close to bankruptcy. In such cases, the number one priority is to 
rehabilitate the business including the processes as a whole, so that it can 
survive and remain in the market. Two cases where such a situation was found 
are the cases G and H. A lighter form of stabilisation and re-framing can be 
found when the overall business is running well, but specific product lines or 
markets are down. This was observed in case E, when the investor decided to 
exclude a product line from the strategic and operative focus. The main reason 
for this decision was the poor fit in the portfolio of potential buyers for company 
E.  
 
In all decision-making, it is very important to understand not only the factors 
bringing about improvement, but also those causing deterioration in the 
performance of a business. All interviewees confirmed this to be the key to 
drawing the right conclusions and launching the right actions. When a global 
business is over-delivering, e.g. the EBIT, it does not mean that all regions and 
all products are following this trend. Very often a boom in one region can over-
compensate a negative trend in another region, with a neutral or even positive 
grand total result. It is vital to understand the situation at a more detailed level to 
take the right action at the right time. Furnished with this input finance investors 
are able to draw conclusions and take action.  
 
Interestingly, the company management itself may also become active based 
on this additional data. Due to their extensive experience in data analysis, 
finance investors do have excellent knowledge in that area and do immediately 
implement best practices, whereas a portfolio company is likely to have been 
changing incrementally and improving things by a heuristic trial and error 
approach or by falling back on tried and tested paths (Durmusoglu et al., 2008). 
A very important aspect of action taken as a result of data- and situation-
analysis is the time horizon considered relevant for the decision-making. Any 
positive long-term effect that has no benefit in the short- or medium-term for the 
business will not trigger financial investment when the long-term vision cannot 
be sold at a high price to potential buyers.  
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Owner-led corporations very often accept investments that will only deliver 
results for the next generation of owners of a business. Similarly to reporting, 
the preparation of business cases is influenced, but not especially strongly. The 
decisive factor here is more the leading role that majority investors take in the 
approval process for investments and budgets in their portfolio companies. All 
investors with share packages big enough to enable them to exert influence 
confirmed this practice (see table 18). The outlook of a finance investor will 
typically be more critical than that of one of the portfolio company members. 
This was also concluded by Choi, Park and Hong (Choi et al., 2012). The 
investor time-horizon is different to that of the portfolio company manager and 
the finance KPIs in particular are crucial for a potential sale of a business.  
 
In the portfolio companies, this more restrictive process results in severe 
internal rules as well. A manager of company E said, “In the past it was always 
possible to kick off investments when a salesman confirmed they had agreed on 
a deal with a customer based on an offer made, but without a signed 
nomination. Neither the finance team nor the plant management blocked such 
activities. Since the investor has been on board all the people involved object to 
starting without having a customer signed document available to ensure they do 
not get into trouble when the investment request reaches the investor for 
approval.” This is an example that illustrates how additional controlling and 
monitoring influences the behaviour of an entire organisation.  
 
Without changing any rules, just by strictly following the existing ones. While 
this loss of pragmatism appears painful for some, it also reminds people to 
reconsider the rules and process definitions. Maybe there are cases where a 
more pragmatic approach is right and justified, but in such cases it may also be 
better to adjust the rules and processes instead of acting against them 
systematically. In a complex strategic architecture, all elements have to fulfil a 
function, otherwise they are obsolete. It requires a certain experience and 
expertise to understand what is needed and what is obsolete. When this is 
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missing or not adequately developed at the corporate management level active 
shareholders can fill that gap (O'Shannassy and Hunter, 2009).  
 
Taking into consideration the huge number of companies in the ownership of 
finance investors it can be said that active investors play an important role for 
the economy through their involvement in the area of corporate change and 
learning. Evidence for this was found in all cases besides case C, in which no 
majority investor was involved (see table 19). This confirms that companies in 
the ownership of active investors are forced to carry out changes that are often 
tested best practices from other investments. Avoiding incremental trial and 
error modifications in the reporting and the stringent application of defined 
processes is for many companies a significant step forward. Active investors 
are not inventive entrepreneurs who come up with radically new ideas for 
products and processes.  
 
Otherwise, they would set-up one new company after another instead of getting 
aboard existing and sometimes very mature companies. They are more 
entrepreneurial tuners who have the experience and knowledge of how to 
optimise systems so that the best and the most can come out of them. The job 
of finance investors can be compared to that of a vintage car dealer. They need 
to identify investment opportunities with a good, solid basis, but also the 
potential to gain in value when fine-tuned. There are also cases where a 
complete rebuild is not entirely necessary, but can still be justified if the market 
value afterwards is higher than the total investment needed. And last, but not 
least, there can be unexpected casualties.  
 
Something that at first sight seemed to be running well turns out to be 
disastrous when minimising the loss becomes the new target. And similarly to 
the finance investors, vintage car dealers are normally open to all good deals, 
no matter what brand or type of vehicle and this is equivalent to products or 
branches of business. Looking back to the groundwork of this thesis, the 
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evolutionary theory, the findings are clear evidence that institutional 
shareholders act in support of the evolutionary theory. They contribute positively 
to the corporate learning and organisational development processes in the 
businesses they own to gain the maximum return in the short and long-term. 
With regards to previous evidence on investor involvement, it can be said that 
an anonymous, pure fact and figure analysis may potentially reach the wrong 
conclusion.  
 
The conclusion arrived at in the past that investor involvement is positively 
associated with R&D spending has not been confirmed. A change in some KPIs 
that occurs in parallel to the involvement of an active majority shareholder does 
not necessarily mean a strong direct impact on the area that is measured by the 
KPI. To discover the real trigger chain, it is vital to look at each case in detail. 
There may be cases where direct influence is exerted, but most probably, as 
proven by the outcome of this thesis, there is a lot of indirect influence that 
triggers various actions, adjustments and changes. Secondary analysis of data 
from the nowadays incredibly large databases is highly valuable. This shall not 
be questioned. In order to draw the right conclusions it can however be 
necessary to look behind the curtain in order to understand the mechanisms, 
roles and reaction chains. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and further research 
 
The evidence gained from the case study research proves that finance 
investors with dominant share packages, or even sole ownership of companies, 
interact closely with corporate management. Both the channels and the intensity 
of interaction were analysed in detail leading to the following outcomes. Finance 
investors act as monitors, but exert direct influence as well. By doing so, they 
participate in shaping the organisational landscape and influence the 
evolutionary processes by implementing tested practices, standards and rules 
in administrative areas. These findings illustrate pretty well the role that 
investors play in the companies in their portfolio and, in consideration of the 
high number of investor engagements worldwide, their impact on the global 
industry and economy.  
 
The legal authority that any shareholder gains when they acquire or hold a 
certain percentage of the total shares of a business is clearly the justification for 
the acquisition. The justification in itself is insufficient without the necessary 
capability and expertise, but nonetheless a mandatory factor in impacting 
organisational behaviour and processes. Minority shareholders might want to 
have close interaction with and involvement in their portfolio companies as well, 
but company management normally is not very open to such external advice as 
long as the investor has no authority for hiring and firing. Such investors might 
be listened to and depending on how they are regarded by the portfolio 
company management, their input may play a role in the decision making 
process, but if it does, then only because the company management wants it to 
and not because this is the investor’s wish.  
 
Such first-hand insights, collected within the framework of the study were 
absent in previous research. Drawing conclusions from figures and secondary 
data, without detailed knowledge and understanding of the interactions behind 
the scenes, can lead to misinterpretations and incorrect pseudo-objective 
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observations.  Technology strategy, was and is, for all the finance investors 
interviewed an important area due to its effect on the company value and 
earnings, but not something that they were attempting to steer directly. 
Responsibility for this sensitive area has to be clearly and solely assumed by 
the company management. Direct and active involvement of investor 
representatives as indicated in previous research was not found. All the 
interviewees confirmed this, regardless of whether they were from the investor 
or the company side.  
 
The expert committee for technology strategy is the corporate management 
team and it is part of their role to work out strategies and plans that have to be 
presented to and sanctioned by the majority investors. The shareholders do 
though indirectly influence the directions of portfolio companies, when they have 
enough shares to be involved in the decision-making and the organisational 
learning processes, as explained in previous sections. Whether the indirect 
effect they have on the technology strategy of each individual portfolio company 
is positive or negative cannot be answered by this research project as no 
corresponding data that would allow such analysis on a scientifically solid basis 
was collected. Previous evidence that investor involvement leads to an increase 
in R&D spending has not been confirmed by the case studies.  
 
An effect is not the consequence of the portfolio company following the direction 
dictated by a finance investor, but the overall result of indirect influence in 
combination with many other factors that have a role in a company’s technology 
strategy such as government policies or activist campaigning. The cases 
confirm that the involvement of active investors in companies can and does 
produce quicker learning cycles, but also radical and rapid changes when, for 
instance, tested best practice procedures and methods are implemented. The 
initiation is typically, either a direct demand coming from an active investor or 
through initiation of activities such as acquisition of third-party expertise that 
was not used before. In the current global business environment such evolution 
boosters are decisive for the survival and success of individual companies.  
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Small and medium size businesses do not generally take such an approach on 
their own initiative as they are often too focussed on day-to-day activities to 
consider the larger, extended market and economic changes. Furthermore the 
information gained from the research project uncovers a lot of internal company 
roadblocks that vary in occurrence and characteristic from case to case and 
over time. Making a few company policy adjustments could easily dismantle 
most of the moral roadblocks identified in the fieldwork. This could happen by 
implementing regular communication with the employees, in which the role and 
involvement of the finance investor(s) is clearly explained within the conditions 
set down by law.  
 
In particular the positive aspects of investor involvement should be outlined, in 
several of the cases that were analysed this would have changed the picture 
from a pure cost-oriented investor for whom employees are nothing but a cost 
factor to a performance-oriented one who still wants to make the best out of the 
investment, often with positive, long-term consequences for businesses. Such 
transparency would help disenchanted employees who are not fully behind 
company policy because of poor internal communication or a lack of information 
to allay their doubts and negative thoughts (Hall et al., 2014). Such openness 
can eliminate rumours among employees about hidden agendas and their 
potentially negative impact on the workforce.  
 
First line management made no mention of mistrust and lack of information, but 
the organisational layers below confirmed they were a major cause for 
deteriorating commitment and dedication at the working level. Trust is a vital 
element to keep the workforce on all levels motivated and committed to 
contributing to the success of the corporation. This kind of open circle 
communication across all management layers, with the right focus and right 
level of detail appears to be key to managerial practice in maintaining and 
boosting the motivation and involvement of the workforce in changing 
environments. Replacing insecurity and guesswork by clear information, a 
transparent outlook and visions is something that employees should be able to 
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expect from a dynamic, modern leadership team even in consideration of the 
changes and challenges of interacting environments.  
 
This goes back to the very basic needs of people, such as the need for self-
fulfilment. Sharing information is a demonstration of respect for everyone and is 
confirmation that each person has a role to play. Employees can and want to 
follow and believe in such leaders. A measure promoting a lot of trust would be 
the involvement in the investor meetings of a few people selected from all the 
layers of an organisation. While at first sight this might not be seen as a very 
beneficial use of the investors’ time, it can be the key to unlocking the potential 
of an organisation that has become frozen when the company’s direction is 
unclear to the workforce. In feedback sessions with some of the interview 
candidates some successful tests were confirmed.  
 
The thesis results also lead to the conclusion that regulations do play a 
significant role in defining a corporation’s technology strategy, the regulations 
on emissions, for example, and this outcome should be a useful take-away for 
public policies. Taking a closer look at individual industries would enable the 
specific requirements of those industries to be defined and in return these would 
allow specific and individual improvements not only benefiting the environment 
and all stakeholders, but also the corporations themselves. Another question 
beyond the focus of this work is how much public policy involvement in 
corporations is right or good. However, public policy is clearly a channel which 
can be used to influence and steer corporate decision-making in line with 
targets that are defined by not only looking at individuals’ interests, but by also 
focussing on environmental effects and the public in general (Hoskisson et al., 
2004).  
 
Taken as a whole this research project provides evidence that investor 
involvement is increasing and contributing to the pool of information, experience 
and expertise that is used in corporate decision-making processes. Several 
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companies would simply have been eliminated without the involvement of 
finance investors, not only because of the fresh input of capital, but also 
because of their involvement in organisational development processes and 
decision making. A lot of gut decisions are being replaced by fact and figure-
based decisions, often using models constructed by third-party consultants or 
the finance investor portfolio teams. By setting internal rules and regulations 
accordingly more objective decision making processes can easily be 
implemented.  
 
While the gut decisions of experienced people are often as good as or even 
better than pure data based decisions, the big difference is the reproducibility of 
decisions and the non-dependency on specific people. In summary: investor 
involvement pushes companies to implement processes that are not centred on 
individuals, but part of a comprehensive model that allows experienced leaders 
to take over control within a short period of time. When the principles are 
communicated openly and the framework of the model including the data 
relevant for the decision making process is shared with the internal 
stakeholders such as investors, the management and the workforce, broad 
acceptance will be the consequence, including agreement to informed decision 
making.  
 
This sounds very simple and easy to implement, but as often is the case in life, 
it is the small steps and simple things that make the difference between a 
successful strategy decision and one that fails. And each fact shared removes a 
potential negative assumption or rumour from minds and builds trust. This work 
opens up the potential for the next layer of transparency for investment fund 
managers and corporate CEOs and should not only trigger a change in 
mindsets that results in a more open communication both internally and 
externally for the benefit of companies in the portfolio of the investor. It should 
also create awareness of the indirect influence the investors’ involvement has 
on the corporate technology strategy definition and other areas as well.  
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The key to investor involvement, which is of utmost importance for all 
stakeholders, is that the finance investor representatives must clearly 
communicate their intentions regarding any specific action or requirement and 
the consequences they expect. Corporate management teams have to analyse 
the consequences and effects from their own perspective, based on the 
knowledge they have about mechanisms and processes in the business. Any 
side-effects such as deceleration in the decision-making processes or influence 
on the direction of the technology strategy due to investor-desired adjustments 
to the delegation of authority have to be identified and communicated if a 
regulatory circle is to be triggered.  
 
Whether investors are willing to react by adjusting their actions and 
requirements will depend on the individual situation and specific agenda. 
However, the option to react only exists when the feedback function in the 
regulatory circle is working. This is in the responsibility of the corporate 
leadership team and requires awareness and a good understanding across all 
levels and disciplines within a business. The fundamental requirement is that an 
open and constructive exchange between investor and investee is possible, 
even if perceived by the investor side as criticism or an attempt by corporate 
management to avoid specific requests. When these basic prerequisites are not 
given, cooperation when the investor has hold of the steering wheel will remain 
in a control loop and potentially unwanted effects may be uncovered when it is 
too late to react.  
 
This finding also reinforces the previous recommendation to seek an exchange 
with the employees in a business to get their buy-in on specific actions, right 
down to the level of feedback about consequences and effects. The proposed 
actions may match exactly with what is wanted, but most probably there will be 
divergences that were not previously visible on the radar. When this is the case, 
the internal regulatory circle helps to maximise the output of each individual 
employee by not only being in the role of their specific job, but additionally by 
helping as a consultant in a very specific area. This micro-consultancy, which 
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already exists in different but similar forms, such as the continuous 
improvement process programs, is an excellent way to improve employee 
identification with their employing company.  
 
The outcome of this project would benefit from further and broader evidence. A 
research project based on a quantitative analysis of the results of a structured 
questionnaire would be a suitable augmentation and the theoretical framework 
and findings developed in this thesis could serve as a platform. Further 
quantitative analysis is expected to strengthen the evidence and information 
gained from the 14 case studies summarised in the previous chapters. The use 
of an online-questionnaire seems to be the most appropriate method to collect 
information for such a project as it means a maximum of addressees can be 
reached with minimal effort (Gill and Johnson, 2002). The addressees could be 
selected according to a range of parameters such as company size, industrial 
sector, etc. and feedback in the form of emails would mean this information can 
be tracked and a substantial quantity of data would be available for analysis.  
 
In contrast to the underlying purely qualitative work, the results of a quantitative 
study would be more focused and could possibly identify some outliers as well. 
The major and unavoidable roadblock is the lack of response to the 
questionnaires in the first place. Experience from this project and also several 
other research projects involving questionnaires is that reminders and personal 
calls can deliver additional results. However, this may be an issue as this is very 
time consuming and still does not get the return rates above 50%. Personal 
interviews are even more difficult to arrange when the target people are not 
personally known to the interviewer and contact through third-party friends or 
colleagues is not possible.  
 
Finding interviewees was the biggest hurdle for this project and was only 
accomplished by being persistent in calling people when there was no response 
to emails and no insider contacts had been befriended (e.g. the CEO secretary) 
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in the target organisations. Contacts, no matter how elusive, helped a lot to 
establish a connection with the targeted interviewees. Further interesting cases 
for individual and specific study could be defined when a quantitative analysis 
delivers outliers. Again qualitative analysis should be considered for such cases 
to understand in depth the situation and the drivers for the different effects. 
Additionally, a qualitative in depth study of a complete organisation with 
interviews at all levels of the hierarchy over a certain period of time could bring 
further interesting results.  
 
In this thesis the interviews were at the top management level. However, it can 
be assumed that the involvement of active investors also has an influence on 
the middle and lower management behind the scenes, which is not directly 
visible and obvious for the first line managers. In how far such influence plays a 
role in the performance of a business cannot be said at this point. But it is 
definitely worth digging deeper to develop a comprehensive understanding 
about actions and reactions to investor activism within a firm. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Interview questionnaire 
 
 
Interview questionnaire (semi-structured) 
Information about the research project: 
The research will focused on the influence of investors on decision making and 
learning processes in their portfolio companies, with the main emphasis on 
technology strategy. 
Confidentiality guarantee: 
All information from the interviews will be handled strictly confidentially and 
appear in the doctoral thesis only with codification of people and company 
names. 
Questions: 
0. General data: (a) Industry - firm, name, position, how long with firm, (b) 
investor firm, name, role, age + experience 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom? 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting, ...)? 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects…) and who prepares/receives it? 
5. Do your asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company…)? 
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7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
7b. If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in the mid to long-term? 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
companies’ technology strategy? 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
10c. Are all investors (and asset managers) the same or are there differences 
between them? 
11. Is the technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
14. Can you recommend other people whom I could interview? 
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Appendix 2 - Case study company A 
 
The case of company “A” 
Data collection 
The data used for analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship in the 
case of the company “A” was collated from the study of existing secondary data, 
such as annual reports, the company website, press releases, the company 
internal magazine, which is published monthly and one personal interview with 
a board member of the portfolio company. From the investor side, one asset 
manager who was involved in the 2010 investment was interviewed.  
 
Company background information 
Today the company “A” is one of the market leaders in Europe for Broker 
Software. It was founded in 1985 as a small software company offering software 
for construction financing. At around the same time the founder tried to pool 
separate independent insurance and finance brokers. By 1986 the definition of 
the area of activity had changed from construction financing to general 
brokerage consulting. “A” was one of the first companies in that area to offer 
computer analysis enabling consultants to simulate quickly different scenarios. 
In 1992, the first software to include online access and connection 
functionalities was developed and successfully launched on the market. Having 
started in 1985 with a handful of associated brokers, the number had grown to 
500 by 1993. And the growth story continued.  
 
Today more than 10,000 brokers with an agency funding of roughly 5 billion 
Euros use the software packages offered by company “A”. The permanent 
increase in customers is strongly linked to the company’s innovativeness and 
customer orientation. Every one to two years a new software tool or specific 
application is launched on the market. These tools were developed purely in-
house during the first few years after the foundation of “A”. In 1991, a strategic 
partnership with another software company was started. Acquisition of 1/3 of the 
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shares of this company proved to be crucial to the success and profitability of 
the cooperation. As a consequence of the cooperation, which included the first 
brokerage system in Europe with online connection to all leading European 
investment companies, the remaining 2/3 of the shares of the partner company 
were acquired in 1998. In 1999 both companies, previously private limited 
companies, were merged into a public traded company.  
 
After the merger of the two companies, the registered capital steadily increased 
in the following years from less than 2 million EUR to more than 5 million EUR. 
After the merger, when the company was publicly listed and traded, the first 
non-family investors to acquire shares were customers. Subsequently, in the 
following years the dominant milestones for “A” were the foundation of a stock 
broking bank for financial service providers in 2006 and the acquisition of 
another financial service provider with 300 associated brokers and a 
corresponding agency fund of 1.5 billion Euros. In 2009, around one third of the 
company shares were sold from the founder family to 4 insurance companies, 
each of them owning less than 10% of the shares. The expected turnover for 
the year 2010 was around 70 million EUR, achieved with 92 full time 
employees. 
 
The role of technology in company “A” 
The company “A” division that develops and deals with pure finance products is 
not at all directly affected by technological changes. However, in the area of 
software and IT service, it is key to keep pace with the competitors and offer 
solutions based on the latest available communication and computer hardware 
technology. The speed with which transactions can be made, security and user 
friendliness are decisive factors when a broker is selecting their software tools. 
Mega trends in “A”’s line of business were first the integration of online access 
to internal databases, later direct connection to trading platforms and today 
accessibility and usability at any place on earth. Such mega trends first have to 
be identified and then “A”’s business adapted accordingly. It goes without 
saying that all hardware and software always has to be up to date and 
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complaint with the latest available technology and functionality. Otherwise 
clients simply move to another company that does provide state of the art or 
even advanced technology.  
 
To maintain a strong position like “A” has today, regular investment in the 
infrastructure and screening of future trends is vital. The overall business model 
of “A” would be in danger if it lost ground in the area of brokerage software. One 
of the projects currently under investigation is an animated trailer tool. 
Depending on the client’s need, the broker can build a specific and fully 
customised animated movie with just a few clicks. Even if this is not a radical 
innovation, but just the next step in an incremental adaptation process, “A” will 
once again be the first to launch such a tool. The steady improvement and 
adjustment required to be ahead in the state of the art technology is mandatory 
for “A” to maintain the base of brokers and to increase further their business. 
Once a broker decides to move away and use another system it is extremely 
difficult to get them back, as this means a huge investment in both financial 
terms and manpower. 
 
Ownership structure 
From 1985 until 1999, “A” was 100 percent privately owned by the founder and 
his family. In 1999, when “A” went public, people outside the founder’s family 
acquired a small number of shares. The majority of the investors who had 
joined in an early phase were customers of “A”. Today the family of the founder 
still owns around 55% of the shares. Other major shareholders are 4 
institutional investors with packages of 9.99%. The portion of free-floating 
shares is only around 5%. Shares owned by customers are also included in the 
5% free-floating shares, which means no dominant influence is possible by law.  
 
Interaction with investors 
When “A” went public, some of the investors tried to discuss in general terms 
how the company was going to be managed in one-to-one meetings with board 
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members. They wanted to exert direct influence on the day-to-day business and 
long-term strategic decisions. In fact, the board members were not particularly 
interested in such investor action and just considered it to be the opinions of 
minor shareholders. No one felt under pressure and decisions were not 
changed. No one tried explicitly to exert influence on the technology strategy. 
Obviously the customers (who are in the role of finance investors) seek 
openings to generate advantages for themselves as customers of “A”. This may 
be by adjusting the price guidelines, selection of suppliers or other business 
related issues. The company needs to invest in new software and hardware 
technology not to lose ground in the market. At present the market position of 
“A” is very good and compared to its competitors, it offers advanced technology. 
But some competitors are currently investing a lot of money in new technology 
the consequences of which may be a stagnancy of “A” and possible competitive 
setbacks for “A” within the next few years. 
 
This situation is clear to the board members of “A”. However, there is one 
person with a different approach and strong influence, he is the founder of the 
company who has still a huge share in the assets of the company and an 
influential seat on the supervisory board. He did a very good job in the past. The 
company was permanently expanding. But now he wants to minimise the 
entrepreneurial risk with the consequence that he does not want to support 
long-term investments. He prefers a higher dividend in the next years for the 
price of a shrinking competitive advantage. The board members who want to 
strengthen the position of the company in the long-term have analysed all the 
key data of the company. According to their results there is a huge potential that 
can be lifted by “A”, but not without deciding to invest in new technology. This is 
the point where the finance investors join the game. The management of “A” 
presented the long-term outlook for the company, including opportunities and 
trends, within the framework of the bi-annual report for the shareholders and on 
occasion during personal meetings.  
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The analysis of the board members convinced the finance investors to favour 
the plan to invest in new technology in the form of the latest IT hardware and 
software. After intense discussion, the finance investors did finally also convince 
the majority shareholder – the founder of “A” – that this decision was the right 
one and inevitable in preparing “A” for the future. In this specific case, it was the 
group of investors who did finally push the decision with regards to technology 
strategy, but not because of their expertise in that area. It was simply the 
management analysis that convinced the investors to agree to the investment 
proposal. They are used to driving decisions based on complex data collection 
and analysis. For the founder of “A”, too many assumptions and variables are a 
little frightening, because he is afraid of harming the company with incorrect 
decisions that involve significant investment. The investor is clearly indicating 
that the competence to decide which technology is appropriate and necessary 
is in the hands of the management of “A”. For the investors, it is just about 
making a decision based on an analysis made by the expert committee. This is 
where an experienced investor is often more skilled and better able to make a 
decision. If they have not been involved in the preparation of the data, they can 
make their decision objectively. CEOs are sometimes said to be in love with a 
specific technology or project and so unable to make the best decision for the 
company. 
 
Findings from the company “A” 
The specific case of company “A” showed regular, but not very tight contact and 
information exchange between the company management and the investors. 
Active involvement of the investors only occurred when investment or other 
significant decisions were to be made. A distinctive situation in “A” is the fact 
that several of the minor shareholders are customers of “A”, with direct contact 
to the management. They sometimes try to exert influence during personal 
meetings with the management of “A” to generate an individual benefit for 
themselves. No investor involved in “A” had directly exerted influence on the 
technology strategy. The investors consider the company management to be 
the panel of experts who have to prepare the decision making process so that 
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finally, when the investors are involved, a decision can be made on a 
presentation of pure facts and figures. One of the investors interviewed 
described the pre-investment phase as the most important phase of the 
investment, during which all aspects, including the technology strategy are 
evaluated. 
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 “A” provides a detailed financial report to all investors twice a year. Besides 
that quarterly calls take place during which the investors can ask questions or 
make comments that will be heard by other shareholders as well. Personal 
meetings with the institutional investors are arranged on request, but not more 
often than 3-4 times a year. In between, phone calls are made and emails are 
exchanged, but on average less than once per month.  
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee? 
 Direct communication between the investors and the portfolio company 
occurs between the asset manager on the investor side and the CEO or another 
board member at the portfolio company. There is no contact between an 
investor and a management level other than board level. 
 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The standard tool for direct communication is phone and email. Personal 
meetings rarely take place (just 3-4 times/year). 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 The only detailed report is the bi-annual report that is published on the 
website as well. It sometimes happens that shareholders ask for specific 
information by phone or email, which can be given if there is no risk of this 
giving the requester an unfair advantage compared to other shareholders. The 
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management team of “A” is very careful not to compromise the laws and 
regulations in place against insider trading. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 The asset managers of the 4 finance investors involved have a good 
knowledge of “A”’s activity in the brokerage and investment area. However, 
none of them has specific knowledge on the technology used and applied to 
make the things work. They thus rely fully on the data and analysis prepared by 
the board members. In some cases 3rd party expertise is requested to ensure 
that the analysis was done properly both in terms of tools and data. 
6. When do the investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 In an environment where the finance investors have no dominant share, they 
cannot request third-party expertise. However, it was commented that this is 
common practice in the pre-investment phase in case of major investments and 
for significant business decisions. If the investor has enough power to force the 
portfolio company to hire third-party advice, it has to happen. In other cases the 
asset manager will recommend such action. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 It is an important area and each of the 4 finance investors involved is 
interested in the technology roadmaps developed by “A”. Control of and the 
generation of such roadmaps however is solely the task of the portfolio 
company. It often happens that companies draft wonderful technology 
strategies for manufacturing or product engineering, but without a stable 
business case to back it up. This is where finance investors often do intervene. 
It is an absolute must that all commercial analysis has already been done 
before the roadmap is presented. Otherwise too much time is lost on discussion 
that might be obsolete after the figures have been analysed. 
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7b. If they do influence technology strategy, on what basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 None of the investors directly influences the technology strategy decisions 
because they are aware of their lack of expertise and know-how in that area. 
Also, accountability needs to remain with the board members and the CEO. For 
the finance investors it is purely a game of economics. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 The finance investors have a back office with analysts and in some cases 
specific portfolio teams to help collect information. Besides that, the asset 
managers who have been in the business for a long time have a good network 
so that they know where they can ask for support to be able to judge something. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 Financial targets are key and all decisions related to the organisation, 
marketing etc. have to make sense in a way that the boost to the company 
value is greater than proposed expenditure. All this can negatively impact the 
technology strategy, e.g. due to financial or personal restrictions. In the case of 
“A” however, the finance investors initiated nothing in that direction due to a lack 
of power. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in the mid to long-term? 
 The investors do not directly evaluate the technology strategy itself. It is the 
overall business case that counts. Depending on the investment, involvement of 
a third-party company may be recommended by the investors. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
companies’ technology strategy? 
 There is no reason and in most cases also no justification for a direct 
influence on technology strategy. The management of the portfolio company 
has the expertise and is accountable. In the case of “A”, the investor base could 
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try to exert influence by requesting the management to move in their direction, 
but it would just create a negative atmosphere and is not in line with “A”’s 
philosophy. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 Usually the portfolio company management presents a business case or an 
analysis and already has an idea or a wish in which direction it should go. If 
there is some flexibility in the interpretation of data, a certain manipulation is 
definitely an option. However, company management has to be very careful. 
The asset managers are normally not able to identify minor points that might be 
hidden or explained incorrectly. But if third-party expertise is acquired and such 
an issue were to become visible, it would harm the management significantly. 
10c. Are all investors (and asset managers) the same or are there differences 
between them? 
 For each investment case, each company and each investor are unique in 
detail and on the personal level. There are too many parameters and 
influencing factors, one case can never be like another. For sure there are 
similarities and over time things happen repeatedly, but generally each case 
has its own DNA.  
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Framework parameters like available budget, the people in charge of 
decision-making, etc. definitely play an important role. Some investors put 
strong pressure on the management of their company portfolio when they are 
convinced, e.g. that they do not have the necessary expertise. Equally, when 
the budget is cut to the minimum to avoid too much of a negative impact on the 
EBIT, technology projects and roadmaps can become obsolete. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 The investor himself cannot positively contribute to the area of technology 
strategy. For organisational learning, investors do often bring in new aspects, 
such as reporting systems, requirements for specific KPIs, ERP systems and 
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internal processes, due to their experience with other companies. Generally 
speaking, the less experience a company has from the outside (through e.g. 
fluctuation in workplaces), the less up-to-date are the processes and the 
procedures. In such cases investor involvement can really be a kind of 
consultation, but on a very basic level. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 In the case of “A”, all the investors involved act and think equally. They want 
to be up-to-date on what is going on in the company in which they have 
invested, but they do not intervene strongly and put no pressure on the 
management for any specific decision. 
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Appendix 3 - Case study company B 
 
The case of company “B” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “B” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
study of annual reports, the company websites, press releases and articles. 
Primary data was gained through four personal interviews at top management 
level at the portfolio company. From the investor side, one asset manager 
involved in the investment in the period from 2000 to 2005 was interviewed.  
 
Company background information 
“B” is today a major supplier to the global automotive and commercial vehicle 
industry. The germ cell for the company was a saddlery that was founded in 
1880 in southeast Germany. In 1954 the grandson of the founder registered a 
company for the production of tractor seat cushions. In the first years it was a 
one-man show. The products were purely customer specific and he even visited 
farmers personally to hone specifications for the product to be manufactured. 
Today the company has around 8,000 employees in 17 countries and the 
annual turnover is close to 1 billion EUR. With a diversified product portfolio the 
company supplies different markets for both on and off-road vehicles. The first 
step of real B2B was the supply of seat cushions to local German tractor 
manufacturers in the late 1950s. Relatively simple products made from 
polyurethane foam and vinyl or leather – at that time however polyurethane 
foam was a revolutionary new material.  
 
Driven by the innovativeness of the founder, in 1964 not only a seat cushion, 
but a complete suspended seat for agricultural machineries was launched on 
the German market and later exported to other European countries and the 
Americas. Over the years the products have been continually improved to offer 
the customers state of the art technology at all times. After an initial single metal 
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bar to provide a minimum of suspension, more complex mechanics with 
mechanical springs, air springs and even dampers followed. In the early 1980s, 
new markets were entered through diversification of the product range. The first 
new segment was the production and sale of swivel office chairs with height 
adjustment in 1980. Only two years later, 1982, a generation of suspended 
driver seats for trucks was developed and successfully launched.  
 
In 1985 seats for public transport and interior components for passenger cars 
were added to the product portfolio. In the public transport segment, the main 
customers were bus manufacturers and train manufacturers. Prominent 
examples are the seats in the German ICE and the Transrapid. Full seats were 
not developed for passenger cars, only headrests and later centre consoles and 
door panels. The main synergies between all segments are the foaming and 
coating technologies. Since its foundation, the company has always been driven 
by the founder’s will and engagement to discover new markets, to develop new 
products and to grow the company. During a speech he gave at the company’s 
50th anniversary, he said that he was never satisfied with what he had achieved 
in his professional life and that had been his main motivation for continuous 
research and development activities. He was always searching for something 
new that would offer him the chance to increase the turnover of the company, to 
strengthen its market position and to offer the best portfolio to the customers.  
 
The company grew mainly as an intact company, but a few acquisitions were 
made in the 1980s and 1990s. A magic number that was targeted in the 1980s 
was an annual turnover of 1 billion Deutsche Mark. That was finally reached 
after acquisitions mainly in the automotive segment. The company is today 
structured in two main divisions. First, the seating systems division, for which 
the agricultural sector is still a major market, with an annual turnover around 
350 million EUR. And second, the automotive division with the dominant annual 
turnover around 700 million EUR. In the seating systems division, a business 
unit structure is in place that reflects the corporate history. It contains the 
passenger seat business, the highway seat business and the off-road seat 
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business. In the year 2000, the office chair division was sold as part of a 
restructuring activity and a plan to concentrate fully on the motorised vehicle 
market again. 
 
The role of technology in company “B” 
Decisions regarding technology are key to the future market position of “B”, both 
in terms of product specification and production process. In all markets, “B” has 
just a handful of competitors and the decisive factors for market success are 
product specification and prices. If a supplier can bring a feature first to the 
market, it can make him single source in that segment or for certain customers. 
The same can happen if a process innovation allows a company to offer 
products at a lower price than all the competitors who do not have the 
capabilities to utilise the new production technology. 
Innovations in the business field of “B” are e.g.: 
- Cooled seats by adding cooling fans and a specialist secondary layer 
below the fabric or leather.  
- Electronically controlled suspension to adjust to road or ground 
conditions. 
- Lumber support adjustment including a full backrest shape with a 
mechanically adjustable backrest angle to guarantee the right position 
with fewer adjustment elements. 
- Use of new materials to reduce weight and allow a more attractive design 
due to better characteristics also with regard to crash tests and 
homologation 
- Crash active headrests that change the headrest position in the event of 
a crash.  
- Moulding of hard and soft material in one shot, for e.g. door panels, 
dashboards, etc. 
- Replacement of a very complex valve with around 80 single parts by a 
very simple solution with less than 10 parts. 
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In all such technological innovation, different factors play a role that is 
sometimes neither necessary nor sufficient, but supportive. Most of the 
technological innovations developed by “B” come from an advanced 
engineering department. The most valuable input for this department comes 
from internal Kaizen processes as well as user observational research. Some 
projects that were put on hold because they were not high priority are continued 
undercover. One of the interviewees called that sort of project and activity 
submarine projects, because these activities are below the top management’s 
radar. These projects are not budgeted and no status or progress report is 
made to the top management. All work is done “in between” during a working 
day, when there is sufficient slack to move forward with the undercover project 
or in the evenings or even at weekends. The people involved are extremely 
motivated and enthusiastic about such projects as they experience a feel a 
strong sense of self-fulfilment when their work is finally recognised by the 
company management. The motivations for such activities links satisfaction with 
the relationship employees have with their employers. 
 
Having said that, an advanced engineering department significantly increases 
the probability that technological innovations are developed. Another incentive 
for “B” is to receive specific RFQs or development orders placed by customers. 
While self-initiated research activity is fully upfront financed, the advantage of 
customer-driven projects is a funding that often covers 100% of the cost. In 
return, exclusivity normally has to be guaranteed for a specific period. As the 
products are very complex and made with up to 500 single parts, including 
safety devices, customers normally cooperate just with one supplier for new 
projects, which in turn guarantees a stable turnover if the product is accepted by 
the end customers as well. In the seat market a dilemma that becomes more 
significant with each new project is the need for safety and standards 
compliancy on the one hand and weight reduction on the other hand. Thus the 
need for new solutions to absorb the forces of a crash test or pull test in the 
seat structure are key, no matter if realised with new materials or improved 
design. 
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Ownership structure 
Until 1996 the company was not publicly listed but in 100% private ownership of 
the founder and his family. In 1996 the legal form of the company was changed 
to a publicly limited company through an IPO on the Frankfurt stock exchange, 
still with the founder’s family as the dominant shareholder. However, in 2000 the 
ownership structure changed significantly. As part of a fundamental 
restructuring, during which the office chair division was hived off, a major 
portion of the shares was sold to a private equity fund company. This investor 
was on board until 2005. In 2005 a second public offering followed and for a 
short time more than 90% of the shares were free floating. In the meantime, a 
few finance investors once again acquired packages between 2 and 10%, but 
since the 2nd IPO the free floating portion has always been above 50% and no 
shareholder has had a package above 10%.  
 
Interaction with investors 
In the last decade “B”’s ownership structure has significantly changed a few 
times, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The management has been 
confronted with all sorts of different types of shareholders, starting from the 
private owner via the private equity fund as dominant shareholder to a more 
diversified ownership without a dominant shareholder. Some of the interviewees 
had been working for the company for more than 10 years and could comment 
on the differences brought about by the different ownership constellations. 
While the founder of the company would regularly walk through all departments 
including the shop floor, interaction with the private equity investor was totally 
different. Instead of frequent personal visits and discussions with people at all 
hierarchy levels, the private equity team met only the board members. Personal 
meetings were scheduled 3-4 times per month depending on the issues that 
were on the table. Conference calls were scheduled monthly or on specific 
occasions also at short notice. 
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At the meetings the participants from the investor side were always only the 
asset managers, that is no analysts or experts. There was never discussion 
about technological details or technology strategy. The asset managers were 
purely figure driven and interested only in cash flow calculations, finance 
mathematics and KPI. Of course, any plan for investment either through direct 
expenditure or through allocation of workforce had to be presented to the major 
shareholder, but when the presentation was viable in itself, agreement was 
normally given immediately. When the investor had doubts, for whatsoever 
reason, a potential consequence was a request to the board to provide 
expertise from an independent expert or consultant. During the time when the 
investor was involved, there were a few occasions when Roland Berger, the 
Boston Consulting Group or the Fraunhofer Institute were contracted to analyse 
a specific business case or scenario. Direct influence from the asset managers 
or their back office analysts never happen. They have always considered the 
board members to be the expert committee who forward proposals with their 
justification or proof that this is the right and the best thing to do with the 
available resources. 
 
The asset managers did ask for specific changes in the company with regard to 
KPIs. The control system was historically not very strong and only a few 
parameters and numbers were monitored and tracked regularly. Following a 
request from the major shareholder, several cockpits were implemented to give 
a quick overview on e.g. major projects, complaints, sales, etc. One of the 
board members said that the improvement and standardisation in reporting was 
very positive and beneficial for both the company management and the 
investor. However, again no comment or indicator regarding technology was 
included. The reports concentrate wholly on comparisons between plan and 
actual cost, timing and quality. In the past, project budgets were updated 
annually, but no fundamental consolidation of all project related spending was 
made and supervised. An R&D controller was installed driven by a request from 
the private equity investor, and the full product development process was 
revised with the support of external experts. The final outcome was a 
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standardised product development process including quality gates, steering 
committee and a corresponding reporting tool. At the end of the day the request 
to improve and detail the control and reporting systems produced a fundamental 
change in the R&D process in recognition of the norms and standards being 
introduced in the vehicle industry.  
 
Similarly, further detailed and standardised analysis was requested at the key 
account level to analyse, e.g. average margin by key account, to identify of loss 
makers and investigate possible actions to clean the portfolio and to be more 
selective when new products are quoted. In this area the asset managers are 
without any doubt experts, regardless of the product segment or industry. When 
it comes to decisions regarding product or technology, the asset managers rely 
on other people’s expertise. In many cases the board members, with the entire 
management team in the background, can successfully present a potential 
business case without further evaluation by consultants. In some cases 
however it is crucial that an idea, concept or strategy is re-evaluated by a third-
party. The cost for that third-party advice has to be paid for by the company. 
Preparation for decision-making, said one board member, was also very much 
appreciated also by other shareholders and the advisory board as it strengthens 
the foundations on which decisions are built. When cases were presented which 
did not meet the financial conditions of the private equity investor, they were 
rejected straight away, without further analysis from within or outside the 
portfolio company. The rules are very straightforward when expected returns 
cannot be delivered. 
 
Since the private equity investor as a major shareholder exited the investment 
the situation has changed significantly. At present there is no dominant 
shareholder. All packages held by institutional investors are below 10% 
ownership. Nevertheless, some of the investors would like to play a role similar 
to that of the private equity investor as a major shareholder. They call frequently 
and ask for personal meetings. The similarity to the other situation lies in the 
fact that the expertise of these investors is also more in the area of general 
155 
management, analysis and management accounting systems. Technology 
strategy is not and never has been a hot topic because of the technological 
directions proposed. When it comes to discussion about technology then it is 
always due to the associated spending and/or the market. Investors who ask for 
personal meetings, due to the legal requirements, can neither get more 
information than the other institutional or private investors, nor can they exert 
influence. A board member has to think very carefully about the consequences 
of such meetings because they have to assume liability for all actions. That 
means that a clever board member will not directly implement an investor 
requirement, if they are not absolutely convinced that that is the right decision.  
 
Findings from company “B” 
The feedback from the interviews was that all the investors with a significant 
package of shares in their portfolio showed interest in the actions and activities 
at their portfolio companies. The level of interest and engagement is equivalent 
to the financial significance of the company in the investor’s portfolio. In general 
the management of company “B” welcomed investor involvement. The main 
reason is that the investors asked for detailed analysis and justification of 
decisions made by the portfolio company management. When the investor was 
involved in the decision making process even stricter regulations were put in 
place. Before active investors were on board, it was possible to drive decisions 
without a scientifically convincing projection of the outcome and corresponding 
results. The stricter approach can be regarded as a very professional and 
scientific approach that minimises failure. On the other hand, it does kill 
creativity and the potential that is created when one is willing to take a risk, 
even if the outcome cannot be accurately predicted. Trust in gut feeling and 
experience is not possible when the environment is too formalised and 
stringent. However, in the eyes of the top management this lifts a load from their 
shoulders, because then decisions are not made by themselves as individuals, 
but as the outcome of analyses and investigations. 
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A key outcome of this case was that the investors never tried to influence 
directly decisions regarding products, the production process or technology. 
Their role was merely to agree to proposed directions and projects or not. When 
disagreement was expressed, it was either a no or a request for further external 
opinions and expertise. The investors considered themselves to be more 
professional in the areas of management accounting and business analysis 
than the management of their portfolio companies. Regarding product and 
process know-how and technology strategy however, it is clear that know-how 
was entirely in the hands of the company’s management team and the 
employees. In some cases the investor influence did affect the technology 
strategy direction taken by the company, but never because of a direct influence 
in the decision making process by proposing a specific roadmap. When the 
technology strategy was affected then only because the methods and data used 
to analyse and evaluate both the current situation and the future outlook were 
more standardised, formalised, mathematic and data driven.  
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 Regular “keep-in-touch” calls to bring both sides up to speed on the actual 
situation were scheduled on a monthly basis. Personal meetings were not 
scheduled on a regular basis, but more on a case-by-case basis. On average, 
such personal meetings happened every second month. In the case of budget 
approval, restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, the close involvement of the 
investor including personal meetings, phone calls and emails was expected and 
requested. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 Usually it was the asset manager of the investor side who kept in touch with 
the CEO of “B”. Other board members of “B” joined the personal meetings, but 
not usually without the attendance of the CEO. No analysts or other back office 
staff joined the personal meetings, but they did take part in the phone 
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conferences. The CEO insisted on being copied in on any communication from 
“B” to the investor. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The dominant tool for communication is email, followed by phone. Both 
channels were used by “B”, on average 5 times per month. For complex or 
delicate issues, phone calls and personal meetings are definitely preferred. The 
monthly “keep-in-touch” call was organised as a phone conference to enable 
different people to dial in and follow the meeting. In such calls it was standard 
for members of the investor’s portfolio team to join. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 A monthly reporting system that includes a tracking cockpit for projects, 
global and regional financial figures, highlights and lowlights for strategic 
customers was installed after the private equity investor became involved in the 
company. One of the first actions was to define a comprehensive reporting 
system to guarantee that the investor is permanently up-to-date regarding all 
key actions. A comparison of both year to date and actual had to be included for 
all the figures that were also part of the budget. A bridge to explain any 
deviations was requested as well. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 Asset managers very often do have excellent knowledge and experience in 
specific regions of the world or in specific markets. On a product or process 
level however expertise is normally not extensive. If an asset manager happens 
to have similar expertise in a business like the portfolio company than it 
happens just by chance – it is never a rule. Besides the potential positive effect 
this brings to the portfolio company, facilitating better decisions, it could also 
have the negative effect of the decisions being too much driven by the asset 
manager. The consequence may be conflict regarding accountability. Thus, 
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even if an asset manager has fantastic expertise, it does not necessarily mean 
that the best possible result will be achieved. 
6. When do the investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Involvement by an external, independent consulting company in the pre-
investment phase is quite standard when a finance investor is considering 
buying a significant amount of shares. And this was the case with “B”’s 
investment. Furthermore, if important and cost intensive decisions are on the 
agenda, external consultancies again are one of the preferred sources for 
advice and analysis. In most cases the investor will give a recommendation or 
even prescribe which consultant to be hired for a specific analysis. The portfolio 
company however always pays the bill. On request of the portfolio company or 
by recommendation of the asset manager, analysts from the investment firm 
can support the portfolio company in certain issues, mainly relating to business 
planning, reporting and financial analysis.  
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 The investors see the area of technology strategy as a key area for long-
term development and value evolution of a portfolio company – just as the 
management of the portfolio company does, the difference being that the 
investor is not really interested in the technology itself, just the outcome that can 
be achieved by following a specific technology. The business case has to be 
prepared in detail so that it is fully transparent when presented to the finance 
investor. 
7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 In the case of “B”, the finance investor who was interviewed and the other 
investors who followed on afterwards were very careful when making direct 
judgements about products or process technology. Feedback from them was 
always holistic and related to the complete business case, never individually to 
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a specific technology or technology strategy. It is very clear that the portfolio 
company management is accountable and wrong decisions could result in a 
management change, driven by the finance investor. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 Sources that were used regularly were internal portfolio teams, analysts, 
expert panels who were known in the finance investor scene and external 
consultants. As finance investors often bring interesting projects to 
consultancies, in return they often get quick feedback on specific questions 
(depending on the relationship). This is more often the case than not. Most 
asset managers have preferred consultancies, which they recommend or 
stipulate for their investees. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 A company is a very complex and sensitive mechanism and all the 
aforementioned areas interact with and influence the others. Finance and 
organisation strategy have a strong impact on technology strategy. When an 
organisation is downsized as a consequence of a restructuring program to 
optimise cost, certain projects – mostly long term oriented ones – cannot be 
continued, as the workforce required for them is no longer available. In the 
same way, strict budget regulations sometimes hinder the pursuit of a 
technology strategy, simply because the necessary budget has not been 
approved. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 Success of the technology strategy is measured though the internal 
company reporting system and the external analysis of the aforementioned 
consultants. The investor does not normally judge whether a technology 
strategy is right or wrong. They decide if a business case is interesting based 
on figures developed by the company management. When the assumption does 
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not match reality, the expert panel who made the incorrect decisions, i.e. 
company management, is accountable. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 In the case of “B”, neither the investor nor the private equity investor had 
direct influence, nor did the other investors who followed after 2005. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 A CEO might have a clear idea about the technology strategy they would like 
to follow. If this is the case, they can definitely influence the analysis and the 
business case in a variety of ways. There are various databases available from 
which data for a business case can be built, but the data can differ from 
database to database. Data can be selected according to the desired outcome. 
What is white will not become black, but there are plenty of shades that can be 
generated instead of white or black without lying or even hiding information. But, 
for decisions that are related to huge investments with high significance for the 
company, it is almost taken for granted that third-party expertise will be hired. 
This is also known to company managements and thus to hide any information 
or to influence the evaluation in a way that it is immediately transparent to 
another expert panel would not be clever. What a manager can do if they want 
to push in a certain direction is to seek out independent third-party analysis that 
supports their position. Such external data combined with a clear and irrefutable 
internal analysis can be sufficient to convince the investors to give the “B” the 
green light. These are little elements that drive mechanisms and allow the 
portfolio company management to gain momentum in discussion and 
negotiation with the finance investors. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 In the case of “B”, both the private equity investor who was involved from 
2000 until 2005 as well as the later investors after 2005 behaved in the same 
way. A difference however was the distribution of power. The investors who are 
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currently engaged all have minor share packages, whereas the private equity 
investor had a dominant package and therefore more power to influence 
decisions. A certain specialisation of the investors was confirmed. 
11. Is the technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 The overall available budget and the investment necessary to follow a 
possible technology strategy are strongly linked. In the case of “B” a project for 
a new seat concept was not approved because the market launch was 
scheduled for a period when the private equity investor assumed they would 
have sold the company. What was decided, was to start a project based on an 
existing product with minimum effort, in order to show prospective buyers of “B” 
as well as the current customer base that something new was in the pipeline. 
The experience of the management of “B” is that all the investors were clever 
enough to realise that a well-designed project, product and technology pipeline 
is vital for the successful sale of a company like “B”. But ultimately a buyer will 
often be aware that an acquisition will not deliver everything promised by the 
previous owner. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Definitely not for a long-term technology strategy, which would be necessary 
and vital for the long-term survival of a company like “B”. Regarding business 
practices, e.g. project management, for all different kinds of processes, e.g. 
efficient reporting, temporary involvement can result in significant improvement. 
This happened with company “B”, as described in the background information 
for this case. Due to the positive effect, all the managers of “B” who were 
interviewed remarked that the involvement of the finance investor had been a 
positive experience for the company as well as for themselves as individuals.  
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 The feedback from the interviews with people from “B” was that the investors 
often have worked outside Europe and thus they act more or less all within the 
same cultural framework. No one, either during the time at “B” or at another 
company, had experience of an investor who had wanted to push through a 
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fundamental change, either in the area of technology strategy or anywhere else. 
The personal experiences reported were all characterised by a general sense of 
cooperation and approval. 
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Appendix 4 - Case study company C 
 
The case of company “C” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “C” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
study of company websites, press releases and articles and internal 
documentation, which was made available. Primary data was gained through 
three personal interviews at top management level at the portfolio company and 
two interviews with investors.  
 
Company background information 
“C” was founded in the 1950s in Chicago/USA to manufacture electrical snap 
switches for household appliances. While expanding in the US by entering the 
vehicle market, a significant expansion was also taking place in Europe in the 
1960s and 1970s. After making in-roads in Europe with their copy-paste 
products from the United States, in the mid 1960s first key switches and then 
complete computer keyboards were developed and launched with great 
success on the global market. In the decades following the launch of the first 
keyboard, the products made by “C” were the benchmark and renowned for 
their reliability. Step by step, sales offices were opened in most European 
countries. In 1977, “C” went public in order to generate the cash that was used 
to invest in a semiconductor business. The semiconductor business was quite 
different from the original core business, but very profitable.  
 
Two manufacturing plants were built in Germany and a third European plant 
followed in the 1990s in the Czech Republic. In the USA, the company grew 
until the end of the 1990s, when a downturn in the automotive industry hit “C” 
very hard. In the early 1990s, a second public offering followed to finance some 
restructuring within the group as well as a first factory in China. In 2000, the 
semiconductor business was sold to a large American electronics company. 
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The reason for the sale was to generate cash to buy back shares to become 
independent from external investors. Today “C” employs around 2,500 people 
around the world. The annual turnover is around 400 million Euro.  
 
The role of technology in company “C” 
In the first year of business, “C” manufactured a small range of electrical 
switches for home appliances. From the mid 20th century until today “C” was 
very active in the market for electrical switches. The trend was always to make 
the products smaller, to improve performance and to adjust them to the 
specifications currently applicable in the respective markets. Originally switches 
were used to switch load currents directly and needed to be able to handle large 
currents. Now relays are used to switch the load currents and the switches only 
control the relay, requiring typically only a few milliamps (for an ECU standard 
device). Today “C” produces about 450 million switches and is the world’s 
market leader. The majority are manufactured on fully automated assembly 
lines in Europe and North America with just a small portion currently produced 
manually in China. The production processes are a key element for “C” as the 
reliability of the products is strongly linked with the processes and the speed of 
the assembly machines that have to be run as fast as possible to minimise the 
cost per piece. The assembly machines run 24/7 the whole year round. Only at 
Christmas are they switched off for a few days of maintenance.  
 
Another key element is the development and selection of the best materials, as 
the parts are used in a harsh environment. Temperature in the area of usage 
ranges from -60° C up to +155°C and the products also have to be able to 
withstand contact with silicone, grease, oil and other fluids and gases. The 
sealing components have to be carefully selected and tested, particularly the 
waterproof switches. Nevertheless, the perfect product has not as yet been 
found, because even the waterproof switches are not gas proof. A silicon-
containing atmosphere was not a problem in the past, when deposits at the 
contact area were just burned away when a few amps were switched. Today 
with decreasing electrical loads this is not the case, with the result that an 
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insulating layer can form very quickly. “C” has already been confronted with two 
serious complaints from Automotive OEM customers, where in one case a 
person died due to malfunction of a switch resulting from silicon contamination. 
As an extension to the switches, “C” started to develop a highly advanced 
overmoulding technology, that allows integration of the lead frame into the 
plastic material that simultaneously is one shell of a normally two shell housing. 
These parts are typically used for ABS systems, locking systems and several 
other electromechanical assemblies in cars and also in home appliance 
applications. Selection of the right material, the right temperature treatment 
during the production process and the parameters for the movements of the 
tools are very critical here again.  
 
Before the plastic material is injected into the tool, the lead frame is fixed with 
little metal bolts. As the lead frame is going to be fully overmoulded afterwards, 
the bolts have to be moved away slowly after the plastic material has been 
injected. Slowly enough to avoid the lead frame being removed at the same 
time, but fast enough to ensure the plastic material is still viscose enough to fill 
the space that was opened by the bolts. Many but not in all of these parts will 
also include micro switches. In the past they were soldered on, which is not the 
safest process. Today it is clear that welding is much better, when the 
parameters are exactly controlled and in fact “C” is working on the 
implementation of this technology at present. Further application fields in the 
automotive sector are electronic control units for window lifters, electric tailgates 
and gear shifter applications. The most advanced technology currently being 
used in this area is the use of inductive coils that are printed on multi-layer 
PCBs. A high frequent voltage is applied to these coils, which is permanently 
measured.  
 
By moving a non-ferrite material above the coils, they are dampened and 
subsequently the signal that is measured is altered, i.e. the amplitude is 
reduced. This technology is borrowed from the home appliances sector that is 
described later on. For the first launch on the automotive market with gear 
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shifter applications, the new sensor was designed in such a way that the 
moving element always covered a minimum of three coils with the effect that 
when one coil was defect, the system would still work. A huge advantage 
compared to Hall sensor technology, which can be applied similarly, is that the 
sensors are free, as they are made from the copper that is on the PCB anyhow. 
This technology led to a completely new product range for “C” with incredible 
market success. 
 
In the household appliance market, the switches are used in infrared 
applications, for today’s state of the art ceramic stove top controls. This 
application, based on the inductive technology above, is based on detecting the 
size of the cooking pot. In this case the coil is much bigger and the cooking pot 
and acts as the damping element. In this segment “C” is experiencing a good 
and stable return. New investments and available resources are mainly 
allocated to automotive applications, as the annual volumes are greater and 
consequently the potential growth rates are greater. The third field in which “C” 
is active is the manufacture of computer keyboards and mice. Over the past few 
decades this was a top business field for “C”. Today “C” still has a good market 
position for keyboards with improved functionality for professional users, such 
as card readers, finger print detection and such. In the mainstream market 
however, “C” has lost ground in standard products as “C”’s cost base is killing 
competitiveness on the one hand and on the other hand it does not have the 
multi-functional keyboards used by gamers in the product range. 
 
Ownership structure 
Following its foundation in 1953, “C” was in 100% private ownership until 1977, 
when a public offering changed the ownership situation. In 1977 “C” had a 
successful IPO and generated a good amount of cash to allow further 
diversification. In the early 90s, a secondary offering followed to finance some 
restructuring and expansion into the Chinese market in the form of a 
manufacturing site. In 2000, the family decided to sell the semiconductor 
division to be able to buy back the majority of the shares of “C”. Even during the 
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time when “C” was a public company, the family always owned a minimum of 
55% of the shares. The packages of the biggest non-family shareholders were 
always below 10%. Some finance investors held packages of around 5% of 
shares, whereas just a few percent where free floating. A significant difference 
between this example and many other public companies is that the CEO was 
always a representative of the founders’ family and a majority shareholder. 
 
Interaction with investors 
When the company was publicly owned with shares held by outsiders, the CEO 
of “C” had frequent contact with the large shareholders. Occasionally, a small 
shareholder would get in contact, but this was clearly the exception. For the 
CEO and the managers of “C”, it was clear that they had an obligation to run the 
company for the benefit of the shareholders. The challenge for the CEO, as 
representative of the 55% majority of the shares, was to be sure that his 
interests were well known to the minority public shareholders. As the majority 
owner he had to be mindful of the interests of the minority, without letting them 
run the show. That is, if he was really committed to a particular position or 
strategy, he could not allow himself to become too defensive. But then again, 
just because a minority shareholder held a contrary view that did not mean that 
he had to change his. Whatever the ownership structure, the shareholder can 
sell, of course. Nobody forces a shareholder to buy stock and nobody forces 
them to hold on to stock. They all knew that what the ownership structure of the 
company was when they bought their shares, but that did not nevertheless stop 
shareholders from making their interests known.  
 
During the period when “C” was a public company, face-to-face meetings with a 
handful of the biggest non-family shareholders (all of them funds) took place a 
couple of times a year. In most cases breakfast, luncheon or dinner meetings. 
The shareholders generally requested key figures and an executive summary of 
the current condition and the outlook for the next months (book to bill ratio, etc.). 
In several meetings shareholders made comments on what could be done 
differently in terms of market approach, but never specifically regarding the 
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technology. Some just wanted to give friendly advice, others were more 
demanding and in rare cases, letters were sent to the advisory board. At the 
end of the day, the minority shareholders were never able to exert influence on 
the opinions of the majority shareholder group. External consultancy was not 
sought due to minority shareholder requests, but due to a majority shareholder 
decision. Sometimes the banks requested 3rd party expertise to release a credit 
package. For the minority shareholders, if they strongly disagreed with results 
or perspectives of “C”, the only option open to them was to sell their shares. 
They were aware of the limitations of power and did not waste their time on 
endless discussion or battling with the majority shareholders. The shareholders 
had no real influence.  
 
Findings from the case of company “C” 
The asset managers representing the funds that had share packages in “C” met 
regularly with the company CEO. Besides a general exchange on current 
business and delivery of an outlook based on the latest information, no 
exchange happened. It is interesting that the people from the finance investors 
did ask about product strategy for the coming years, but never tried to give 
advice or comment positively or negatively directly in the meeting. According to 
a finance investor with a small investment in “C”, when direct influence is very 
limited, such data is collected for internal analysis. Based on this information, 
market studies are done to estimate how competitive “C” will remain or become 
in the future. The technology strategy in the long term is of secondary 
importance to the investor. What counts is the product portfolio and the market 
share, which at the end of the day is also a result of the technology strategy, but 
development of technology strategy and turning it into reality is the job of the 
portfolio company management. 
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The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do the investors and investee communicate? 
 A regular phone conference accessible to all shareholders was organised for 
once a month. Personal meetings with the institutional investors took place 2-3 
times a year, when they could easily be combined with other meetings in the 
region for the investor or the company CEO. Emails, letters and phone calls 
took place only very rarely.  
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 Only the portfolio company CEO ever met with the investors. From the 
investor side, only the asset manager joined the meetings. The first line 
management of “C” also took part in the conference calls as well as some back 
office people from the institutional investors. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The communication channel most used in the case of “C” was the 
phone/conference call and personal meetings. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 A quarterly report was produced to inform all investors about the latest 
financial situation. This report did not include details on the project or product 
level, but was quite general and finance driven. 
5. Are the asset managers specialised in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 The asset managers involved in the investment of “C” were knowledgeable 
about general market trends, such as sales volume of cars, etc., but definitely 
not experts when it came to product detail and /or processes. 
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6. When do the investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 In the case of “C”, 3rd party expertise was never sought at the request of a 
finance investor. External consultancies were booked a few times to do some 
analysis to generate a basis for decisions to be made at that time, but the 
initiative came purely from the company management. In this case the finance 
investors did not involve 3rd parties in the pre-investment phase. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 The funds engaged in “C” did care about the overall business situation and 
were interested in hearing about how the technology strategy developed. But, in 
fact the focus of interest was to understand what “C” intended to achieve by the 
strategies defined. 
7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 There was no attempt to exert influence on technology strategy at “C”. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 The information that asset managers have available generally came from the 
back office, i.e. the analysts and experts at the fund companies. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 According to the management of “C”, the proposals that some shareholders 
made such as focusing on one market segment or product line would have had 
direct consequences on the technology strategy. But in fact at “C” no real 
influence by any investor was exerted over all the years. In some cases it was 
exhausting to explain again and again why certain investor advice was not 
followed. 
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9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 It is the analyst community at the fund company who prepare and pre-
evaluate data so that finally the fund manager in charge of a certain investment 
can decide to continue or to exit from the investment. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 In the case of “C” the finance investors did not have the power to drive any 
change and no one tried to do so aggressively, e.g. via media or official letters. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 During the phone conferences and meetings, the situation was explained 
with full transparency. One of the key principles of “C”`s CEO was and is to 
communicate all plans and ideas openly. Discussion and defence of any 
decisions in meetings or calls with investors is definitely preferable to strategic 
dis-information that leads to a surprise afterwards. If the surprises were positive, 
no one would complain, but that is not always the case. The investor 
interviewed commented that not all company CEOs are like the one of “C”. 
During his career he had often experienced people who had tried to give 
selected information to support their own ideas and strategies and to avoid 
controversy. Such behaviour however does not create a fruitful atmosphere, 
only mistrust, which makes the lives of both sides more difficult, as the fund 
managers are responsible for their investments at the fund company. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 Of the finance investors involved in “C”, one was substantially more 
aggressive than the others and made proposals on which markets and products 
to focus, but this was more because of the individual person’s responsibility. 
They all have a common target – to earn money with their investment, but the 
way that they select target companies is different (size, region of activity, etc.). 
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11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 The money available for research, etc. is limited. Thus if a budget is 
generally cut it automatically has an influence on the technology strategy, 
because decisions about where to spent the money have to be made. A 
comment made by the investor was that technology strategy often changes 
when the top management of a portfolio company changes.  
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 In the case of “C”, no significant improvement or change within the company 
originated from a proposal made by one of the institutional investors. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 The American investors who were involved in “C” appreciated informal 
meetings in combination with breakfast, lunch or dinner. German investors 
prefer a face-to-face meeting arranged purely to discuss business.  
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Appendix 5 - Case study company D 
 
The case of company “D” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “D” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
study the company websites, press releases and articles. Primary data was 
gained through one personal interview at top management level at the portfolio 
company and one interview with the investor currently involved.  
 
Company background information 
Company “D” was founded 1925 in southern Germany as a family business. 
Starting with 4 employees and a number of home workers, the company 
produced different products made from knitted wire such as cooking pot 
cleaners. In the 1950s the product range was extended with products for 
filtering and noise protection in ventilation systems, again made from knitted 
wire. After the founder died, his grandson took over management of the 
company, which was still fully owned by the founder’s family. New 
developments in the automotive market led to new application fields for “D”. In 
the 1970s, knitted wire products for catalytic converters were co-developed with 
and supplied to exhaust system manufacturers and OEMs. The product range 
extension achieved strong growth for the company, so that the existing shop 
floor area had to be re-built.  
 
Further innovative products in the automotive business and steady expansion of 
the filtering applications in the areas of process engineering, electrical 
engineering and environmental engineering made the move to a new but bigger 
place necessary. In the 1980s “D” produced knitted wire products for the world 
market in 8,000 square meters with 140 permanent employees. In the 1990s, 
the first division outside of Germany was founded. The product range of this 
facility, which was opened in South Africa, was a copy/paste of part of the 
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German business. In the same century the founder’s family decided to sell all 
their shares in “D”. Before two institutional finance investors jointly acquired “D” 
in 2005, it was owned by two different company holdings that kept the company 
for just a couple of years in their portfolio. A milestone for the portfolio was 2002 
and the start of production of filtering elements for applications inside of the gas 
generator in automotive airbags. For these new products a dedicated automatic 
production line was installed. Another production plan was built in parallel in 
Hungary to further strengthen the manufacturing footprint in Europe. Today, “D” 
employs roughly 300 people and achieves an annual turnover of 60 million 
Euros across all segments.  
 
The role of technology in company “D”  
Historically the products manufactured by “D” were not particularly sophisticated 
in terms of specification. Having started in the early 20th century with a minimal 
portfolio of knitted wire products such as pot cleaners; tolerances or product 
specifications in general were not a critical issue. Over time this has changed 
significantly. By the 1950s the requirements of the extended customer base had 
changed fundamentally. As “D” s products were being used as components in 
the assembled products or systems of other companies, it was vital to define 
specifications and interfaces. The characteristics of a product that is used in an 
assembly have to be constant or at least within a clearly defined range. The 
requirements for filter elements in ventilation systems or for noise reduction 
products in exhaust systems are much stricter than those for a pot cleaner, but 
still moderate compared to, e.g. electrical components.  
 
Up to now, the specifications for the filter elements that are used in different 
industries have not been too rigid. But, there have been different products 
added to the portfolio, such as the automotive exhaust system application, 
during the last two decades that have set the company totally new challenges. 
The most critical applications are the safety restraint system applications. 
Knitted wire products are used to control and soften the explosive effect when 
an airbag is fired into use. Malfunction could have very severe consequences 
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both for the passengers in a vehicle as well as “D”. To ensure that the 
company’s insurers accept liability in case of a complaint, a lot of control 
systems have to be installed. It goes without saying that the production 
processes have to be up to date with latest available technology.  
 
This radical change in terms of production process complexity and product 
performance has led to new RFQs for products made from knitted wire. A 
difficulty is the price pressure from the Chinese companies that produce goods 
of a significantly lower standard. Even if the customers request the standard of 
“D”, buyers regularly confront the sales staff with dumping prices. As a second 
step, after the upgrade of “D”’s production processes for the existing 
components, two of the globally leading airbag manufacturers have placed 
RFQs for complete assemblies. They have had a good experience with “D” 
even with the new paths and have supported “D” with product and process 
know-how. “D” stopped producing and supplying components a decade ago and 
now only manufactures complete assemblies. When in the beginning several 
parts were bought from an external supplier, “D” built up internal know-how to 
increase the vertical integration. Being a renowned supplier in the area of safety 
restraint systems, opportunities in other areas are automatically created. One of 
the latest projects is again a knitted wire product with new materials that is used 
in the injectors for diesel engines to reduce the vibration of the vehicle. This 
project is being carried out in close cooperation with one of the world market 
leaders for such systems. 
 
Ownership structure 
From its foundation in 1925 until 1992, “D” was 100% in the ownership of the 
founder’s family. In 1992 the company was sold to a large holding that already 
included 6 other companies active in different areas of machine construction 
and metal component manufacturing. This ownership was not a long-lasting one 
and by 1999 the company had been sold again. Again the owner was a holding 
that already had 5 companies in the area of construction equipment and metal 
component manufacturing. In 2005 “D” was sold yet again. This time two 
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finance investors jointly acquired 100% of the shares, each investor owning 
50%. This ownership situation is still in place in 2011, but exit strategies are 
under evaluation and most probably another company will shortly own “D”. 
 
Interaction with investors 
The finance investors involved in “D” have a lot of experience of SMEs in 
Germany. They were actively involved in several investments when the first line 
of management was taking over responsibility after a former founder and owner 
was leaving the company to retire. What was and is exceptionally helpful for “D” 
is the excellent network of the finance investors, through which “D” was able to 
both identify new and valuable suppliers as well as new customers. With 
regards to the products of “D” and the technology strategy that changed after 
the founder’s family shares had been sold, neither investors would have been 
capable of providing support. Neither was it their intention to run a business 
fully. They are not experts in all segments in which they invest. They are 
excellent in financial subjects and also networking is a significant aspect where 
the investor can help, but day-to-day business and the strategic planning have 
to be managed by the company management. The investor will however 
carefully evaluate the proposals made by the portfolio company managers to 
ensure the analysis was carried out correctly and based on realistic 
assumptions. 
 
Findings from the case of company “D”  
The finance investors who are the majority shareholders of “D” support the 
company with regards to administrative and organisational matters. Due to their 
experience with SMEs they were able to give advice for various decisions. 
However when it came to technology strategy, the shareholders did not and 
were not able to intervene or to suggest the optimum direction. In the eyes of 
the shareholders, the areas in which they – and finance investors in general – 
can and should express their opinions are limited. Portfolio companies often 
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lack experience and know-how in general business practices. For technology 
strategy however, the expert panel has to be the company. 
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 The investors meet the portfolio company management personally once a 
quarter as a minimum. Regular “keep-in-touch” calls are scheduled on a 
monthly basis and further contact is arranged on request or demand (e.g. during 
budget time, financing issues, etc.).  
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom(investor/investee)? 
 The asset managers from the finance investors take part in the personal 
meetings, sometimes supported by experts from their back office. All the board 
members from the portfolio company management join the meetings. 
Occasionally meetings with the CEO only may happen. The participants in 
“keep-in-touch” calls are the same as those for the personal meetings. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The most frequently used communication channel is the phone, but emails 
are also exchanged, mainly to submit specific data or documents. Personal 
meetings are scheduled roughly once a quarter.  
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 After the finance investors acquired “D” they requested some modifications 
to an already existing reporting system that had been put in place by the first 
holding to acquire “D” in 1992. Although the reporting system already included 
all the relevant financial figures, the investors requested a monthly update on 
the projects, the average efficiency of the production equipment and important 
news about customers and suppliers. 
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5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 The asset managers involved in “D” have good expertise and experience in 
the market of metal components, but not specifically in the ones that “D” 
manufactures, in other words, the markets that “D” serves. But they have a 
sense for metal products in general, as well as for the requisite investments. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 In the pre-investment phase, two independent 3rd party consultancies 
analysed the current financial and product portfolio situation, including the 
project pipeline. After the investment had been made, 3rd party advice was 
requested several times, when for example, a huge investment was about to be 
made, to support internal restructuring, etc. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 Both parties commented that a finance investor has to be convinced that the 
manager(s) in place at the portfolio company know what they are doing. If an 
investor believes that they know how to manage the portfolio company better or 
which technology strategy would be best to select, the manager(s) would not 
and should not survive long term. This is why it often happens that the 
management is changed several times within a short period in companies which 
are in a very difficult situation or environment. 
7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 In the case of “D” no direct influence was made, but a specific indirect 
influence did take place. New product and process technologies were 
developed resulting from the connections to new customers established through 
the finance investor’s network. The investor himself was never deeply involved 
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in direct action at the portfolio company or the customers, which is why it can be 
said that no influence was exerted. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 Main sources of information are internal analysts, other asset managers and 
the professional network. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 The strongest link is between the finance and the technology strategy. When 
the top priority is to save money or to run the company with the minimum of 
expenditure, investment in new technologies is not possible. Furthermore, a 
strong focus on current technologies that ends in all available specialists only 
having time for current technology products hinders investigations and progress 
into new technologies, that might be necessary in the long term. All depends on 
the horizons of the people who are driving the decisions. The impact on 
technology strategy is similar no matter whether organisational or marketing 
decisions are being made. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 The tools are simple business calculations. It is the responsibility of company 
management to ensure that the assumptions and the figures are realistic and 
achievable. In a well-presented business case, data from different sources are 
shown. The investor will simply ask a few questions to allow him to judge 
whether the approach is realistic and good or not. If there is any doubt, the back 
office of the investor will be involved or maybe a 3rd party. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 An investor can give advice if they have a gut feeling about what is the right 
technology strategy. Furthermore, investors can ask a 3rd party to analyse the 
situation of a company and present that as a “you have to go in that direction” 
approach. Most probably this would end in a conflict with the company CEO, if 
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their thinking was totally different. Most CEOs are not financially dependent on 
an employer and will be strong willed. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 In the case of “D”, cooperation and the relationship between the finance 
investors and the company management is very open. It is clear that the 
investors can give advice in certain administrative aspects, but at the same time 
it is also clear that the technology strategy as well as R&D in general is purely in 
the hands of company management. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 Finance investors in most cases seek short-term returns and prefer 
investments that are short to medium term, stay in sight of a potential buyer and 
deliver good returns. Long-term returns are not first priority. In the case of “D”, 
the investors are seeking profit as well, no doubt. But their view is different. 
They are prepared to accept a lower return today, if they are convinced it will 
bring long-term results that are too distant for them to profit, but may profit a 
potential buyer of the portfolio company. They focus on small and medium size 
companies. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 The two main factors through which finance investors, as quasi outsiders, 
indirectly influence the direction and intensity of technology strategy are budget 
and investment decisions as well decisions in the area of HR. When an investor 
realises that something is going fundamentally wrong in a portfolio company, 
they might suggest a change in management. This may be to replace the CEO 
or other management team members. As different people have different 
preferences and experiences that influence their decisions, changes in the 
management very often result in a change in technology strategy as well. 
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12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Regarding organisational learning, the answer in the case of “D” is definitely 
yes, due to the extensive expertise of the asset managers in SME companies. 
The answer is no for technology strategy. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Differences according to geographical region do not really exist. Most 
investment companies think and act in quite similar ways. A few are more 
cooperative, like the ones engaged in the investment of “D”. Then there are 
others that act on the offensive and aggressively by blaming in public the 
company management of being unable to do their job properly.  
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Appendix 6 - Case study company E 
 
The case of company “E” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “E” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
company websites, press releases, the company in-house magazine and 
articles in finance magazines. Primary data was gained through four personal 
interviews at top management level at the portfolio company and two interviews 
with the private equity investor. One with an asset manager and another one 
with a member of the portfolio team who supports the portfolio companies on 
request or when the investor believes it is helpful or/and necessary. 
 
Company background information 
The company “E” is the result of the diversification strategy of a leading nuclear 
energy company in the late 1980s. With the target of doing some business 
outside the nuclear energy field, it was decided to focus on something that is 
still related to energy. Finally it was decided to buy and merge different 
connector manufacturers worldwide to become a global player in that market 
with activities in different segments such as the automotive industry, 
telecommunication industry, consumer and industrial electronics. The 
companies that were merged into “E” had all existed for a few decades and had 
a good and stable portfolio with a large customer base. In 2005, the mother 
company decided to sell “E” to generate cash for another activity in their core 
area, the nuclear power business. The buyer was the private equity fund that 
still owns “E” today. From 1988 to now “E” has been constantly growing through 
acquisition and expansion. Today “E” employs around 13,000 people around 
the world with a turnover of 1.3 billion EUR and is one of the world’s market 
leaders. The manufacturing footprint of “E” is truly global. Currently 22 
manufacturing sites and 13 R&D centres are spread across all continents, 
supplemented by additional sales and administrative offices. 
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The role of technology in company “E”  
The products of “E” seem at first sight to be relatively simple as in most cases 
they are just made from one piece. In some rare cases a complex mechanism is 
included to reduce the mating forces on the connectors, to ensure that the 
connector cannot be unlocked, etc., but even then they don’t seem to be very 
complicated. However, a look at the details changes the picture fundamentally. 
One fact that illustrates the innovativeness of “E” very well is the number of 
patents – which is currently above three thousand. The patents cover a lot of 
product details as well as processes, both in production in “E” s factories as well 
as in the factories of the customers. One area where “E” is more advanced than 
most of its competitors is the processing of their own components at the 
customers. As of today there are new projects with new technologies in the 
pipeline, such as crimping terminals in two steps with one tool, the crimping 
taking place in a heated atmosphere or welding instead of crimping. 
 
These are all technologies that are not currently available on the market and 
they will definitely not be entering the market with significant coverage in short 
term because of the necessary investment required. As these technologies 
bring huge improvements to quality, it is possible that for some critical 
applications the implementation will happen rapidly after the testing phases 
have been concluded while for most of the standard applications the process 
change will happen over a period of 5 – 10 years. In “E”’s factories the stamping 
process will soon be implemented in a new technology. A few years ago it was 
revolutionary for two metal strips to be included in one stamping formed at 
600rpm in a two-piece terminal that is laser welded. The next step currently 
under development is to have a two-out die that is fed with 4 metal strips. While 
the tooling cost will again be 50% higher, there is already a saving because the 
output is doubled and there is a significant saving because the doubled output 
from one tool still runs on one stamping machine.  
 
Overall this results in a doubling of capacity for a cost multiplied by 1.2-1.4 
depending on the tool design and machine type. The problematic thing is the 
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technology to build and fine tune the tools that have to be developed and then 
the skills required to use them have to be transferred to all people involved, 
including external suppliers and the maintenance and trouble shooting teams in 
case of interruptions. Something will brake or stick from time to time in tools 
with an incredible number of moving parts, even when preventive maintenance 
is done properly. For such an event, the loss during each hour of lost production 
is again incredible and very painful. This is also one reason why a few people at 
“E” would prefer to continue with the current technology. An excellent internal 
support unit for such activities is the corporate R&D centre based in France. 
The function of this R&D centre is to carry out advanced research and 
development for all divisions of “E”, independent of the application field. The 
staff are also involved in the optimisation of the plating processes for terminals 
or smart card chips – for which “E” is the world market leader – and which is 
required to reduce the cost intensive amount of precious metals that cannot be 
replaced. 
 
It requires careful strategic planning to roll out the technology to keep and 
extend the large portfolio from the very simple tube terminal to the latest high-
density connectors or smart card connectors. Without that, new and more 
efficient production technologies, for simple and mainly price driven products, 
may not be identified at the right time with the consequence of uncompetitive 
pricing. The same thing can happen with new technologies that offer better 
characteristics. The market can accept a higher price when the product offers a 
specific benefit or advantage in return. Such competitive advantages are key to 
being among the world’s market leaders. When such a position is achieved, it 
will not be lost immediately when technology strategy no longer has priority 
because of a change in priorities. However in the medium and long term it will 
hurt significantly. Currently the focus at “E” is on several hot topics that are 
creating huge difficulties and losses, such as manufacturing footprint, pricing, 
logistics, so that there is definitely a suspicion that “E” is losing track of its vision 
in the short and medium term against the main competitors due to heavy 
pressure to improve the EBITda. 
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Ownership structure 
The company “E” was founded in the 1980s, through acquisition of several 
SMEs around the globe. It was formed by the M&A department of one of the 
largest European companies in the nuclear energy sector. All of the companies 
that formed “E” had been active in the field of electrical connections a long time 
before the acquisition took place. Most companies were founded in the mid 20th 
century. Finally in the mid 1990s the company had more than 10,000 
employees and a turnover of more than 1 billion EUR. Around 15 years after the 
foundation of the company in 2005, it was sold to a private equity investor to 
free up cash for a large project in the core area. Since 2005 the ownership 
situation has been unchanged. 
 
Interaction with investors 
One of the first investor driven actions in 2005 – after the ownership change – 
was to do some fundamental restructuring that affected all sites worldwide. The 
decision was made to form four divisions under the umbrella of a corporate 
group with the aim of making each division more manageable and to allow more 
specialisation and focus in the respective areas. Another significant factor was 
to make more of the acquired companies. While the previous owner had 
several, partly global companies in one basket, the investor was pushing for 
filtration of all sites by segment, so that from one large company a group with 4 
independent but still global acting companies, with leading positions in their 
specific area of activity would result. In 2009, one of the divisions that 
specialised in interurban connections was sold - the first positive return from the 
restructuring that had taken place a few years before.  
 
It is quite probable that the remaining divisions of “E” will not be sold or 
prepared for an IPO as one package, but as separate and individual companies. 
The shareholder does not drive the sale of an individual division alone, it is 
decided in close cooperation with the corporate CEO and the corporate VPs of 
the divisions. When a good offer is made for a division, no matter whether by a 
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competitor, another investor, or whoever – the sale can go through immediately. 
If no interesting bid is put on the table, it can easily take several years until the 
current investor fully exits their investment in “E”. 
 
In recent years it was common practice for investments to start before official 
approval had been given, e.g. when project timing was very tight. Many things 
even ran in parallel to the official process. These “submarine” schemes were 
often the key factor in success in comparison to competition. Nowadays no one 
is willing to take that risk anymore. Even for small investments, a very detailed 
proposal has to be written. Financial controllers fear having to answer difficult 
questions put by the shareholder, or, even worse, that it becomes evident that 
some aspects of the proposal have not been considered (e.g. complementary 
investments that are necessary for additional equipment). Key financial figures 
are the number one priority for the shareholder. If the top line is going down, as 
it was in 2008, immediate action is expected. Restructuring to slim down the 
cost base is a must. Whereas in the past lay off decisions were made also in 
consideration of experience and knowledge of the employees, the focus is now 
purely on cost savings (the higher the salary the bigger the effect…).  
 
For sure, experience and knowledge are not fully ignored, but priorities have 
definitely shifted to the detriment of the performance profile of the company. 
Final approval for the budget, including all investment plans has to be made by 
the shareholder. It regularly happens that last minute adjustments are required. 
All spending on production equipment and R&D has to be fully in line with the 
product and market strategy that has been closely defined with the 
shareholders experts. In the case of “E”, the shareholder has his own consulting 
division that not only takes care of the portfolio companies, but also outsider 
clients. Apart from the consultancy, which is part of the finance investor group, 
other outsider consultancies are involved that are specifically experienced and 
skilled in the areas under analysis and improvement, such as re-pricing, 
regional marketing and product planning, etc. The whole way of working is 
much more in line with the existing and defined rules with the investor at the 
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back and everyone aware that big brother is watching. This is positive from a 
stringent process point of view, but at the same time it kills creativeness and 
entrepreneurial thinking. 
 
Findings from the case of company “E”  
In the case of “E”, the investor uses expertise in all kinds of straight and 
transversal analyses to support and double check the strategic initiatives of the 
portfolio company. On many occasions best practice solutions from other 
investments have been shared and implemented. Even totally different sectors 
inspire new thoughts and ideas. Third-party consultancies and portfolio team 
members from the finance investor sometimes act as moderators as they are 
outsiders and do not have the tunnel view that many employees have after 
several years in the same environment. Human resource decisions are also 
sometimes made on the basis of feedback and recommendations by these 
people, both for employee promotions and restructuring. Regular involvement of 
the top management of the investment firm is written into the contract for all 
investment decisions. The value after which an investor OK is mandatory is 50k 
EUR. However, smaller investments also need to be listed and submitted to the 
investor’s back office for information.  
 
In fact, even little investments are questioned. The site controllers request 
information on all investments, even if for 1k EUR, plus a reasonable and 
transparent justification. Furthermore, all decisions with a significant influence 
on the product portfolio, market position, capacity adjustment; generally 
speaking anything that results in changes to the company parameters and 
specifics, has to be given a green light by the investor. Direct influence on 
technology strategy does not exist. This is not an area of expertise of the 
finance investor. However, involvement in market and investment decisions and 
strong pressure to improve the EBITda does move the focus away from 
technology strategy and as such is an indirect influence. Furthermore, potential 
influence on nominations for the top management team results in an indirect 
effect on the technology strategy. 
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The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 The meetings with the shareholder do not happen on a regular basis such as 
every 1st Monday of the month. Communication is much closer. Some people 
from the portfolio teams are permanent team members for selected projects. 
Furthermore, all investment decisions have to be approved by the shareholder. 
In many cases, it is enough to send an email with a rough description and in 
return the management team of the shareholder responds positively. On the 
other hand, when something is not very well-founded and fully backed-up, it can 
easily be rejected. Everyone is afraid of breaking the rules for investment 
approvals. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 Communication regarding company performance, approvals and strategy 
definition is purely on the level of the asset managers at the finance investor 
side and the CEO / division VP level of the portfolio company. For specific 
projects, people from the investor portfolio teams are involved on a daily basis. 
In some instances these people are almost temporary employees of the 
portfolio company. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The most commonly used method for communication is email as several 
exchanges take place in a week for which the involvement of more than one 
person from both the portfolio company and the investor side is required. Phone 
calls and phone conferences take place when detailed explanations are 
needed. Personal meetings are not scheduled on a regular basis, but they 
happen on average more than once a month. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 Yes, the reporting system is a very important tool that is readjusted from time 
to time, depending on the current focus. Since 2005, the content has mainly 
been growth, i.e. new business. In 2010 and 2011 it was restructuring (resulting 
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from logistical mismanagement) and re-pricing (due to the significant increases 
in raw material prices). All such projects have to be defined and then analysed. 
In parallel the reports also access a huge database of financial figures on the 
division, region and also at the plant level. The investor also asked for a 
consolidated excel file with all data on P/N and product line level in addition to a 
detailed power point presentation. The back office of the investor then carries 
out an internal analysis based on regularly updated data for which the results 
are reported back to the portfolio companies in the form of why-questions or 
requests for action. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 At the asset manager level, the expertise is usually in markets or is sector 
specific, there is rarely product and process knowledge. If by chance an asset 
manager is involved in an investment in which they have a personal interest, it 
can elevate them to a position where they are better able to judge the decisions 
of the company, but in most industrial investments that does not happen. When 
an asset manager is repeatedly involved in comparable investments, in time 
they will acquire corresponding expertise, but this is truly the exception. Large 
investments are not everyday business. Minor similarities between different 
investments are standard, but nothing more than that. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 In the case of “E”, 3rd party expertise has been requested on several 
occasions. The first was the pre-investment phase. Thereafter external 
consultancies have been involved several times for restructuring, pricing 
analysis, logistic concept analysis, technical benchmark analysis, etc. Some of 
these consultancies work on a global basis and even travel to different regions 
to carry out their analysis. For other specific actions where knowledge about, 
e.g. the law in a certain region has to be considered, local companies are 
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chosen. Similarly, when offices or manufacturing sites are set up in a country in 
which “E” has had no previous activity, then consultancies are called in. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 The technology strategy of “E” is important for the value of the company. For 
the investor it is clear that they are not going to be keeping “E” in the portfolio 
long term. At the same time however, it is clear that when an IPO or sale of “E” 
takes place, technology and technology strategy will be areas of interest for all 
potential buyers. Thus some investment in that area is necessary. In the high 
power segment for electrical vehicles, for example, “E” has a minimum portfolio 
which has brought in good business already. However, further investment would 
be necessary for expansion into other OEMs. But such investment is currently 
not approved, because the returns would take a few years to come in and in the 
event of a sale it would be possible to construct a story-line that the current 
portfolio does fit to other OEMs with or without minor modifications. Also, 
selection of the technology to invest in is dependent on the expected fit to 
potential buyers in the area of competition, customers, etc. Currently no 
proposed investment or new project has been approved for business lines in “E” 
that do not correlate to a prospective buyer. 
7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 What happens with many investments is that an analysis is carried out into 
which other companies in the same area would be interested in buying the 
portfolio company. The results of the analysis often show that certain business 
lines do not fit the portfolio of potential buyers. Then a decision has to be taken. 
Can the business line that does not fit be separated, or, if separation is not 
possible, due to size (too small), how it can be “shut down” or maintained with a 
minimum of investment. It is in the investor’s best interests to push and improve 
interesting and promising products and technologies and invest all the cash that 
can be made available for R&D in these fields. With the market value of the 
company in mind, the investors definitely do influence technology strategy 
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decisions – not directly based on superior expertise, but driven by product lines 
and market attractiveness. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 Apart from third-party consultancies, the back office people and portfolio 
teams are the dominant sources of information for the investors involved in “E”. 
In general the investor does not know better than the portfolio company 
management, but in some details the involvement of an analyst or advice from 
someone with an outside view is helpful. The portfolio team member who was 
interviewed talked about one case where one of the biggest European canteen 
food suppliers had already made very detailed plans about how to expand into 
certain areas. The business plan had been completed and reviewed by the back 
office people at the investor’s. Following a deep-dive analysis, the question 
came up as to whether the portfolio company would be able to support growth 
like this with the existing logistics concept and flow of goods. Suddenly the 
response was that they had not looked at this so far, but they assumed it would 
not be a problem. After analysing a huge Excel file, it was clear that the current 
logistic concept was not at all capable of supporting expansion and it would 
quickly collapse - with negative consequences for the end customers. Luckily 
this was discovered early enough to react. The strange thing is that it was not 
the experts at the portfolio firm who identified this gap, but an outsider analyst. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 Technology strategy is directly affected by finance strategy. In the case of 
“E”, it was evident that all spending and investment is minimised to keep the 
existing business running and to maintain some projects in the R&D pipeline. 
The focus is not on the long term. Consequently, technology strategy is 
influenced by marketing and organisation. If an organisation does not have the 
necessary resources or know-how, it can be impossible to move in a certain 
direction. Ensuring the vital ingredients are available is a basic condition. 
Similarly the direction of product marketing influences or in some cases even 
dictates the direction of the technology strategy. 
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9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 The investor analyses a business case that has been prepared by the 
company management on the basis of various assumptions and known 
parameters, maybe with the involvement of external experts. The return on 
investment and the timeframe for the returns is crucial. Anything that in the 
short term does not bring a good return or increase the value of the company is 
likely to be rejected by the shareholder. The ROI expectation is on average 
much higher for the finance investors than the private owners. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 Finance investors can – especially when they are the major shareholders – 
put pressure on the management for anything. Even minority shareholders do 
this sometimes, but few companies do actually do this systematically. In fact the 
decisive factor for such behaviour is generally the personalities of individual 
people, not the general policy of a company. The culprits are generally known 
anyway as their letters will have been written to news agencies.  
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 In the case of “E” several first and second line managers have had to leave 
the company over the past few years as a result of management failure. Today 
everyone is extremely nervous about doing anything wrong, but recognises that 
to hide anything could create a problem later on, for which they must accept 
responsibility. However some minor cosmetic corrections are standard and in 
each management line people try to organise their team with maximum 
responsibility for the people in the next line below, so that it is clear who has to 
leave in the event of significant failure. 
10c. Are all investors (and asset managers) the same or are there differences 
between them? 
 The asset managers are different to the extent that other managers or each 
of us as an individual is different. Their personality and their previous 
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experience are the main drivers for their behaviour and actions. The targets are 
mostly the same – to generate increased company value and short-term cash 
returns, only the way to reach these targets differs depending on the factors 
mentioned before. A limitation on the targets for investment was not reported, 
but a willingness to eradicate the business was reported – which ultimately did 
happen. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Yes, definitely. Targeted markets and products as well as the manufacturing 
footprint play a major role. When a business case promises only long-term 
returns, the go-ahead to invest might not be given. The important question is 
whether the investment would increase the company value in the event of a 
sale or IPO, even if returns from the investment would not positively impact the 
finance investor or new company shareholders in the short-term. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Regarding technology strategy, the finance investor was and is unable to 
give any direct input into “E”. The situation is different for organisational learning 
in general. In the areas of reporting, analysis and management accounting “E” 
has brought internal business excellence up to a level far above what it had 
been before the finance investor became involved. On the one hand this is 
because the company was learning from the investor and the contracted 3rd 
party expertise. On the other hand, many regulations and processes have been 
in existence for a long time, but have not been followed with dedication because 
it was often easier not to do so. Now, with the finance investor involved, failure 
or neglect of existing processes and procedures can have much more severe 
consequences, so that people are still not especially eager to follow the 
regulations, but are afraid of the negative impact if they act according to gut 
feeling. The sad part of this is that the entrepreneurial thinking and acting that 
sometimes helps a company to react quickly by bypassing some rules has 
evaporated. The first maxim is to follow the internal rules and guidelines and 
safeguard your own job. 
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13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 The main difference in investors is their investment size. Smaller investors 
often act in a more cooperative manner including personal relationships. Large 
investors function without personal relationships, in a much more anonymous 
style. 
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Appendix 7 - Case study company F 
 
The case of company “F” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “F” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
company websites, press releases and articles in magazines. Primary data was 
gained through two personal interviews at top management level at the portfolio 
company, one interview with the private equity investor who has been involved 
since 2000 and one interview with the investment bank. 
 
Company background information 
 “F” was founded in the mid 19th century in northern Germany to produce metal 
fittings and locking mechanisms. The original customer base consisted of coach 
makers, the construction industry and later on vehicle manufacturers, following 
the introduction of motorised vehicles. Due to rapid growth of the company in 
the first few decades following foundation, a new production area with more 
than 50,000m² of production floor was built, to which the company moved 
before the beginning of the 20th century. From the mid 20th century on, “F” 
streamlined its portfolio in order to concentrate on products for the motorised 
vehicle market only. The products were used by all European carmakers and 
from the 1970s on, also by some of America’s global carmakers. Due to the 
long lasting and very cooperative relationship, “F” was in most cases the only 
supplier for locking systems. This position as single source guaranteed a stable 
business over a long time, as the parts were very often carried over without 
modification into new platforms.  
 
Furthermore it was relatively easy for “F” to bring new products onto the market, 
if there was an improvement in price or functionality, as the trust and know-how 
that a newcomer needs to build before they are rewarded with the first few 
orders in the automotive market was already established and well-
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acknowledged by the prominent customer base. In the 1970s, “F” acquired an 
innovative start up company that was about to gain a market share in the 
segment of automotive latches. With this new acquisition and the existing know-
how, the first central locking system for passenger cars was developed and 
successfully launched on the market. At the beginning of the 1980s, the position 
of CEO for the first time ever was taken over by someone outside of the 
founder’s family, while still being 100% owned by the founder’s family. Later in 
the 1980s, this CEO founded a finance investment company and bought up all 
the founder’s family shares in order to prepare “F” for the initial public offering. It 
took several years to settle, but in 1995 “F”’s shares were finally traded on the 
stock market. In the 1990s the manufacturing footprint was adjusted in line with 
growing demands from North American OEMs and American transplants of 
European OEMs.  
 
Two plants were built in the United States of America plus one in Mexico during 
that time, mainly to serve the activities of the German carmaker Volkswagen. 
From 2005 to 2010 “F” was grounding its activities in China with a joint venture 
partner. From 2011 on, “F” has been acting independently in China in order to 
take full advantage of the growth that is expected for both non-Chinese and 
Chinese OEMs. Five years after “F” went public, the dominant portion of the 
shares was acquired by a private equity fund. “F” experienced another major 
ownership change in 2006 due to the model used to finance the acquisition. The 
shares acquired by the private equity fund in the year 2000 were transferred 
into the portfolios of two hedge funds and one investment bank. Today “F” is still 
in the ownership of this finance investor consortium and last but not least, 
because of the current boom in the automotive market, is in good shape 
financially. In 2010 “F” achieved a turnover of slightly above 500 million EUR 
with 4,300 employees around the globe. Proof for the innovativeness of the 
company is the large number of 800 patents owned by “F”. 
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The role of technology in “F”  
 “F” started business by making relatively simple metal fittings and basic locking 
systems for doors, shutters and coaches. With the advent of the growing 
demand for motorised vehicles, “F” experienced a similar but stronger growth in 
products. The main reason why the growth was so strong for “F” was simply the 
growing complexity and number of locking mechanisms used per vehicle. The 
first vehicles without a roof were only equipped with a locking system for the 
engine compartment. With increasing comfort and the hard top as a standard, 
doors became standard as well – including the locking systems. The 
requirements for locking systems were steadily being set higher to keep pace 
with other components in vehicles. The effect was twofold: Firstly, the 
tolerances had to become much narrower, making application of the latest 
available production technology absolutely necessary. Secondly, the market 
expected new materials and innovations to reduce the number of parts in 
parallel with improved reliability. Nowadays the major projects are in the area of 
electronics, such as electrically controlled locking systems for passenger cars. 
 
The alarm system, the interior, lights, the double locking function and other 
comfort features are today controlled by a number of micro switches. The 
reduction of the number of elements in a locking system usually automatically 
produces a cost reduction. The housing that used to consist of two shells is 
today an overmoulded stamping grid that often already contains the nuts and 
bolts. Instead of going through standard wires, the electrical connection is 
created in the stamping grid. The connector is integrated in most cases. A 
dilemma is sometimes posed by the need for vehicle specific solutions on the 
one hand and the requirement for standardisation and variant reduction on the 
other. Regarding the switching function, the latest technology offered 
exclusively by “F”, is the use of Hall sensors instead of micro switches. The cost 
per module is higher, but the reliability is better. In a micro switch, particles from 
the plastic parts cannot be eliminated completely.  
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By definition there is a failure rate of 2-3 parts per million because of such 
particles. Multiplied by 8 switches per locking system that is already too much 
risk for some customers. Selection of the right sensor elements and the 
necessary capacitors, as well as definition of the right process parameters took 
a long time and was quite costly. Nevertheless the investment is bringing a 
good return because at this moment in time exclusively “F” offers it and it is the 
only solution accepted by one of the top 3 German OEMs. New products and 
technologies are pretty much driven by the requirement for more comfort or new 
applications. For electrical vehicles, for example, it is a legal requirement that 
the charge plug is locked during active re-charging of the batteries. 
 
Permanent monitoring of the market trends and OEM requirements as well as 
the internal R&D activities to develop new products are key for “F” to maintain 
and in the best case improve its current market position. For electrically 
controlled locking systems, “F” has to invest more in innovative solutions, as 
today it is no longer allowed by European law to eliminate all the mechanical 
options for opening the doors. This is mainly due to safety considerations in the 
event of an emergency. This and other trends have to be followed closely to 
ensure that the market share is secure for the future. 
 
Ownership structure 
Since foundation to the beginning of the 1980s, the company was owned by the 
founder’s family and also managed by the founder’s family. Due to growing 
debts, resulting from huge investment in capacity expansion and strong price 
pressure from the customers, driven by competitors who wanted to break a 
monopoly, a CEO outside of the founder’s family was nominated in 1982 for the 
first time. Five years later this CEO started a finance investment company and 
bought all the founder’s family shares in “F”. He started some reorganisation 
activities and streamlined the administrative part of the company in order to 
prepare for an IPO. It took several years until all those activities were 
completed, but finally in 1995 “F” went public. For more than five years a major 
portion of the shares remained in the ownership of the CEO’s investment 
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company. In 2000 a fundamental ownership change took place. More than 90% 
of the shares were acquired by a private equity fund. Unfortunately the model 
used to finance “F” which involved large debts – with the plan that “F” should 
pay back the debts and the interest – did not work. In 2007 the private equity 
investor sold his shares for a symbolic amount to a consortium of two hedge 
funds and one investment bank. Today ownership is still in this configuration 
and the founder’s family no longer has a significant portion of shares. 
 
Interaction with investors 
After the IPO in 1995 until 2000, there was no signification interaction with the 
finance investor who owned the majority of the shares, as the CEO of the 
investment company was also the CEO of “F”. The situation changed at the 
beginning of the 21st century when the majority of “F”’s shares were sold to a 
private equity investor. The CEO who had been with “F” for a few decades, until 
acquisition by the finance investor, was similarly knowledgeable and involved in 
different projects and schemes at “F”, as had been the case with the founder. 
Shortly after the ownership change, some management changes did occur. As 
a consequence of the ownership change, personal contact between the owner 
and people from different hierarchy levels at “F” was cut. The representatives of 
the private equity company simply met with the CEO and the other board 
members. Exchanges by phone and email were quite frequent – on average 
weekly. Regular personal meetings were not planned, but happen on average 
once a month.  
 
The attendees from investor side were always only the asset managers, without 
support from their back office team. A few days after the monthly report was 
issued (reports had to be prepared by “F” according to a list of important KPIs 
defined by the investor team), a phone conference was usually scheduled for a 
question and answer session to which people from the back office team of the 
investor were also invited. As a matter of fact, the most important KPIs were the 
financial figures and it was vital to be able to explain all deviations from the 
budget which had to be approved by the majority shareholder. 
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For significant decisions regarding products, manufacturing and markets, the 
asset managers requested that “F” purchased external expertise from renowned 
consultancies or scientific institutes. Driven by the investor input, the new 
reporting system was not only a better guide for the investor as an excellent 
information tool, but also for the company management. Previously, the reports 
were far less structured and the number of defined KPIs fewer and 
subsequently less specific.  
 
There was no direct interest on the part of the investor in technology or 
technology strategy. Similarly, the investor never tried to influence the 
technology strategy, as the team of experts available to support the portfolio 
companies had no specific expertise in the areas that are fundamental to the 
business of “F”. The investor asked to be informed about all investments above 
5k EUR in the form of a monthly file detailing these investments. Crosschecking 
of the file took place at the finance investor’s back office. For investment 
decisions above 50k EUR, the investor wanted to be directly involved. Without 
satisfactory justification, most investments were initially rejected, with two 
consequences. Firstly, the number of investments that reached the investor 
went down, as some investments were considered untenable or unjustifiable in 
front of the investor. And secondly, the quality of internal investment requests 
was improving enormously in the description of the investment object, necessity 
and benefit. A quick decision at management level, which had been standard 
before the involvement of the majority investor was not possible anymore. This 
helped to reduce annual expenditure of “F” to a 7-digit Euro figure. In some 
cases however, it also created huge roadblocks.  
 
Particularly for projects with very tight timelines, it caused a lot of friction, extra 
cost and accelerated the realisation time of different investments to recover the 
time that had been lost in preparing the data for presentation to get the approval 
first internally and in then secondly from the shareholder. With the transfer of 
the majority ownership to the consortium of two hedge funds and one 
investment bank, the situation changed again for “F”. One of the first actions of 
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the new consortium was the decision to make a fundamental change to the 
organisation of “F”. They created the position of a chief restructuring officer who 
reported both to the CEO and the investors. Employment of a full-time chief 
restructuring officer was expected to deliver quicker results and guarantee more 
accountability. The top priority of the CRO was to support a turnaround in the 
company with the focus on the short to medium term financial result. Again this 
was not supportive of the technology strategy, because the focus was on 
improving and stabilising the current business situation. There is no question 
that such prioritisation is vital to safeguard a company and the workplaces of 
people. On the other hand it can have long-term side effects because of 
financial results that are below expectation, but still not bad compared to other 
benchmark companies. In the configuration with the hedge funds and the 
investment bank, investor control again increased. Regular monthly meetings 
were put in place to track the projects that had been kicked off in order to 
achieve the forecast financial results. Decisions about corrective action when 
the status deviated negatively from the project plan were also made during 
these meetings.  
 
Findings from the case of company “F”  
In the case of company “F”, where different investors have been involved during 
the last decade, it is evident that no direct influence on technology strategy was 
exerted by any of the investors. But this is not to say that the technology 
strategy was not influenced at all. The actions that were taken and driven by the 
investors clearly have had an influence on the technology strategy, but not in a 
direct way and not due to the fact that the investors know any better than the 
company management what the right direction to take is. The investors were 
actively involved in the decision making process based on company 
performance. Investment approval can have a direct effect on technology 
strategy, even though the decision made by the investors is not made because 
of their expertise in the area, but because of the overall business case prepared 
by the portfolio company. The company management has to make sure that a 
business case is prepared and presented properly. Failure by the CEO’s team 
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to produce a good business case can result in a negative response from the 
major shareholder. But not because the shareholder knows the technology 
chosen is not the right one. The effects on the organisation of “F” were quite 
significant, not only, but also due to the installation of a chief restructuring 
officer. This is the only case study from the six in which such action was taken 
by an investor.  
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 In the period where one private equity firm was the majority shareholder, the 
average frequency of communication was a bi-weekly “keep-in-touch” call and a 
bi-monthly personal meeting to review the actual situation in detail. Extra calls 
and emails were exchanged if required by the current investor project or when 
the company CEO wanted to have the investor in the loop. Looking back, the 
people interviewed reported that if they did not count the extraordinary calls 
then weekly contact was normal. When the investor consortium took over 
ownership of “F”, contact was much closer, but mainly between the chief 
restructuring officer and the investor committee. They had weekly “keep-in-
touch” calls and monthly personal meetings and when, e.g. the chief 
restructuring officer was visiting subsidiaries abroad or attending customer and 
supplier meetings there was a close contact to hand who could drive short 
notice decisions. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 The instances of contact between the portfolio company and the investors 
were always between the asset managers from the investor side and the CEO 
plus in most cases the board members from the portfolio company’s side. When 
the chief restructuring officer was installed, he reported to both the company 
CEO and the investor committee. People from the investor portfolio teams were 
deeply involved in the analysis of data and strongly supported the work of the 
chief restructuring officer. Personal meetings did not take place, although 
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sometimes the analysts visited “F” to request specific data and information 
needed for their analysis. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The normal method of communication is email for the investor – investee 
relationship for when the investor needs information or when involvement of 
more than one person from investor side is necessary for a specific reason. 
Secondary to this are the regular “keep-in-touch” calls - as calls to drive quick 
decisions (mainly after the chief restructuring officer was activated). In terms of 
frequency, the personal meeting was the least dominant channel for exchange, 
but actually the one with the greatest importance. During personal meetings it is 
important that in addition to the pure fact and figures, a personal relationship is 
established. This is reportedly not a priority for the investor representatives, but 
for the company representatives it is enormously advantageous when a certain 
level of trust and confidence in each other has been established. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 During all the time of the investor involvement, reports were submitted on a 
monthly basis. They included several KPIs from finance, logistics, production, 
sales and quality. The structure was a few pages of management summary, but 
with a very much more detailed back up. Normally the back up was studied and 
analysed by the investor portfolio teams and analysts who would then report 
any inconsistency or obstacle to the asset managers in charge. Specific 
questions on the report were normally addressed during the “keep-in-touch” 
calls and personal meetings, depending on whichever was next after 
submission of the report. From the portfolio company view, reports are a very 
important and critical tool. It is dangerous to think that the report data and 
information can be manipulated or that specific things hidden. For sure there 
are certain degrees of freedom, which will be discussed later, but it must be 
always clear to the people who have to defend and explain the reports that they 
must be coherent and reasoned. Otherwise a fundamental breach of trust could 
result with severe and immediate consequences. 
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5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 The investor representatives involved in the case of “F” were not specialists 
in the specific business area of “F”. This does not however mean that they did 
not have a clue about the business. Most of the asset managers involved do 
have extensive knowledge of and experience in the automotive industry due to 
previous investments. In some respects that makes cooperation easier because 
the standard industry business practices and finance modes, e.g. for project 
specific investments, etc. will be known. The asset managers did not have any 
specialist knowledge regarding the products and processes and were not 
involved in compiling the information for decisions that was prepared by the 
company management including all the background information and 
assumptions. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Before all the ownership changes in the last decade external third-party 
expertise was brought in for almost all investments in the pre-investment phase. 
Cooperation between the portfolio teams of the investors and the consultancies 
is of significant importance, as responsibility for the investment decisions has 
ultimately to be made by the investment company. It is extremely difficult to 
make the third-party accountable for incorrect information, so external 
consultants can be important advisers, but nothing more. Once investors were 
involved in “F”, third-party expertise was sought for all significant decisions 
linked with large investments, such as product diversification, change of local 
footprint and capacity extension. In most cases the investor would recommend 
a consultancy for a specific project, either from personal experience or 
recommendations from their professional network. One of the most extreme 
forms of consultancy was the implementation of a chief restructuring officer. A 
person who is part of the portfolio company, but doing a job that in most 
investment cases is usually done by an outsider consultancy. 
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7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 In the case of “F”, technology strategy was not an area of direct involvement 
for the shareholders. It was a topic before the acquisition, as the technology 
strategy and the corresponding project pipeline are important for the company 
value in both in the short, medium and long term. After the investment had been 
made, the focus was clearly on other areas and the shareholder critically 
checked all investments in technology strategy to avoid spending money 
without a benefit for himself in the short or medium term and also to ensure that 
the expenditure was adequate. Financing a playground for engineers with 
visions that in 50% of the cases do not match market demand and customer 
expectations is not the intention of the finance investors. That does not mean 
that the shareholders will not support a good business case involving new 
technology in a product or process, but it must have a 95% chance of success 
to be of interest.  
7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 In the case of “F”, the finance investors involved in the investment did not 
influence technology strategy directly with their own expertise. The investors set 
financial targets and approve certain budgets. The rest is more or less the 
responsibility of the company management. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 The investors’ main sources of advice are the internal back office 
consultants, the company internal and external networks and third-party 
consultants.  
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 In the case of “F”, significant changes in the organisation were initiated and 
partly driven through by the investors. The changes mainly involved finance and 
organisation, but not directly the technology strategy. But for sure, a streamlined 
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budget and a streamlined organisation affects technology strategy as well when 
day-to-day business and hot topics are considered a priority. In consequence, 
strategic topics lose importance, and the result may be a dry project pipeline in 
the medium term and a loss of competencies and competitiveness in the long 
term. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 It is standard for the portfolio company management to prepare the business 
cases for review and approval by the investors. The project status is reported 
regularly. In case of deviations from the plan, a bridge may need to be built by 
the company management to explain the discrepancy. The investor’s evaluation 
is a helicopter view based on the input prepared by the portfolio company, 
which is then double-checked by the portfolio team. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 If a majority investor had a technology strategy in mind that they would like 
the portfolio company to follow, the company would have to follow that strategy. 
What happens from time to time is that an investor forces a change in the 
company top management to put in position a renowned expert in a certain 
area, but this usually happens for specific markets or sectors, but not for 
technology. In the case of “F” however, the investor would not do this because 
he has nothing to do with the technology strategy at all. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 The business case drives the decisions of the investor. The company 
management has certain options to adjust the outcome. It is clear to the 
investor that some parameters may be fine-tuned to reach, e.g. a requested 
margin, and it is equally clear to the CEO that he can do the same within limits. 
The portfolio company management can then be held accountable if the 
business case does not deliver the promised results. When it is becomes 
obvious that some parameters, e.g. pricing, were not realistic at the time when 
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the business case was prepared, then investor will react accordingly by 
launching changes through the human resource department. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 For “F, the consortium of the two hedge funds and the investment bank was 
more strongly and more directly involved than was the case with the previous 
private equity investor. Employment of a chief restructuring officer was a 
significant intervention initiated by the investors. For all the investors involved in 
“F” there were no restrictions regarding the acquisition of potential companies. 
“Each deal can be of interest, depending on the frame parameters”, an asset 
manager said during an interview. The investor was also open to dismantling 
the company in order to maximise profit. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 The only answer here is yes. Technology strategy is strongly influenced by 
decisions regarding budget, organisation, market and in respect of strategic 
customers. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 The effects on the organisation were the standard changes you see when 
the majority ownership is transferred to a finance investor. In some respects the 
changes are dictated and driven directly by the asset managers on the basis of 
their expertise and experience. But to some degree at least, the changes 
originate from and are supported by external consultants who are involved at 
the request of the investors. 
 13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Most investment companies act globally and asset managers sometimes 
work on different continents at the same time. Thus cultural differences cannot 
be significant. Another reason why behaviour and actions are quite similar is the 
fact that through fluctuation and employment at different companies, asset 
managers are likely to have a good mix of experience. 
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Appendix 8 - Case study company G 
 
The case of company “G” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “G” was 
based on secondary data gained from studying the company website, press 
releases and a personal interviews with a board member of the portfolio 
company. From the investor side, one asset manager who had been involved in 
the 2011 investment was interviewed.  
 
Company background information 
 “G” was founded in 1956 in southern Bavaria by one of the world’s leading 
manufacturers of plastics as the first plant for the production of monofilaments 
and tapes. In the late 1960s, the manufacturing footprint was extended to the 
United States of America and at the beginning of the 1990s to Japan with 
involvement of a Japanese partner company. Whereas in the late 1990s the 
Japanese partner company took over 100% of the shares of the Japanese 
business, the German and American activities were sold to a US based 
company, but only for a period of 2 years. In 2001, both the German and the US 
location were also sold to the former Japanese partner as well.  
 
In this configuration “G” was part of the Japanese group until 2009. In 2010, the 
Japanese group sold the German activities to a German based finance investor. 
The name “G” was given to the company only after this last ownership change 
and covers only the German facility. In figures, this means a manufacturing 
plant with administrative staff and a total number of employees of about 250. 
The annual turnover generated is around 40 million EUR. With over 60 patents 
owned by “G” and a new product line in the tape sector just launched last year, 
the perspective for further growth is good.  
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The role of technology in company “G”  
Technology plays a major role at “G” both in the product and process areas. 
When the plant was founded in the 1950s, the products were revolutionary and 
one could argue that they have not moved on. However, look at the details and 
a totally different picture appears. The tolerances, the variation of diameters, the 
shape and other parameters are today controlled with a precision that was 
technically impossible one decade ago, but is in line with today’s technological 
innovations in the area of production,. Also the materials used today open the 
door to a variety of applications that were not considered in the early years of 
“G”. High performance rope, lightweight automotive applications and all kinds of 
fibre composites are typical areas where the products made by “G” are used. If 
“G” did not closely follow technological developments and innovations in those 
areas, it would lose its market position very quickly. Most probably the survival 
of the company would be endangered, because for products of that kind, state 
of art performance is mandatory. There is no market for products with a slightly 
cheaper price and worse performance. 
 
Ownership structure 
From the 1950s until 2009, “G” was owned by a series of different globally 
active groups with a focus on resin and plastic products. In 2010 “G” was sold 
as a stand-alone division to a finance investor who typically invested in small to 
medium size enterprises. There were no free-floating shares, but it was a 100% 
sale to the investor. 
 
Interaction with investors 
The investor’s aim was to turn the former division of a globally active group into 
an independent company that could survive by itself in the market or attract the 
interest of other investors in the short to medium term. The intention is to sell 
“G” within the next 3-5 years at the latest. One of the first actions taken was to 
install a new general manager with experience in restructuring and process 
definition. The investor team does not involve themselves actively in day-to-day 
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business, however it has requested very detailed and frequent reports. Having 
defined the extent to which the general manager is free to make decisions, 
weekly personal meetings are considered vital by the investment team to be 
informed about the actual status of orders and projects. A fear is that the 
previous owner of “G” will try to ship all orders from existing customers to other 
manufacturing sites outside Germany. This would quickly put the whole 
business of “G” at risk. If such a trend is observed, the investor team would like 
to know immediately which customers are concerned and what the potential 
impact would be in order to be able to take immediate countermeasures. 
 
Findings from the case of company “G”  
In the case of “G”, contact between the finance investor and the company 
management is very close. The company management has a clearly defined 
area of freedom in which they can act and react immediately. This includes both 
process and investment decisions. However, the investor team expects a 
weekly meeting with the general manager who gives an overview of the 
previous week’s events and which generally lasts about 1 hour. Technology 
strategy is not an area in which the investors are actively involved. They are 
confident that “G” has a good and reliable product portfolio and good equipment 
and processes. If new customer relationships can be built or existing 
relationships tightened by adjusting the technology roadmap to specific 
customer needs, the investor team is open to that, as long as the financial risk 
is manageable and the potential business case looks rosy and is in line with the 
target either to make the company fit for standalone survival or acquisition by 
another group company. The investor team has extensive expertise in 
turnaround management and is able to analyse and interpret data and figures 
very quickly. So the focus during each meeting is the presentation, analysis and 
interpretation of figures, followed by a discussion and definition of actions to 
control the financial figures and influence them in a way that the targets are 
achieved with regards to profit, etc. Technology and technology strategy are not 
a primary issue. 
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The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 Weekly personal meetings take place with participation of the investor team 
and the company general manager, sometimes supported by his first line 
reports.  
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 The normal channel of communication is between the asset manager and 
the portfolio company general manager. Other people are not usually involved 
in the communication. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The tool for immediate communication is phone and email, but the dominant 
method in the case of “G” is the personal meeting. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 The weekly report includes the book to bill ratio, sales, quality issues, 
important new business wins and achievements or drawbacks within the 
organisation. The general manager prepares the report aided by his first line 
team and the financial controller. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 The finance investor involved in the case of “G” is a specialist in small and 
medium enterprises, the typical German “Mittelstand”, but works independently 
of sector or the products. If an investment is interesting to them the main 
parameters are size and current situation.  
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6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 In the case of “G”, third-party expertise was only acquired to support the 
development and adjustment of the organisation, e.g. outsiders to moderate 
workshops with team leaders from different departments. No external 
consultants were involved in the product, process or market strategy. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 In “G”’s current situation, technology strategy is a secondary area as this 
influences and affects the long-term survival, however it is monitored by the 
investor. “G”’s focus at the moment and in the near future will be to secure their 
current position and do some fine-tuning. 
7b.If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 The finance investor exerts no influence on technology strategy. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 The investment company that owns “G” is relatively small and thus has only 
a small back office team. Thus the asset managers collect most information 
from their network and public domain sources. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 Technology strategy is a field of high importance for the long-term situation 
of a business. However a finance investor perceives this more as the cream on 
the cake, more important is the current situation and the short-term outlook as 
these can be proven and explained with real data. Due to the strong 
dependency of technology on budget, human resources and market strategy, 
changes in all these areas indirectly impact technology strategy. 
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9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 If a business case sounds realistic and interesting in terms of ROI, the 
investor will normally support it. No specific tools are used to evaluate the 
likelihood of success. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 Theoretically an investor who owns 100% of the shares of a business can 
give any kind of direction to the CEO or general manager. The preferred option 
is to exchange opinions during personal meetings and to decide together what 
is the best strategy and approach. To dictate too many things to the portfolio 
company management can result in frustration and de-motivation. In the worst 
case, the company management would quit their jobs. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 An open dialog is key to a successful investor / company management 
relationship. How the general manager presents data and situations and the 
information they share influences the reaction and position of the investor 
committee. It is common practice that preparation for the meeting and the 
argumentation will support a certain direction of action. This is not a problem as 
long as both parties are open to neutral dialog. Otherwise the cooperation will 
not work. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 Investors have different focuses. It may be company size that is the 
dominant factor for them, the competitive situation or simply the sectors and 
market in which a portfolio company is active. At the end of the day, the top 
priority for all is to increase the portfolio company value, because this is from 
where they get their salaries. A specialisation, especially regarding the 
company size definitely does exist, not only, but also, due to the different sizes 
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of the cash pools that are available. Specific strategies such as buy-build-bust 
are not followed. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Investment and budget decisions are the key drivers for any project, because 
without a budget, no human or other resources are available. Limitation of the 
available resources results in a limitation to the outcome. In other words, yes, 
the technology strategy is definitely influenced by the involvement of investors 
in the investment and budget approval processes. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 A clear yes for the organisation and the general operational excellence, but a 
clear no for technology strategy. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Some follow a very cooperative approach and consider the portfolio 
company management to be an equal member of the team. However there are 
others who have a clear vision of what the figures should look like and consider 
the CEO or general manager to be a well-paid tool to carry out their orders. 
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Appendix 9 - Case study company H 
 
The case of company “H” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “H” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
study of company websites, press releases and articles in specialist magazines. 
Primary data was gained through two personal interviews at top management 
level at the portfolio company and one interview with the private equity investor.  
 
Company background information 
The company “H” was founded in the mid 20th century in Bavaria/Germany to 
produce injection moulded and extrusion blow moulded parts for the 
pharmaceutical industry, the white goods and automotive industries. In the 
1980s and 90s business activity was increased by doubling the production 
capacity in the original plant plus two acquisitions in Germany. In the early 21st 
century, two more plants were opened both outside Germany. One in Poland to 
serve mainly European customers and another one in the USA to reinforce the 
position in the NA region. The dominant portion of the products sold goes to the 
automotive business. Automotive is also the area where the biggest growth is 
possible and where activities are focused. Today “H” generates a turnover of 
more than 100 million. EUR. In 2011 the target was 110 million EUR. The 
number of employees in all plants totals to something around 600. 
 
The role of technology in company “H”  
The products of “H” are very complex in design and material. Thus R&D as well 
as the production processes are the most important factors behind success in 
the market. 
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Ownership structure 
After being a privately owned company for more than 50 years, in 2008 “H” was 
sold to an Indian industry group company before being re-sold in 2009 to a 
finance investment company which today (2011) has 100% ownership. Due to 
negative financial results, the main target of the finance investor is to bring “H”’s 
profitability back on track to again be an attractive partner in the industry and for 
acquisition in the medium term. 
 
Interaction with investors 
It is the philosophy of the finance investor to be in close contact with the top 
management of the portfolio companies. Close contact in this case means 
weekly phone conferences and bi-weekly personal meetings, during which the 
detailed report that has been submitted by the portfolio companies the day 
before is discussed. According to the finance investor, close contact is vital 
because their speciality is restructuring and reorganisation companies that are 
near to bankruptcy. The investor team needs to follow closely the development 
of all financial parameters. Any negative development immediately results in a 
deep-dive discussion about the root cause and the potential countermeasures. 
The portfolio company management team is expected to have done the 
analysis and identification of possible actions already, but the investor team will 
still suggest different or additional actions. 
 
Findings from the case of company “H”  
The involvement of the finance investor team is very close and often ends in 
direct proposals on how to act or react. In the case of order fluctuations for 
example, the investor team immediately suggested adjusting the number of 
temporary workers. There was a clear request made by the investor team to 
cover all personnel required for a production load above 70% with temporary 
workers who could be hired or laid off at very short notice. All investments are 
checked stringently, but in most cases then approved when the portfolio 
company management presents a profitable business case or an investment 
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that is vital to maintain or improve the performance and market position. If an 
investment proposal is prepared accurately and thoroughly justified, it is not 
normally rejected, even if the money available for investments is very limited.  
 
The product and process technology is considered by the investment team to 
be the centre of expertise of the portfolio company’s first line management 
team. In the majority of the cases, decisions are made on the basis of a 
financial analysis prepared by the portfolio company management, which is 
then double checked by the investor team. The technical and technological 
aspects have to be outlined and explained only by the portfolio company 
management team. Only in cases where the proposed investment is huge 
(above 1 million EUR) is further external expertise acquired. Involvement in 
technology strategy can thus happen through approval of investments. There is 
no direct influence on the product or process technology by the finance investor 
team. 
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 Phone calls are made each week. Personal meetings are scheduled every 
other week. During the phone calls, the topics discussed are limited to 
investment approvals, the book to bill ratio, turnover and the main light events 
since the last exchange. Other phone calls are made or emails sent when 
required. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 The asset manager in charge at the finance investor’s and the general 
manager of the portfolio company normally stay in touch with weekly phone 
calls and bi-weekly meetings. The first line management team of the company 
and additional people from the finance investor might join the meetings and 
calls as well when requested. 
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3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 Naturally the most frequently used communication methods are phone and 
email, closely followed by personal meetings. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 A reporting tool that is updated every second week supports the bi-weekly 
personal meetings. Standard figures like turnover, the book to bill ratio, 
complaints, material flow times, etc. are updated by the general manager’s 
assistant, the fine-tuning is done by the general manager and his first line 
management team. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 Asset managers often do have greater expertise in certain areas. In most 
cases this is due to their experience from previous investments and not 
necessarily linked with personal interests. But generally, most asset managers 
will go for any investment if they are convinced that it has the potential to lift its 
own value significantly. Monetary aspects normally dominate any personal 
interest or expertise. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Only in very rare cases, when e.g. significant investments are under 
discussion. Normally in the case of “H” this only occurs when the spending 
being considered exceeds 1 million EUR or when a project would require more 
than 5 man-years for realisation. 
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7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 It is a secondary area, which is on the financial investor’s radar but not 
directly influenced by him. 
7b.If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 No direct influence is exerted. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 The personal network is the largest source of input. Consultants may be 
involved, but mainly in the pre-investment phase when the market position and 
potential of a buy-candidate is being evaluated. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 In the case of “H”, investor influence is in all three areas and the investment 
team reported that this is a regular occurrence in their investments. If such 
influence is exerted then it can also affect the technology strategy because it 
normally includes the allocation and dedication of specific resources, such as 
R&D. Influence on financial decisions clearly influences the technology strategy 
as it defines the available resources both in terms of direct investment and HR 
strategy. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 The asset managers utilise their networks and acquire some 3rd party 
expertise. In the case of “H” this was standard knowledge or analysis with some 
portfolio company specific supplementations.  
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
companies technology strategy? 
 They have the power to drive or stop ideas and decisions within their 
portfolio companies, both directly and indirectly. In the case of “H” not only the 
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general manager, but also the first line team was chosen with the involvement 
of the finance investor.  
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 One of the strongest influences originating from investor involvement is the 
selection of the portfolio company management team. This is strongly guided 
and driven by the finance investor. The investor is also a sparring partner for the 
first line team. Investor involvement in the customer relationship indirectly 
influences the direction of the technology strategy when customer specific 
projects require the application of new technologies. One of the core principles 
of the investor is an open dialogue without hiding or embellishing facts and 
figures. This is clearly agreed and would be no-go behaviour that the investor 
would not tolerate. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 The intention and ultimate target is the same for all – to increase company 
value. However, the methods and level of involvement differ quite a lot. While in 
this specific case the investor plays a quite active role by talking to customers 
and suppliers, for most of investors this is not an area in which they are 
involved. It is very important that such involvement is discussed, agreed and 
aligned beforehand. Otherwise it can cause severe damage and frustration on 
both sides. A build strategy is also an option for the investor when the 
investment is not improving as expected. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Yes, but not only. The more critical factor is the selection of projects, which is 
normally dominated by financial performance and the risk involved.  
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Not directly for the technology strategy, but in some aspects of 
organisational excellence and development. The consequences are more 
analytic, figure and fact driven decisions and less oblique actions and 
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behaviour. Whether this results in better performance is unclear but it gives the 
feeling of having things under control because of the use of different defined 
parameters that have to be monitored. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Basically there are two main kinds of investors. The ones who do involve 
themselves in the business by talking to customers, suppliers, etc. and the 
others, who rely purely on the portfolio company management team to handle 
such things. 
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Appendix 10 - Case study company I 
 
The case of company “I” 
Data collection 
The case of the company “I” was prepared with both primary and secondary 
data. The first step in the analysis of the investor – portfolio company 
relationship of the company “I” was to collect and review secondary data that 
was gained through the company website, the investor website, press releases 
and articles in magazines. Primary data was gained through one personal 
interview at top management level at the portfolio company and one interview 
with the private equity investor who was involved in this deal.  
 
Company background information 
 “I”’s roots go back to an ironworks that was founded in the 16th century. Until 
the beginning of the 20th century, activity concentrated on the production of 
rough machinery for agriculture and industry. In the 1930s the orientation of the 
product changed significantly. Instead of rough machinery, “I” began to design 
and produce precision gear drives. This was a fundamental change from rough 
iron products to highly sophisticated mechanical engineering. In the following 
decades “I” steadily enlarged and adjusted its portfolio to market demand. 
Typical customers were the ship building industry and turbine manufacturers 
with all kinds of turbo applications.  
 
In the 1970s “I” bought out a competitor in the turbo gear market and a licensing 
agreement was signed with a USA based company allowing this company to 
use “I”’s patents. In the 1990s some parts of “I” were sold and shortly after 
bought back from different industry groups. In 2002 a finance investor acquired 
“I”. The actual product range of “I” varies from gears that run at 3,000 1/min to 
gears that run at 80,000 1/min to support a power of more than 80 megawatt. 
Over the company’s history more than 15,000 different gear drives have been 
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developed and built. New challenges that cannot be met with existing products 
are the area where “I” puts its excellence and know-how into action. 
 
The role of technology in company “I”  
Most of the products manufactured by “I” are customer developments with 
specific requirements. New materials and production technologies are 
frequently required to realise the necessary precision and reliability. The R&D 
department at “I” works closely with the production team to ensure their ideas 
can be transferred into real products serving the customers’ needs. As the gear 
drives are used in a variety of applications, it is very important for the company 
to decide in which areas they want to be active. Different specifications require 
different designs for the gear drive and different materials. Going into too many 
areas can cause excessive expenditure and insufficient return. In 2000 for 
example, “I” exited the market for ship gear drives. 
 
Ownership structure 
From foundation to 2002 “I” was in the sole ownership of a large industry group, 
without any involvement of finance investors. In 2002 “I” was sold as a unit to a 
finance investor who took over 100% of the shares with the target of optimising 
business so that the market value increased over a few years. After some 
restructuring and good results “I” was sold to another finance investor in 2005. 
The new owner kept the company for two years before “I” was again 
successfully sold to an industry group active in the area of gears. The 
ownership structure has remained unchanged since 2007 and “I” is one of the 
world’s market leaders for gears and turbo applications. 
 
Interaction with investors 
The first investor who came on board in the year 2002 was a relatively small 
German private equity fund specialising in small and medium companies with 
an investment volume around 500 million EUR. This investor only has 
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companies from Northern Europe in its portfolio and plans on continuing this 
strategy. However, global expansion of the companies in which they do invest is 
one of their main objectives. The first investor pushed expansion in the 
Americas and Japan. Sales offices in these regions were opened and supported 
by the finance investor’s network. The global relationships of the finance 
investor team were considered to be highly valuable by the portfolio company 
for both sales growth and foot print expansion. The investor management team 
was involved in all decisions with strategic importance or significant impact on 
the P&L account.  
 
All the investor management members have extensive experience of senior and 
C-level management of companies. Targets defined by a finance investor drive 
their decisions, but at the same time they have know-how about side effects 
that are not initially visible for someone who is purely figure driven and without 
practical experience. The key executives at the portfolio companies are also 
expected to invest their own money in the business. This is to ensure their 
maximum engagement and offer them a premium in the event of a positive sale 
of the company. To invest from “private” pockets is considered a very effective 
and safe way to get commitment from people to pursue the same targets as the 
rest of the shareholders. After the sale to the second investor in 2005, the 
picture did not change fundamentally, only slightly. The new investor requested 
the management to increase their shares, again from their own pockets.  
 
At the same time, the investor kept a strong focus on the company’s market 
position, as he was convinced that the market position is linked to the IRR that 
can be gained from an investment. The relationship with the second investor 
was a close cooperation based on regular meetings and decisive involvement in 
decisions regarding product mix and market strategy. Not in this specific case 
but generally, the investor continually screens the market for other companies 
that can be merged with their portfolio companies to make more from both 
individual businesses. Direct involvement in technology strategy is not in the 
focus, but it was an indirect consequence of renewal of the machinery park and 
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production equipment in the case of “I” as well as in other cases. The second 
investor is clearly attracted to companies which have a good market position but 
may be losing ground because essential investments have not been made in 
the recent years. With the support of the advisory team, investments are made 
to ensure the operational excellence is state of the art, so that the business is a 
strong player in the field not only in the short term but also in the medium and 
long term. 
 
Findings from the case of company “I”  
The two finance investors had a positive impact on the operative financial 
results and market value as well. The strategy of making each member of the 
executive management team a partial owner of the company seems to be a 
strong motivator. The direct financial injection from their own pockets had a 
strong influence on how decisions were made. For example, exchange with the 
other executives within the company increased. Instead of making conservative 
decisions without too much involvement by others, the tendency was to accept 
more risk by involving other stakeholders in the decision-making process. 
Important examples were the updating of manufacturing equipment, which had 
long been overdue. However, due to the large amount of money needed, the 
decision to invest was not made before the finance investor came on board. 
From this perspective, involvement of the investor was very positive.  
 
The regular weekly exchanges in the form of personal meetings or conference 
calls were pretty demanding for the portfolio company management team, 
because a strong follow up of actions was defined. But then again, the targets 
were challenging, but achievable. And at the end of the day, each executive did 
benefit from a nice bonus payout from the shares they were holding. The 
production equipment update was also an update of the technologies used in 
production. So this can be seen as involvement in the technology strategy, 
however, the definition of the equipment and technology to be used in the 
coming years was not made by the investor team but the portfolio company 
management. 
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The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 The frequency of exchange was always similar. Both investors requested 
weekly exchanges, most of the time in the form of personal meetings, either at 
the portfolio companies or at the investor’s office. If a personal meeting could 
not be arranged, it was replaced by a conference call. This happened in 
approximately fifty percent of the cases because attendees from both sides 
travelled a lot. In between the weekly meetings or “keep-in-touch” calls, 
additional phone calls and email exchanges were the rule. The investor team 
wanted to have the same level of knowledge and information as the C-level 
management of the portfolio companies. This ensured a good basis for the 
weekly exchanges as well. 
 2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 From the investor side, the rule is that depending on the size of the 
investment, 1-5 partners were involved in the meetings or “keep-in-touch” calls. 
In the case of “I”, three people were allocated. From the portfolio company, it 
was the full executive management team, consisting of 4 people. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meetings)? 
 The most frequently used communication methods were phone calls and 
emails. The most important method was the personal meeting. Personal 
attendance of a meeting was considered mandatory for decisions that were of 
high importance for “I”, either because of e.g. the impact on the market position 
or the P&L. Both sides commented that because of extensive exchange by 
phone and email before and after the personal meetings, the meetings were 
very effective and not exhausting at all. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 Because of the close contact and exchange, there is no separate reporting 
system for the investor, but the internal monthly reports (sales figures, product 
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margins, quality KPIs, finance bridge budget versus actual) are shared with the 
investor.  
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 None of the investors had any specialisation in sectors, markets or products. 
However, the investor team did have some experience from other investments 
or their own history in the industry. Parameters that are of importance are the 
company size for example. Typically the businesses are small or medium (two 
digits or low 3 digits million EUR turnover), often previously privately owned and 
with potential for improvement in market position or efficiency. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 In the case of “I”, third-party expertise was brought in for the pre-investment 
phase, but not during the investment. Some members of the investor 
management team might have discussions with colleagues and people from 
their network, but not in the framework of hiring or paying for expertise, but just 
in the form of friendly feedback and advice. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 In the case of “I”, the technology strategy was mainly an issue in the area of 
production. The machine park and the production processes were not state of 
the art when the investors took over the business. This was one of the major 
reasons for the acquisition. The product margins were shrinking because of 
mandatory price downs without any possibility of lowering the manufacturing 
cost with the existing machinery park. The key driver for the acquisition was the 
knowledge that investment in the area of production could potentially rescue the 
company. Regarding the products themselves, no influence on technology was 
exerted. 
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7b. If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 The investors did not really have the upper hand when they were driving 
actions to update the production area. It was known in the market that “I” had 
not been making adequate investment for a long time, and the management of 
“I” had been reluctant to spend a lot of money to serve mainly positive long-term 
effects and also because of the risk linked with a large investment that cannot 
be financed by the company itself. In the case of “I”, the investor was pushing 
forward things that had been known to be necessary for a long time, but not 
followed up or performed with the necessary priority. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 Advice came only from existing networks, unpaid but highly valuable.  
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 A link that clearly exists between marketing and technology strategy is 
pricing. When the technical evolution is going forward, this affects both the 
product characteristics and production technologies. If the product 
characteristics are unchanged, but production becomes more efficient then 
production costs go down. This can lead to increased margins or, depending on 
the market and the competition, to price erosion. Pricing is driven by 
competition. If competitors are able to reduce their production costs because of 
the application of new technologies, other players in the same field have to 
follow with pricing and subsequently with the new production technology. Over 
time the business will shrink if prices are not adjusted to keep margins stable or 
it will go bankrupt if pricing is unaltered despite the fact that margins are 
insufficient to guarantee company survival. In the case of “I”, investor influence 
was confirmed in all three areas of marketing, organisation and finance strategy 
as well as some impact on technology. 
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9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 Judgements and evaluations are made on the basis of business case 
calculations. The assumptions made are examined, so they have to be realistic 
and plausible. Again, the investor management might involve people from their 
network for advice regarding a portfolio company proposal. 
10a. What opportunities do the investors have to exert influence in their portfolio 
companies technology strategy? 
 In the both cases of investor involvement in “I”, the investor had close to 
100% ownership, so they could theoretically dictate the portfolio company 
management’s actions. However this does not concur with the approach that is 
followed, which is an open discussion with the investor setting some targets that 
might involve necessary actions in the area of technology strategy. Ultimately 
the proposals on what to do and how to do it in detail, have to come from the 
portfolio company. The finance investor is more a coach or consultant, the 
difference being that they are only paid if the proposals produce good returns 
whereas consultants are paid for ideas regardless of the final results. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 Beyond a certain degree of involvement, a portfolio company manager 
cannot hide information. If they tried to do so and was discovered, they would 
be fired immediately. The situation is different for large organisations or 
investments with several minor shareholders, where each individual 
shareholder is not involved in day-to-day business. In the case of “I”, honest 
and open communication in all topics goes without saying. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 Differences can be huge both in terms of personality and in the philosophy 
and strategy of an investment firm. Involvement may range from driving the 
healthy shrinking of a company by strongly reducing business activity to driving 
strong growth and an investment plan. 
230 
are experts in one or other area. Some might master both challenges, but 
generally a certain preference for one or the other activity is prevalent. Due to 
the fact that organisational changes often occur during the time of investment, 
expertise with companies of a comparable size, etc. is preferred. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Money makes the world go round and makes changes happen. If 
investments are not approved, changes cannot happen. This applies not only, 
but also, to the area of technology strategy.  
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 The answer is yes for both investors who had major shares in “I”. They were 
both specialists in small and medium companies, mainly because in such 
companies – especially when they are still in family ownership – huge potential 
can be turned into profit when an experienced management or advisory team is 
involved. For the portfolio companies this is a very fruitful interaction as it makes 
them more competitive instead of being behind the times with processes, 
products and footprints. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 The major difference is the target market. The focus is either on a specific 
region or company size or a global approach is taken without specific limiting 
factors.  
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Appendix 11 - Case study company J 
 
The case of the company “J” 
Data collection 
In preparation for analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of 
company “J”, both primary and secondary data was used. Secondary data was 
gained through the company websites, press releases and articles in specific 
magazines. Primary data was gained through one interview at top management 
level at the portfolio company and two interviews with the private equity 
investor.  
 
Company background information 
The company “J” was founded in the late 1990s in eastern Germany as a 
manufacturing and distribution company for solar panels. “I” grew fast due to 
government incentives and a general trend for solar panels as a source of 
electricity. This attracted several investors and in 2004 one owned around 80% 
of the shares. In 2008, when the business was sold to a large German industry 
group, the annual turnover was hitting the 300 million Euro mark. In the period 
from 2004 to 2008, the majority shareholder was on board. During that time 
several acquisitions were made, mainly to increase the internal added value, 
but also to secure the supply chain, as the raw and semi-finished materials 
were sometimes in short supply because of a global boom in that segment. The 
main acquisitions made were a business specialising in ingot and wafer 
production (2005) and a business specialising in silicon recycling (2006). “J” 
grew from a small group of people who started the business to a 1,200 people 
business with a 70 million EUR EBIT in 2008. This is a very good example of a 
growing company which improved and increased in all areas when a majority 
shareholder was on board. 
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The role of technology in company “J”  
The solar cell and wafer business is driven almost exclusively by technology. 
Manufacturing processes and production cycle times as well as the 
effectiveness of the panels change rapidly. Continuous follow up of the latest 
trends and implementation of up-to-date technologies in both production and 
R&D is vital to be a key player in this segment. A good understanding of the 
whole process and technology is also a must in selecting companies suitable for 
a takeover and their subsequent integration.  
 
Ownership structure 
From a start-up company founded in the late 1990s with a variety of small 
investors, one investor became dominant in the year 2004. This investment firm 
managed to take over around 80% of the shares. This remained unchanged 
until 2008 when the portfolio company was sold to a large German industry 
group. “J” has been in the ownership of this industry group since 2008. The 
information gained from this interview came from the majority shareholder who 
was on board from 2004 to 2008. 
 
Interaction with investors 
A strong belief in the photovoltaic market in the 21st century was one of the 
main motivations for the investor to acquire a dominant share of “J”. The finance 
investor pushed for an acquisition strategy aimed at becoming a highly 
integrated and leading player in the field of solar cells and panels. The 
cooperation between both management teams was excellent, even though 
discussion regarding the details of the financing and manufacturing footprint 
were tough going. The finance investor played a very strong, but supportive 
role. The acquisitions and the capacity extensions were dominantly financed 
through the investor. Bank credits were negotiated in cooperation with, but 
under the lead of the finance investor. In the R&D process, the finance investor 
exerted no influence, but for sure the technology portfolio did change with the 
acquisitions made. Decisions that often had to be made concerned which part 
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of the value chain should be integrated into “J” and with which company this 
would make the most sense. Third-party advice was used on many occasions 
as the solar cell market is fast changing and very complex. This was the case 
before the investor bought the majority of the shares and it happened again with 
each company acquisition and integration. Decisions regarding capacity 
extensions were also made with external evaluation of the assumptions made to 
minimise the risk involved.  
 
Findings from the case of company “J”  
In the case of “J”, there was an indirect influence on the technology strategy 
because of the investor’s philosophy of increasing the internal value added to 
the company through acquisitions. This was not a direct influence, as the 
investor team did not evaluate the technologies used by the acquisition targets, 
but it was an indirect influence as it changed the technology focus and strategy 
of “J”, simply because the area of activity was growing. Compared to the other 
cases in this research project, the focus here was clearly on expansion and the 
will to create a major player in a growing market that could later be sold with a 
nice premium margin, either to another investor or to an industry holding. The 
entire investor team was enthusiastically active in the project. The success of 
the company fed their motivation to push the growth strategy. Besides the 
aforementioned involvement, the investor team was deeply involved in steering 
activities. Progress reports on important projects as well as the key financial 
and sales figures were analysed and discussed carefully each month. If 
everything was on track the cooperation was very smooth. In case of deviations 
from the plan or from previous commitment, the investor demanded rigorous 
action plans to achieve the targets and plans agreed earlier. 
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 There was continuous contact by phone and email, maybe not every day, but 
several times per week. A pre-defined and structured report was required once 
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per month. For important projects separate meetings took place with someone 
from the investor team’s steering committee. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 Basically the management teams of both parties, but also the back office 
team from the finance investor was in touch with people from C-level 
management of the portfolio company. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 Phone and Email, followed by personal meetings. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 A reporting tool that is updated every second week supports the bi-weekly 
personal meeting. While the standard figures like turnover, the book to bill ratio, 
complaints, material flow times, etc. are updated by the general manager’s 
assistant, the fine-tuning is the task of the general manager and his first line 
management team. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 Asset managers often have greater expertise than the portfolio company in 
certain areas. In most cases this is due to their experience from previous 
investments and thus not necessarily linked with personal interests. But 
generally, most asset managers will go for an investment if they are convinced 
that it has the potential to lift its own value significantly. Monetary aspects 
usually eliminate any personal interest or expertise. 
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6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 The involvement of 3rd party advice was more or less permanent, due to the 
extensive growth strategy, but the reasons for involvement were various (pre-
investment evaluation, M&A advise, strategy consulting, market studies, etc.). 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 In cases like “J”, technology is very important, as the target was to create a 
major player in the field of photovoltaic, and to be on top, it is vital to have 
leading edge technology on board. 
7b. If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 None of the decisions regarding technology were driven purely by the 
finance investor, but led by the company management with advice from 3rd 
party companies and with the agreement of the finance investor as a kind of 
final approval. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 External consulting firms, the professional network and in a synthesised form 
from the back office team of the finance investors. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 Due to the fast growing market, support for the expansion had to be all-
embracing. A direct link with the technology strategy was not present, but the 
technological evolution was positively impacted indirectly, because budgets 
were kept or boosted in line with the global expansion strategy. 
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9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in the mid to long-term? 
 Analysis was primarily contracted out to 3rd party companies, which analysed 
both the competitors and the market. It is more important to be ahead of 
competition and in line with the market needs than to be out of sight for 
competition with regards to technology.  
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence in their portfolio 
companies technology strategy? 
 Basically a finance investor can push the board in any direction when the 
share bucket is big enough. In reality however, no investor team would force a 
portfolio company to follow a certain direction in technology, but they might 
nominate a CEO or consultancy that they considered knowledgeable and 
trustworthy. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 Managers might play with the way that things are presented and how they 
set their focus. To intentionally hide information which is important for the 
finance investor team would cause an immediate loss of trust and most 
probably the staff member would be fired with immediate effect. Managers for 
sure use the space they have to manoeuvre and promote their own interests, to 
maximise their bonuses or to follow another specific interests, but if they are 
clever, it is never done in an obvious way so they cannot be blamed for 
incorrect behaviour afterwards.  
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 Investors are quite different depending on where they have come from 
(experience), what their interests are (e.g. specific sector or market), what their 
network is and where they want to go (intention for a specific investment). All 
investors might act differently depending on their background. In the case of J, 
a build strategy had been planned. 
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11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 The budget can of course be a limiting factor. Also other parameters can 
negatively impact technology. If, e.g. the financial result is going down and the 
company’s survival is at risk, technology becomes a secondary factor and 
making savings in that area might be considered a quick fix. Later on more may 
well have to be spent to catch up, but it is usual to cut costs in such areas, if 
financial results are deteriorating.  
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 No regarding technology strategy, but yes regarding organisational learning. 
Most asset managers have extensive practical experience either from their 
management positions at companies or from other investments. Particularly for 
companies which are growing or in a situation where radical changes are on the 
way, such experience does influence portfolio companies. How strong the 
influence actually is depends on the portfolio company management teams and 
the individual investors. The approach can be pretty different from both sides. It 
may be that the CEO is cooperative and appreciates extensive exchanges with 
the finance investors (so in effect the investor team is the consultant). But then 
again, a turn-around manager may be extremely experienced and not want to 
be dictated to by others. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 A major difference between investors is one of size. Large investors target – 
sometimes in cooperation with other investment firms – large enterprises, and 
smaller investors focus on small and medium enterprises.  
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Appendix 12 - Case study company K 
 
The case of company “K” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “K” used 
both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was gained through the 
study of company websites, investor website, press releases and newspaper. 
Primary data was gained through two personal interviews at top management 
level at the portfolio company and one interview with the current investor.  
 
Company background information 
The roots of “K” are in the southwest of Germany, where in the late 19th century 
three family members founded a company to produce glass objects. In the early 
20th century it merged with another company active in the same area before 
founding further plants over the next few decades. These included the first 
mirror glass trough and then plants with manual machinery and equipment for 
glass grinding and glass polishing. From the mid 20th century production ran 
continuously and was automated, in line with the latest technological evolution 
in glass making for both flat and hollow glass. Installation of the first 24/7 mirror 
conveyor in Europe as well as implementation of automated edge grinding and 
bending kilns drove competitiveness in the 1940s and 1950s. Further 
milestones were in the 1970s when the production portfolio was supplement 
with a plant for mirror vapour deposition coating, marking the start of production 
of mirrors used in the solar industry.  
 
In the early 1980s the first fruits from the investment in solar mirrors were 
reaped. Orders for several million square meters of mirrors were received from 
global investors for installation in California and Spain. To further strengthen 
their position in the solar mirror market, investment has been made in leading 
edge cathode sputtering technology for the production of chrome glass and blue 
tint calottes. An electron-beam-coating instrument was installed at the same 
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time to improve reflection behaviour. The focus on technology continued 
through the 1990s with construction of a coating conveyor for the wet chemical 
silvering of non-flat glass, such as mirrors and calottes (fully automated 
process) and sag bending for calottes. After launching a sputtering plant for 
indium oxide and anti-reflection coatings, three companies in three different 
countries were also acquired in the 1990s to secure local calotte sales. In the 
early 2000s the automotive mirror division of a large competitor in the glass 
market was taken over, with manufacturing sites in both Germany and Hungary. 
In the following years, there were three more acquisitions in Europe, one in the 
Americas and the formation of a joint venture in China to contribute to a very 
strong global manufacturing footprint. 
 
The role of technology in company “K”  
The production process for glass has always been complex and capital 
intensive. Innovations, incremental technical developments and improvements 
are critical for survival. The delayed detection or implementation of a new 
technical development can lead to a competitive setback that is difficult to make 
good. This applies equally to standard products and changes in the production 
process and also the more sophisticated products that are developed in line 
with the new technologies. Since foundation, “K”’s manufacturing processes 
and product characteristics have changed fundamentally. Incremental 
automation of previous manual processes has improved both product quality 
and production cost.  
 
The permanent integration of leading edge technology is a must for a company 
that wants to play a dominant and leading role in this market segment. Without 
the technological improvements mentioned in the previous paragraph, “K” would 
be nowhere near where it is today in terms of market position. It is quite 
possible it may even have disappeared from the market altogether. If a 
company wants to make a start in this business today, an initial investment in 
the high 2 digit million Euro range would be required. This illustrates both the 
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complex requirements of being in that segment, but also the advantage of being 
in the leading group. 
 
Ownership structure 
The germ cell of “K” was a company founded by three people in the southeast 
of Germany in the 1880s. They started the business with 3 glass furnaces. 
Twenty years later the business merged with a competitor about 200km away. 
For the next half century, ownership was unchanged until in the mid 20th century 
when a German industrial holding acquired the majority of the shares. A few 
acquisitions and roughly 30 years later, one of the top global players in the 
glass arena acquired the majority of the shares in “K”. The same acquisition 
strategy also continued under the new ownership. In 2000 the majority owner 
decided to cut “K” from the rest of the group. This happened within the context 
of a management buyout and the first time in the history of “K” a dominant 
finance investor was involved in the company as the major shareholder. This 
shareholder held the majority of the shares until 2008. The buyer was another 
finance investor who still owns the majority of the shares in 2012. 
 
Findings from the case of company “K”  
The finance investors were very demanding regarding their involvement and 
interaction. Weekly meetings with at least one C-level representative were 
mandatory. But preferably all three executives were expected to attend these 
meetings, which typically were held in the office of the finance investor. One C-
level executive left “K” because this was too invasive for him. Having said that, it 
has to be added that the control was very much on the costing and marketing 
side. In fact the meetings were held to discuss, time and time again, the 
planned investments. Furthermore, the investor believed that a continuation of 
the previous acquisition strategy was good and that it was maybe even vital for 
“K” to keep and further improve its market position. Even though this did not 
represent a change to the pre-investor phase of the business, the authority of 
the executive team had been slashed.  
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In some aspects, the investor team appeared to have more trust in the people 
from within their own professional network than in “K”’s management team. For 
some of the managers, this was not an issue, they simply followed the advice. 
However, as mentioned above, not all the management members reacted in the 
same way. Technology strategy was not a primary target, which does not mean 
the finance investor team was not interested in the technology strategy. They 
did have more trust in the competency of the portfolio company team with 
regards to technology strategy and deciding the right way to go. But when it 
came to deciding how to get there, the finance investor again became more 
involved. A standard question was always whether it would be possible to 
achieve an advance in technology by acquisition instead of own research. 
Acquisition has the effect of speeding up the learning process and reducing 
uncertainty. 
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 For the investors, weekly meetings with the portfolio company management 
are mandatory. Due to a short distance of around 200km between offices, this 
was manageable from the pure timing point of view, but at the same time very 
exhausting for the management team of the business. One board member 
found this level of control unacceptable and left the board. In addition to the 
meetings there was an intensive email exchange and phone calls during the 
week. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 The expectation of the finance investor management team was to see the 
executive team at the personal meetings. Experts for certain areas such as e.g. 
finance, R&D or operations would join the meetings from time to time, but this 
was the exception rather than the rule. At the request of the finance investor 
team, 3rd parties such as consultants or experts from the investors professional 
network would take part in the meetings as well. 
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3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The preferred communication method, not necessarily in terms of frequency, 
but definitely in terms of exchange and effect, was personal meetings. Phone 
calls and emails were more for the fine-tuning that always followed after the 
face-to-face sessions. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 Some figures are discussed each week, like the book to bill ratio, new RFQs, 
project reviews and the general highlights and low-lights. A very detailed report 
including financial statements is compiled. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 Asset managers typically have superior experience in specific markets, 
business types (e.g. SMEs) and/or product types. Their investments can, but do 
not necessarily have to, match their experience. The more their individual 
experience correlates with a business, the greater the involvement is likely to 
be.  
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Third-party support is required for each M&A activity, in the screening and 
evaluation process and in the implementation process. Furthermore, 
investments in new markets and new technologies require global benchmark 
information. The 3rd parties in most cases are independent consultancy firms. In 
addition, the personal networks of the investor team play a strong role. 
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7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 In the case of “K”, the intention of the investor was to continue the trend as a 
market leader with leading edge technology. Thus the push was on having a 
focus on the production processes, changes in technological opportunities and 
other companies. The expectation of the investor was that the portfolio 
company management at all times should know where they stood in 
comparison to competitors in the same market and in which direction the trend 
was going.  
7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 “A finance investor should never know better than their portfolio company 
management what the right technology strategy for the business is, otherwise it 
is the wrong management” one of the interviewees said. However, an investor 
can always act as a coach by asking why certain trends are followed or not 
followed, why the action plan differs significantly from what competitors are 
doing, etc. A certain understanding and sense of the business is vital, but the 
roles and responsibilities should never be mixed. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 From 3rd party consultancies, personal networks and external business 
analysts. The investor back office collates, evaluates and interprets the data to 
draw conclusions. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 Technology strategy is correlated with the areas above. The implementation 
of new production technologies, for example, requires suitable adjustments and 
action in the organisation – it is not just about placing an order at a machine 
construction company. Sometimes process flows have to be adjusted, people 
have to be trained, etc. The same applies to new product technologies. The 
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organisation is inflexible or unwilling to change, it is difficult to change the 
direction of the technology strategy. As money is involved in all such issues, 
financial strategy is of significant importance as well. If cost reduction and cost 
savings are the highest priorities – for whatever reason – the technology 
strategy options are very much limited. The marketing direction kind of sets the 
scene for the technology strategy. Technology strategy has to be aligned to the 
marketing direction. It can be vice versa, but normally it is this direction. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge whether the technology 
strategy of a portfolio company will guarantee success in the mid to long-term? 
 Any investor or leader making any kind of decision or judgement requires a 
large input. It always includes own experiences and know-how gained from the 
past as well as the latest trends and actions taken by other companies, studies 
and analysis carried out by third-party companies or people, either on specific 
request or in the framework of a general service available to everyone. 
Furthermore, any input from the personal network might be valuable as well. 
The business decisions commonly made by the board of the portfolio company 
or the investor management are based on all this data. The role of the investor 
is to ask critical questions and based on the response from the portfolio 
company to evaluate whether this is a direction worth supporting. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence in their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 In the case of “K”, it is clear that the weekly meetings are the place where 
business decisions are discussed and agreed. It is very straight forward, but 
with very little freedom for the portfolio company management team. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 Each person has their own views, preferences and perceptions. Thus 
opinions, actions and suggestions are different from person to person for one 
and the same situation. Such discrepancies can easily cause conflict when one 
party believes the other is trying to cheat or to hide something. However, open 
discussion and arbitration solve all such potential conflict. If a manager really 
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tries to hide something intentionally, to cover their own failure or support their 
own preferences, the investor side will take strong action 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 The focus of all finance investors is the same – to grow the value of the 
investment. There are for sure differences in the way this is achieved and in the 
selection process when an investment is being made. This depends on the 
investors’ own individual preferences, experience and on the input they get from 
3rd party advisors. During the investment phase, the company was restructured 
to allow a burst which would improve the return from sale. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 There is no doubt that budget can be a limiting factor for any technology 
development or strategy, no matter whether it is product or process technology. 
Besides market trends, mergers the portfolio company that occur as part of the 
overall investment will also influence technology strategy.  
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Definitely yes! Partly with their own and partly with 3rd party input. Investors 
are often able to make a significant contribution to the organisational learning 
processes. The main areas are reporting, decision making processes and 
global organisation, which is often where small businesses that have been 
growing quickly lack experience. Investors can provide guidance which avoids 
costly trial and error. For the technology, the 3rd party input, that investors often 
consider as vital before a decision of strategic importance is made, is the 
biggest contributor. The result is a more structured and data based decision-
making process which takes account of potential changes to the environment 
and the underlying parameters. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Yes, even if the general target – to grow value – is the same for everyone, 
the ways chosen to reach the target are different. Some have a very short-term 
business approach and take severe action to produce a result within weeks or 
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months. Some prefer a more long-term approach. The different investor types 
select their investees accordingly, which means there is often no choice, but 
one approach will be more appropriate for one business than another. 
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Appendix 13 - Case study company L 
 
The case of company “L” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “L” used 
data gained through the study of existing secondary data, such as annual 
reports, the company website, press releases and one personal interview with a 
board member of the portfolio company. One asset manager from investor side 
who had been involved in the investment in 2011 was interviewed.  
 
Company background information 
The company “L” was founded in the beginning of the 20th century in central 
Germany as a family business. Starting with simple metal parts for various 
applications, the turnover was moderate for the first few decades. From the 
1950s “L” specialised in products for televisions and radios. These included 
decorative parts and knobs. For a further thirty years “L” simply followed the 
customers’ needs in terms of design and function. The whole firm was 
dependent on the brown goods industry and followed the trends in this 
segment. In the 1980s one of the founder’s daughters took over the company 
management and started to work on the customer base and the product 
portfolio.  
 
Over the next 25 years “L” became an almost 100% automotive supplier for 
decorative parts, such as loudspeaker covers, dashboard components, handles, 
armrests, etc. Due to the large number of products, the target was to stay close 
to the customers, thus the primary location was always Germany. To serve the 
US market, a moulding factory was acquired in the US in the 2000s to supply 
the markets there. When the company went into bankruptcy in 2010 it had 
around 1,000 employees with an annual turnover in the range of 100 million 
EUR. In early 2011, an experienced finance investor bought the business with 
the target of getting the company back on track. 
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The role of technology in company “L” 
Both production technology and product technology are of high importance for 
“L”. The manufacturing processes for decorative parts are often linked with the 
product technology. This means new product technologies require or maybe are 
initiated by innovations in production technology. Imitation leather moulding, for 
example, was one of the most significant steps in the last centuries, born 
through a process innovation which brought new product specifications with it. 
Of the two most critical areas of “L”’s products – design / touch and feel – the 
one with more technological innovations is the touch and feel. Some of the 
shapes that are produced using the technology of today, would have been 
difficult to manufacture years ago, but probably would have worked with a great 
deal of effort. Some of the haptics however, simply cannot be produced without 
the latest production equipment. 
 
Ownership structure 
Since its foundation until 2010, “L” was in the sole ownership of the founder’s 
family. A change in ownership only took place because of insolvency in 2010. 
 
Interaction with investors 
The investor is fully involved in day-to-day business. Even before the acquisition 
was confirmed, some initial restructuring decisions were discussed and agreed 
in a cooperative manner. During the investment phase, it can happen that 
additional companies, which work in the same area, are brought in. The 
management team was replaced in its entirety and the investor team selected 
the new team by choosing people with senior management experience from 
similar positions and segments. The strong background of the investor in the 
area of restructuring was found to be extremely useful and valuable. 
Cooperation was tough but focused on compromise and commitment. The top 
priorities were management restructuring, strategic decision-making and 
reorganisation. 
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Findings from the case of company “L” 
The investor team is heavily involved in the actual business of “L” in different 
areas. First priority was the restructuring of the company – to have the right 
people in the right positions supported by the best financial and organisational 
structures. A solid business plan is part of this restructuring and includes 
strategic planning of the firm’s future. This includes technological aspects that 
the investor team evaluates. The strategy definition is a round table process, 
prepared and detailed by the management team of the business, but discussed 
by all involved. The influence that the investor team might exert there is based 
on data collection and evaluation based on market assumptions or analyst 
input. It is clear the investor team does not have a better understanding of what 
is the right technology strategy. 
 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 The investor team is permanently involved in the business as “L” is just 
coming out of insolvency and the current status of the company is critical. Thus 
all opportunities and issues have to be communicated and discussed on an 
immediate basis.  
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 Communication usually takes place between the C-level team of the portfolio 
company and the investor management team. Depending on the agenda, 
further people from the investors back office might join the meetings instead of 
everything being dealt with by PowerPoint files and email. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 The most frequently used communication method is phone, followed closely 
by email. Personal meetings take place more than once a month at a variety of 
locations. 
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4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 “L” provides reports which are updated monthly with ad-hoc updates during 
the month. The report includes the progress on defined restructuring measures, 
potential new businesses and several KPIs such as quality, scrap, time to 
quote, customer feedback, etc. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 The specialisation lies more in the type of company and the individual 
company situation. In the case of “L” the investor was a specialist in businesses 
that are in or just out of insolvency. The investor team had built up specific 
know-how in that area. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Only for strategic decisions with long-term effects. In the case of “L”, the 
focus is more on the short-term, to restructure the company so that it can 
survive in the difficult automotive market. If a company is going to be merged 
with another investment, 3rd party advice would be brought in – typically in the 
form of an external consultancy specialised in that area. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 If the product portfolio or the production technology had been the root cause 
of the insolvency, an action plan to overcome this situation would have been 
developed. However the reasons for insolvency are varied. Thus it cannot be 
said that technology strategy is of no interest, but it is definitely not at the top of 
the priority list. 
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7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 The former management made several major mistakes in trying to turn on 
the technology screws. Bringing such a business back on track can only be 
done with the right people. Thus the only way forward would be to hire people 
with the right know-how and expertise. The investor team focuses on other 
topics, such as the organisational structure in general, but not normally 
technology. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 Main sources are the professional networks and external analysts who 
supplying investment information. Due to their small size, the investor company 
does not have its own analysts, but relies on 3rd party sources. 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 All such decisions correlate to each other – some more, some less, but 
actions do not result in isolated effects. For firms that are just out of insolvency, 
the focus is often on restructuring and design of a solid fundament. While 
technology is important, in most cases it is only steered indirectly. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 Typically, a business plan is tested and evaluated by a third-party company. 
This additional input feeds into the decision making process undertaken 
cooperatively by the investor team and the portfolio company. However each 
significant expenditure has to be approved by the finance investor, and this is 
where a stalemate often occurs. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio 
company’s technology strategy? 
 With a close to 100% ownership, there is no question about whether the 
finance investor can dictate which way to go. For some things like 
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organisational changes, cost cuts, footprint adjustments, investors often do act 
this way – giving orders to the top management and demanding immediate 
action. Time is money… 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 The standard process is to put a new management in place in firms that are 
in or just out of insolvency. These people do not have to cover anything from 
the past or to give misleading information, simply because they are new and the 
mission is normally clear – to bring the company back on track. The people who 
have worked at such portfolio companies for a long time are sometimes 
reluctant to be transparent, but it is quickly clear to them that they have to pull in 
the same direction, otherwise they will be replaced.  
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 As each human being is an individual, their work style and preferences are 
also individual. This is not (only) because of the DNA they have had since birth, 
but also because of past experience. Some specialisation does normally 
happen. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Cost structures and clear business plans are highly important for each 
business, no matter whether it is a start-up or if a mature business has to be 
restructured. A business can only survive when a positive cash flow is 
generated. It may be said that cash is king. Subsequently technology 
expenditure has to be strictly controlled, like all other spending. In most cases, 
the strategic investments will be cut instead of other investments when short-
term survival or competitiveness is at stake. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Yes – investors basically provide consultation, management and coaching. 
Theoretically each business could find the potential that finance investors are 
aiming to lift. For different reasons, that often does not work. It is sometimes 
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because there is too much reluctance for change; i.e. people in positions where 
they do not contribute positively to the firm’s result.  
 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Yes, for sure, the differences partly come from the individuals’ interests, 
experiences and preferences, but also from the investment firm’s specific 
philosophy and environment. 
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Appendix 14 - Case study company M 
 
The case of company “M” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “M” used 
both primary and secondary data gained through the company website, the 
investor website, press releases and articles in magazines. Primary data was 
gained through one personal interview at top management level at the portfolio 
company and one interview with the private equity investor who was involved in 
this deal.  
 
Company background information 
Over 100 years old, “M” was founded at the beginning of the 19th century in 
northeast Germany to produce fire extinguisher equipment. A few years after 
foundation, the firm was already the world market leader with subsidiaries in 
other European countries and in the US. Over the years its portfolio was 
extended continuously. While in the beginning only simple transportable cornet 
bags and water containers with an integrated pump system were produced, 
systems for fire fighting vehicles and fixed integrated units were later developed 
and sold. In the mid 19th century, the company extended its activities with a 
brand new plant in the southwest of Germany. Twenty years later, expansion 
continued through the merger with a major German competitor based in 
Northern Germany, arranged by the company group that then owned “M”.  
 
In the following years, steady expansion followed combined with extensive R&D 
activity. The most recent milestones were the opening of a new research centre 
in northern Germany in the late 1990s, which was renovated and extended 
again in the late 2000s. Two more mergers with competitors in the US followed 
in 2007 and 2009. Today “M” is once again the world market leader in fire 
extinguisher equipment with an annual turnover of more than 1 billion EUR and 
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more than 6,000 employees globally. The product range today includes 
solutions for all kinds of buildings, machines, industries and vehicles. 
 
The role of technology in company “M”  
To be state of the art in all the technologies used and applied by “M” is 
mandatory for different reasons. On the one hand there is the market 
requirement for specific product and service characteristics, but then there are 
the legal requirements and insurance company requirements. Insurance 
companies often have in place severe clauses regarding fire protection and 
extinguishing in their insurance contracts, especially for expensive equipment 
and buildings. Insurance companies are less likely to pay if the customer has 
not done their utmost to protect their property. “M”’s products and services 
include sensing technologies to detect smoke or fire, chemicals to extinguish 
fire quickly and efficiently without causing additional damage (sometimes the 
damage caused by the extinguishing material is more than the damage from the 
fire itself), distribution of the extinguishing material, control units and so on. 
Typically, evolutions from other areas are applied to fire extinguishers. There 
are few developments made specifically for this branch, but the application of 
new technology is key to the competitive position. 
 
Ownership structure 
From foundation at the beginning of the 19th century, until 1969 “M” was in the 
sole ownership of the founder’s family. In that year the firm was sold to a large 
German industrial holding extensively active in the metal sector. After more than 
30 years of ownership this holding decided to focus on another sector and as a 
consequence to cut some companies. One of them was “M”. In 2001 the 
ownership transferred to a private equity investor for the first time. Just two 
years later in 2003, the firm was sold again to another private equity investor 
who kept the business in its portfolio for three years. In 2006, the current owner 
took over the company. For the whole time the focus was on growth and 
globalisation, not only from the inside but also from acquisitions. 
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Interaction with investors 
Involvement of the finance investors was mainly in the area of mergers and 
acquisitions. The involvement of the shareholders in the approval processes 
depended on the individual company situation, i.e. performance and profitability. 
When the figures were good and the targets achieved, the C-level management 
was able to act quite autonomously. This does not mean that reporting was not 
required, but that the investors saw no reason to intervene. The investor 
behaviour can be compared to that of parents with a child in school. If the 
grades are good, the parents allow the child lots of freedom. The child is 
allowed to act freely within a predefined arena. If however, the child’s grades 
are bad, then the parents might seek to involve themselves directly by helping 
the child with homework or overcoming blockages in understanding by spending 
time on explaining difficult concepts. Alternatively, the parents may decide to 
pay for additional private lessons. Translated into the major shareholders’ world, 
it means that they become active or involved in underperforming portfolio 
companies as they have the expertise and are able and willing to spend time. 
The alternative is to acquire 3rd party expertise, typically from expert 
consultancies. 
 
Findings from the case of company “M”  
The investors pushed forward the growth of “M”, mainly through mergers and 
acquisitions. The investor team provided support and involvement in the 
integration process after the M&As as well as in the identification of synergies, 
not to mention selection of suitable candidates. Here the investors often came 
up with proposals provided by third-party companies. To be state of the art or 
even ahead of the game in technology is a must for the market leader, but this 
was not a dominant area of influence for the finance investor team. The focus 
was on the build strategy and on the corresponding financial figures, both top 
line and bottom line. The involvement of external advisors and consultants was 
usual, depending on the actual situation of the company. 
 
257 
The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 Exchange is a minimum of once a week depending on the current projects 
which involve the finance investor. If mergers or acquisitions are planned, the 
exchange is frequent – often daily. In a “normal” environment however, a 
weekly call or email exchange can be sufficient, plus monthly reports, which are 
presented in the personal meetings. 
 2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 The finance investor management team and the C-level team of the portfolio 
company. Experts from, e.g. finance or R&D, might be involved for specific 
presentations, such as the annual budget, technology roadmap, etc. 
Furthermore, external consultants may be involved when 3rd party expertise is 
required to drive decisions. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 Phone and email with the portfolio company C-level team are the most usual 
methods of communication in terms of frequency. Email is more common for 
subordinates. A personal meeting is always the preferred option for important 
issues, with the corresponding attendees all at one table. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 A standardised report by the portfolio company is submitted to the finance 
investor each month. The content of this report was agreed by both parties, 
although the finance investor had a “must be included” list for things such as the 
book to bill ratio monthly, year to date, turnover, margins and EBIT. Any 
deviation from the budget potentially raises a question. It is very important to 
have explanations for negative deviations but also positive ones need to be 
explained. This is a positive development compared to the past. While 
historically no one took too much care about the positive deviations, as soon as 
the investor was on board, there were questions about capacities, market 
trends and the effects for the rest of the year or next year. The report is on the 
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one hand an information tool for the shareholder, but at the same time it is also 
the initiator for discussion that can often result in a mutual decision. 
5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 Specialisation may not be the right word. But they do have experience and 
preferences, yes. This can be related to markets or products, but more often it 
is related to more general aspects like business size, business situation and the 
need for action. Experts who have followed a buy and build strategy with 
success tend to seek similar opportunities again and again. Besides the pure 
financial benefits that are targeted, it has the potential for creativity and “a 
game”. But coming back to financials, it can also boost the performance and 
profitability of a business far beyond the potential of a standalone business. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Third-party consultancies are involved in strategic planning regarding the 
manufacturing footprint, market penetration, product portfolio and very 
importantly, the legal or contractual requirements. Besides this, external input, 
and advice is acquired before mergers and acquisitions are made, not only 
during the building phase, but also before the platform business is acquired. 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 Technology strategy is important and in the context of build strategies, it is 
important to understand which companies suit each other in the sense that the 
resulting company value and profitability is higher than the sum of both 
individual companies. Recommendations however, come more frequently from 
external advisors or the portfolio company management than the finance 
investors themselves. In addition, the technology of a portfolio company is 
considered to be just one parameter of many that contribute to the company 
value. 
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7b. If they do influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 A direct influence would be a rare exception. The business is run by the 
company management and not by the finance investor. Otherwise a salary for 
the company top management would be a waste of money. 
7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst?, …) 
 From external consultancies, the portfolio company top management and the 
professional network.  
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 The build strategy aims to gain market share and to improve the overall 
market position. At the same time, all M&A activity influences all areas of the 
business when the acquisitions bring on board full stand-alone businesses. This 
can have a neutral effect, if the new unit remains independent and isolated. But 
as soon as departments, functions or activities are merged, the modified 
starting point has an influence on the target or strategy.  
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 When a portfolio company is healthy and has a clear line of development 
through its technology evolution, which has guided the company through 
different economical environments, then a technology strategy plan presented 
by the management is far more likely to be accepted. It may be that this 
depends pretty much on the portfolio company’s past, i.e. the reasons for the 
takeover by the finance investor. When a portfolio company has to be 
manoeuvred out of a crisis situation, the shareholders will not be able to agree 
to each and every activity, but will require proof that the proposed actions are 
the right ones. If a company has been taken over because the previous journey 
was highly successful and highly profitable, each new influence or disturbance 
may be seen as something negative. When trust is lacking, it is normal for a 
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steering committee with people from the portfolio company, from the finance 
investor and from outside to evaluate new plans or changes in direction. 
10a. What opportunities do the investors have to exert influence on their 
portfolio companies technology strategy? 
 The two most frequently used methods are the installation of personnel 
selected by the finance investor or the use of veto rights in approval 
procedures. Both options are frequently chosen, depending on the situation of 
the individual company. The use of veto rights for investment approval is 
probably the most frequently occurring blocking point, but also annual budgets 
often require several revisions before they are approved. An active influence 
can also be selection by the finance investor of people for the teams who work 
on future strategy plans. 
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 Influence is exerted mainly through steering or approval committees and 
through the involvement of third parties. Managers would not usually hide 
anything, because the reaction of the shareholder is likely to be severe, 
meaning the manager would most probably be fired immediately. On the 
working level, some undercover activity might happen, but on the C-level this is 
unthinkable. 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 The target of all investors is the same – they have cash (or investors to hand 
who are willing to provide cash) available that they want to invest in the most 
profitable way possible. Some prefer investments in smaller companies where 
they can play a more active role while others prefer to buy and sell, depending 
on the performance of a business. In the case of M, a buy and build strategy 
was followed successfully for a few years. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 Yes, but it does not necessarily mean that a no to an investment proposal 
coming from a finance investor would be a yes if the approver was e.g. the CEO 
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of a group company. The general answer is yes, but whether investor 
involvement actually changes decisions is questionable.  
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 In the case of “M”, investors lead the M&A process, while in the individual 
businesses they do not push e.g. specific technologies. They work more from 
the macro point of view. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Some become nervous when the trend of an investment goes in the wrong 
direction. These investor types can often be a real nightmare for the 
management because they attempt micro-managing too many details, which is 
frustrating for the portfolio company management team and slows down 
progress. Others are cool and act very professionally on the basis of clear 
analysis and definition of action. The target to increase the company value and 
to get more out of the investment is the same for all. 
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Appendix 15 - Case study company N 
 
The case of company “N” 
Data collection 
Analysis of the investor – portfolio company relationship of company “M” used 
both primary and secondary data gained through the company websites, press 
releases and articles in specific magazines. Primary data was gained through 
two personal interviews at top management level at the portfolio company and 
one interview with the private equity investor.  
 
Company background information 
The core business of “N” is the production of plastic films for food packaging, 
electronics, pharmaceutics, and medical devices. Customised films are also 
produced as solutions for printing and packaging. The business was founded by 
a German industrial group, that was previously active in the steel industry as 
part of a diversification scheme and in response to the growing demand for 
plastic products in the 1960s. The first operational facility was opened in the 
mid-west of Germany. Expansion outside Germany started from the late 1970s 
beginning with the United States of America. Today the company attains a 
turnover of more than 1 billion EUR with manufacturing sites in 11 countries and 
more than 3,000 employees. By the mid 1990s, “N” had 2 sites, one in Germany 
and the other in the US. From that time on, several acquisitions in all regions 
were made and some joint ventures were founded. This build strategy continues 
today and continues to be successful. The market share is growing steadily and 
the global reputation with regards to the product quality and variety is on a high 
level and still improving. 
 
The role of technology in company “N”  
Technology is of high importance to both the product and the process area. At 
present “N” is world market leader in terms of market share and technology. 
One of the primary targets is to keep and further strengthen this position with 
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strategic partnerships and cooperations. All stakeholders have the same priority 
namely being more efficient in the production process through application of 
latest available technologies as well as a continuous enlargement and 
adjustment of the product portfolio. 
 
Ownership structure 
From the mid 1960s until 2001, “N” was part of the company group that had 
founded the business. Over the years the size and product focus of “N” 
changed permanently through organic growth due to extensive activity in the 
areas of acquisition and strategic partnerships and last but not least because of 
portfolio cleansing when parts of the business were sold on. The company has 
been in the hands of private equity firms since 2001. The first such finance 
investor kept the business from 2001 until 2007 when he sold it for 2.2 times the 
purchase price. Today “N” is in the sole ownership of the second private equity 
investor. The changes in ownership did not impact the direction of the company 
and the growth and build strategy has been continuously adhered to. 
 
Interaction with investors 
The finance investors owning “N” both followed the growth strategy that “N” had 
defined in the late 1990s when it still was part of a German industrial holding. 
The global potential of the expansion strategy was a major attraction for both 
finance investors. While the first investor was satisfied with a return of more 
than double the original investment, the second investor was convinced that 
there was much more potential available. The intervention of the investors was 
mainly aimed at growth and economic sustainability. In other words, it was 
driven by KPIs, achievement of the targets set by the investors and the 
competition’s benchmark. The finance investor team is strongly involved in each 
M&A or JV. The investor team often brings in 3rd parties, e.g. from their 
professional network or consulting companies that the finance investors 
consider to be knowledgeable and valuable in the decision making process. The 
investors are not strongly involved in the day-to-day business and technology 
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strategy is not an area where they involve themselves too much, but it is an 
issue that is in the spotlight. In the investment case of “N” the company is a 
world leader and not just a niche player. Thus permanent product improvement 
and innovation is vital to keep and further strengthen its position.  
 
Findings from the case of company “N”  
In the case of “N”, the private equity investors clearly followed a build strategy, 
in order to maintain and further strengthen the world market leader position of 
the portfolio company. Technology is an important factor in achieving this target, 
especially in the long-term. Thus the technology strategy is of interest to the 
finance investors, but they do not need to understand fully the strategy and the 
roadmap drafted by the portfolio company management. If the finance investors 
are not fully convinced of the validity of the strategy, for whatever reason, they 
might use either their veto right and allow the portfolio company management 
time to rework their plan or bring in external advisors. Investors normally do not 
have the know-how to decide what is the right technology strategy for a 
company in which they have invested.  
 
They have an idea of the direction in which the company should go, in fact it is 
more than an idea and normally the result of a detailed pre-investment analysis. 
Nevertheless, details are not their metier. This is the responsibility of the C-level 
teams in the portfolio companies. Depending on the actual financial situation of 
an investment, intervention can come from the investor side to ensure that the 
financial figures and results remain in a certain corridor, potentially resulting in a 
direct impact on the technology strategy. If costs do have to be cut, there has to 
be discussion about how the available resources are allocated. This is often the 
point when the shareholders and investors discuss technology strategy. Also 
the M&A activities directly impact the product, project and technology portfolio. 
This has to be managed and planned at an early stage of the M&A. Besides the 
immediate effect, this is also very much appreciated by the employees, who in 
some cases are afraid of job cuts.  
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The outcome of the interviews summarised in brief 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
Phone calls and emails are exchanged every week for different reasons, 
usually to inform the investors about specific topics or to ask for approval for 
investments, projects, etc. Experience shows that close involvement, even if it is 
not invasive or detailed can avoid frustration later on, when the investor team 
may criticise something in which they were not involved. 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom(investor/investee)? 
 From the finance investor side, the asset manager team deals with the 
communication and depending on the topic a suitable portfolio team. The asset 
managers from the financial investor and the C-level team of the portfolio 
company are usually responsible for communication and approval. For any kind 
of analysis, the portfolio team members communicate directly with the second 
and third line management of the portfolio company. 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal 
meeting)? 
 Phone and emails are the most frequently used methods (several times a 
week….), while personal meetings taking place on average monthly. 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report 
(key figures, projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 In parallel to the regular exchanges, a monthly report is the rule as private 
equity investors are on board – in fact a report system was in place for the top 
managers of the industrial group who owned “N” before, but with each change 
in ownership the content of the reports changed. At present the most important 
things are KPIs such as the book to bill ratio, top and bottom line results, 
complaints, plan/actual comparisons for all budget figures and the top priority 
projects. The reports are prepared by the portfolio company management and 
submitted to the asset manager team of the finance investor. The investor’s 
back office team often come back with specific questions as they usually the 
ones doing the analysis and number crunching. 
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5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or 
products? If yes, what is the reason/justification (experience, expertise, 
individual interest,…)? 
 Typically, asset managers specialise in markets, product types or business 
types. But some connection with their personal interests or personal 
background often becomes apparent when you talk to the people. 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? 
Who is/can be the 3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting 
company,…)? 
 Third-party companies are more or less permanently involved in a business 
the size of “N”. Starting from the pre-investment phase to identification of 
improvement potential and the selection of possible take-over candidates, 
external advice and expertise is vital for the decision making process. The 
significance of each and every swing in the business top and bottom line is so 
great that permanent expenditure on advice is easily justified. The portfolio 
teams from the finance investor are fully dedicated to supporting the 
investment. Real third-party involvement normally comes from well-known 
consultancies, the professional networks of all stakeholders and also from 
research institutes.  
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio 
companies? 
 It is one of the most important areas of a business, as the selection of the 
right technology is the decisive factor in future success and market position. 
Active involvement of the investors in that area is not typical, as the expertise 
panel is the portfolio company management. The investors get involved when it 
is the time for significant decisions. 
7b.If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that 
(legitimation)? 
 As mentioned before, involvement does not extend to the investors dictating 
a certain direction. 
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7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information (business 
analyst? …) 
 From the experts in their own company, from professional networks and from 
3rd party consultancies and research institutes.  
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance 
strategy influence of an asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 Technology strategy often does play a role when decisions are made 
regarding organisation, finance or marketing strategy. This is because finance 
cuts very often impact, e.g. the expenditure approved for advanced engineering 
projects or HR in general. If there are certain marketing targets, specific 
customers or markets, technology strategy will have to be adapted, as a kind of 
complementary function. Organisation is the least related area. 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy 
of a portfolio company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 The portfolio company management has to prepare and present a robust 
business case that is resistant to questions by the shareholders. When doubts 
remain, no investment approvals are made. In any case, external expertise in 
the form of e.g. market studies is always required as well. 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence in their portfolio 
companies technology strategy? 
 In the cases where the finance investors own 100% or close to 100% of the 
shares, then of course they can exert influence anywhere and everywhere. 
Basically it depends on how the finance investors set the rules and where they 
want to be involved.  
10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide 
information – if yes/no – why? 
 Managers have to communicate openly in front of the majority shareholders; 
otherwise they will be looking for another job in no time at all. Hiding anything 
would only be an option if the manager is having to leave the company anyhow 
because of misbehaviour. 
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10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there 
differences between them? 
 Besides the mutual objective of increasing value, there are for sure 
differences. A build and expansion strategy such as the strategy followed by “N” 
is often found. In the same way however, many investors prefer to buy 
something that is simply too big and not optimised. In either case the activity will 
make the companies fit for long-term survival, but the way of achieving this can 
be different. It can also be said that an investment that is very attractive for one 
investor, may not be attractive for another. It is linked with the individual 
expertise, the interest but also on the willingness to take risk. 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by, e.g. budget decisions? 
 Yes, definitely. When times are hard and cash flow is bad, cost cuts are 
often made even if the effect on important projects is negative. Each business 
has to run by itself and priorities shift. 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and 
organisational learning? If yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 Consultant is the wrong word, a better word would be coach. The business 
still has to be led by the portfolio company management team, but the asset 
managers will challenge them at each and every opportunity. If the portfolio 
company C-level team has done its homework and can explain and justify all 
decisions and actions based on solid and factual analysis, they do not have to 
be afraid. Any playing of games or action based on guesses will immediately 
lead to personnel changes. 
13. Are there cultural differences between different investors? 
 Everyone wants to earn money. Some try to work in a true entrepreneurial 
spirit, meaning they want to grow the business or slim it down, because it is the 
right thing to do. Others just act with a short-term view to make quick profit. The 
first style is much more challenging and ultimately more satisfying. 
269 
Appendix 16 - Summary of tables with key findings per question 
 
1. How often do investor and investee communicate? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exchange between finance 
investor and portfolio company 
once per month or less 
Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
Exchange between finance 
investor and portfolio company 
several times per month 
No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Who (position/responsibility) communicates with whom (investor/investee)? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Portfolio company CEO leads the 
exchange from investee side 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other C-level members of the 
portfolio company are involved 
occasionally 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Portfolio company members below 
C-level are involved occasionally 
No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Asset manager leads the exchange 
from investor side 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other management members from 
investor side are involved 
occasionally (e.g. a defined 
steering committee) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other investor representatives 
such as portfolio teams are 
involved occasionally 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3. Which communication methods are used (e.g. email, phone, personal meeting)? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Use of email Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Use of phone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Use of personal meetings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Most frequently used method e/p e p p e e e/p e/p e/p e/p e/p p e/p e/p 
Preferred method for important 
topics 
pm pm pm p pm pm pm pm pm pm pm pm pm pm 
4. Are reports made regularly? If yes, what is the rough content of the report (key figures, 
projects,…) and who prepares/receives it? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regular reporting is made Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reporting is designed according to 
finance investor request (specific 
KPIs) 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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5. Do the asset managers specialise in specific sectors, markets and/or products? If yes, what is 
the reason/justification (experience, expertise, individual interest,…)? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Activity of portfolio company 
(products, markets...) the reason 
for selection by the asset manager  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Portfolio company size/legal 
form/actual performance was the 
reason for selection by the asset 
manager selection 
No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
6. When do investors involve or request 3rd party know-how and/or advice? Who is/can be the 
3rd party (specific division of investor, independent consulting company,…)? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Third-party expertise is used in 
the pre-investment phase 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Third-party expertise is used for 
specific business cases involving 
e.g. new markets, new technology 
or to generally improve the 
company performance 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7a. How much do investors care about the technology strategy of their portfolio companies? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Finance investor interested in 
technology strategy and considers 
it to be a key area for the 
company market position and 
value 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finance investor wants to be 
involved in the decision making 
process regarding technology 
strategy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is one of the 
main areas watched by the finance 
investor in the investment phase 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finance investor wants to steer 
the direction of the technology 
strategy 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
7b. If they influence the technology strategy, on which basis do they do that (legitimation)? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Do finance investors consider 
themselves or people from their 
teams to have the expertise or 
legitimation to steer technology 
decisions 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Do finance investors verify (w or 
w/o external support) the 
alignment of a technology strategy 
proposed by the portfolio company 
management with the investor 
targets 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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7c. From where do the asset managers receive their information from (business analyst?, …) 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Asset manager is strongly 
supported by back office analysts 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Asset manager is strongly 
supported by a whole portfolio 
team 
Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Third-party consultancies are 
utilised 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Valuable input comes from the 
asset manager network 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8. What is the link / relationship between marketing, organisation, finance strategy influence of an 
asset manager and technology strategy influence? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Dominant finance investor 
involved 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced 
by finance investor involvement in 
finance driven decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced 
by finance investor involvement in 
marketing decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced 
by finance investor involvement in 
organisation specific decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
9. Which tools can/do investors use to measure/judge if the technology strategy of a portfolio 
company will guarantee success in mid to long-term? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Do specific tools exist to evaluate 
technology / technology strategy 
of a portfolio company 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Technology / technology strategy 
is evaluated in the context of an 
overall business case (including 
financial parameters) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10a. What opportunities do investors have to exert influence on their portfolio companies 
technology strategy? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Percentage of ownership would 
allow the finance investor to 
dictate a certain technology 
strategy 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Technology strategy is dictated by 
finance investor 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Technology strategy is indirectly 
influenced by finance investor (see 
question 8) 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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10b. What are the mechanisms/dynamics of influence? Do managers hide information - if yes/no - 
why? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Can (and do) portfolio company 
managers influence directions of 
action by “adjusting” the 
specification of information 
packages 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10c. Are all the investors (and asset managers) the same or are there differences between them? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Investor focuses on companies 
with specific parameters (e.g. 
SMEs just out of insolvency...) 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Investor doing fundamental re-
organisation of companies (buy 
and build, build and burst...)  
No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personality and experience of 
asset managers impacts their 
course of action 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
11. Is technology strategy indirectly influenced by e.g. budget decisions? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Technology strategy is influenced 
by finance investor involvement in 
finance driven decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced 
by finance investor involvement in 
marketing decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology strategy is influenced 
by finance investor involvement in 
organisation decisions 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
12. Do investors act as consultants concerning technology strategy and organisational learning? If 
yes, what are the consequences and results? 
 C A S E 
O B S E R V A T I O N A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Investors act as consultants for 
organisational learning 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investors act as consultants for 
technology strategy 
No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
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